Narrative:

A C320 entered our sector from the south; handed off from sector 10. His routing was dsd...sea; which takes him over mt. Hood; where the mia is 13;200. Air carrier X's altitude was 12;000. I asked if he wanted to climb to 14;000 or a reroute around the mountain. Air carrier X responded that he wanted a reroute; so I gave him ltj…sea; with the intention to clear him direct sea through the mountains once he was clear of mt. Hood. Ltj...sea passes through the mt. Adams mia of 14;300; but because there would be no frequency changes and it would be a long time before air carrier X would reach it; we were comfortable with the routing. When air carrier X neared the 34 boundary; I called him to give him a reroute. He did not respond. I tried again three times and eventually began relays through other aircraft in the area and asked surrounding sectors along his route to try to raise him on their frequencies and on guard. Management also asked other sectors and facilities to try to reach air carrier X. Air carrier X proceeded through sector 34 and had entered the mt. Adams mia level at 12;000 before he finally reached sector 32; two sectors from us; and turned to avoid the mountain. It was never made clear to us why air carrier X had gone off frequency and could not hear calls from multiple transmitter sites and aircraft. It's difficult to say what the best solution here would be. The safe solution seems to be to either climb air carrier X to an altitude safe for his direction of flight or to give him a route that would definitely clear mt. Hood and mt. Adams. On the other hand; there's not a clear definition of how far is a reasonable distance when it comes to protecting for distant mias. Is it 50 miles beyond your boundary? 100? What if I had used my original plan of giving him a vector? He'd still be pointed at mt. Adams; so is that unsafe routing? Should you provide extended or alternate instructions in the case of a NORDO; and if so; is that too cumbersome to be practical? This was a perfect example of the analogy of the swiss cheese lining up to create a dangerous situation. In retrospect; because mt. Adams was fairly close to our area; it would have been wiser to issue a routing to take air carrier X past mt. Hood and through mt. Adams and mt. St. Helens. With that said; mt. Rainier is not far past either of those two mountains; but it's far enough out that a B area controller is not planning routes around it. There's a balance between safety and practicality; and this incident gives me a lot to think about concerning where those two meet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSE Controller described a MOCA/MVA event when an aircraft rerouted to avoid higher terrain then failed to answer attempts by ATC to establish communications.

Narrative: A C320 entered our sector from the South; handed off from Sector 10. His routing was DSD...SEA; which takes him over Mt. Hood; where the MIA is 13;200. Air Carrier X's altitude was 12;000. I asked if he wanted to climb to 14;000 or a reroute around the mountain. Air Carrier X responded that he wanted a reroute; so I gave him LTJ…SEA; with the intention to clear him direct SEA through the mountains once he was clear of Mt. Hood. LTJ...SEA passes through the Mt. Adams MIA of 14;300; but because there would be no frequency changes and it would be a long time before Air Carrier X would reach it; we were comfortable with the routing. When Air Carrier X neared the 34 boundary; I called him to give him a reroute. He did not respond. I tried again three times and eventually began relays through other aircraft in the area and asked surrounding sectors along his route to try to raise him on their frequencies and on guard. Management also asked other sectors and facilities to try to reach Air Carrier X. Air Carrier X proceeded through Sector 34 and had entered the Mt. Adams MIA level at 12;000 before he finally reached Sector 32; two sectors from us; and turned to avoid the mountain. It was never made clear to us why Air Carrier X had gone off frequency and could not hear calls from multiple transmitter sites and aircraft. It's difficult to say what the best solution here would be. The safe solution seems to be to either climb Air Carrier X to an altitude safe for his direction of flight or to give him a route that would definitely clear Mt. Hood and Mt. Adams. On the other hand; there's not a clear definition of how far is a reasonable distance when it comes to protecting for distant MIAs. Is it 50 miles beyond your boundary? 100? What if I had used my original plan of giving him a vector? He'd still be pointed at Mt. Adams; so is that unsafe routing? Should you provide extended or alternate instructions in the case of a NORDO; and if so; is that too cumbersome to be practical? This was a perfect example of the analogy of the swiss cheese lining up to create a dangerous situation. In retrospect; because Mt. Adams was fairly close to our Area; it would have been wiser to issue a routing to take Air Carrier X past Mt. Hood and through Mt. Adams and Mt. St. Helens. With that said; Mt. Rainier is not far past either of those two mountains; but it's far enough out that a B Area Controller is not planning routes around it. There's a balance between safety and practicality; and this incident gives me a lot to think about concerning where those two meet.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.