Narrative:

About halfway into our flight; while cruising at FL320; we got the hydraulic G eng 1 pump lo pr ECAM. We waited to execute the ECAM to make sure it was not spurious; and because I had just gotten back from a lavatory break and the flight attendant was just delivering our meals. No other ecams were displayed. The bottom screen displayed zero pressure as well as zero quantity on the green hydraulic system. I was pilot flying and captain was pilot monitoring. We discussed the issue and then began to execute the ECAM. We realized we lost all green hydraulic fluid. This meant we would have to gravity extend the gear; and that we had lost a lot of stuff. We also had to apply the landing distance procedure. Captain wanted to divert; but I advocated getting a hold of maintenance control and dispatch before deciding anything. We contacted dispatch and maintenance control; discussed our problem; potential threats and options. After realizing our gross weight was still way over max landing weight; we all agreed to continue to destination. Dispatch and maintenance control would coordinate our emergency arrival; and we all agreed that we would declare emergency to ATC closer to destination. Captain notified the flight attendants and told them to finish service early. We studied the QRH and FM for any further notes; warnings and cautions and briefed the approach and arrival. On the second center frequency; we declared our emergency and let every new ATC sector thereafter know that we were the emergency aircraft. We asked for the longest runway and the emergency equipment and tow vehicles to meet us. On approach control frequency; they gave us direct [to the IAF] for the ILS. Captain became pilot flying and I gravity extended the gear successfully. I accomplished all normal and non-normal checklists. After this; we kept getting an annoying and repeated ECAM that kept flashing and going away very quickly. Captain and I think we were seeing the hyd G rsver lo lvl ECAM because the hydraulic fluid was sloshing around in the reservoir. It was momentary; but repeated itself many times. We elected not to emergency cancel this ECAM. Approach vectored us west across the localizer course because the ILS was not turned on and up and running yet. We were then given a 020 degree heading to intercept final. We told approach that we had the airport insight; but we wanted to follow the glide slope down on final. ATC cleared us for the visual approach; but now had the ILS identified with good signals. The remainder of the approach would've been normal except for 2 RA's on final. At approximately 9;000 ft; approach called out traffic at 5 o'clock above and behind us (being vectored to [a parallel runway]; I think). Approach control said that the traffic had us insight. At first; looking back out my right side window; I couldn't see traffic. But then we got a climbing RA. I looked out my right side window again; and saw an rj at 5 o'clock descending and turning northeasterly. I told the captain I had the rj insight. I recommended continuing since I saw we were not converging. A second different RA came on; I looked back again and saw that the rj was still no factor again and told the captain again. I told him I was going to select TA on the TCAS. With all that distraction; the captain got 1+ dot high and 1+ dot left of course which I announced. He was able to stabilize the approach well within limits and landed uneventfully. On short final; the aircraft seemed to wallow and wing rock back and forth. Captain noted it was more sluggish than normal. We stopped on the runway and arff and airport ops vehicles met us. We accomplished the shutdown checklist and the tow-in procedure and got towed in by a tug.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer experiences a Green Hydraulic system failure at FL320 and the crew elects to continue to destination.

Narrative: About halfway into our flight; while cruising at FL320; we got the HYD G Eng 1 Pump Lo Pr ECAM. We waited to execute the ECAM to make sure it was not spurious; and because I had just gotten back from a lavatory break and the Flight Attendant was just delivering our meals. No other ECAMs were displayed. The bottom screen displayed zero pressure as well as zero quantity on the Green Hydraulic System. I was Pilot Flying and Captain was Pilot Monitoring. We discussed the issue and then began to execute the ECAM. We realized we lost all Green Hydraulic fluid. This meant we would have to gravity extend the gear; and that we had lost a lot of stuff. We also had to apply the Landing Distance Procedure. Captain wanted to divert; but I advocated getting a hold of Maintenance Control and Dispatch before deciding anything. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control; discussed our problem; potential threats and options. After realizing our Gross Weight was still way over Max Landing Weight; we all agreed to continue to destination. Dispatch and Maintenance Control would coordinate our emergency arrival; and we all agreed that we would declare emergency to ATC closer to destination. Captain notified the flight attendants and told them to finish service early. We studied the QRH and FM for any further notes; warnings and cautions and briefed the approach and arrival. On the second Center frequency; we declared our emergency and let every new ATC sector thereafter know that we were the emergency aircraft. We asked for the longest runway and the emergency equipment and tow vehicles to meet us. On Approach Control frequency; they gave us direct [to the IAF] for the ILS. Captain became Pilot Flying and I gravity extended the gear successfully. I accomplished all normal and non-normal checklists. After this; we kept getting an annoying and repeated ECAM that kept flashing and going away very quickly. Captain and I think we were seeing the Hyd G Rsver LO LVL ECAM because the hydraulic fluid was sloshing around in the reservoir. It was momentary; but repeated itself many times. We elected not to Emergency Cancel this ECAM. Approach vectored us west across the localizer course because the ILS was not turned on and up and running yet. We were then given a 020 degree heading to intercept final. We told Approach that we had the airport insight; but we wanted to follow the glide slope down on final. ATC cleared us for the visual approach; but now had the ILS identified with good signals. The remainder of the approach would've been normal except for 2 RA's on final. At approximately 9;000 FT; Approach called out traffic at 5 o'clock above and behind us (being vectored to [a parallel runway]; I think). Approach Control said that the traffic had us insight. At first; looking back out my right side window; I couldn't see traffic. But then we got a Climbing RA. I looked out my right side window again; and saw an RJ at 5 o'clock descending and turning northeasterly. I told the Captain I had the RJ insight. I recommended continuing since I saw we were not converging. A second different RA came on; I looked back again and saw that the RJ was still no factor again and told the Captain again. I told him I was going to select TA on the TCAS. With all that distraction; the Captain got 1+ dot high and 1+ dot left of course which I announced. He was able to stabilize the approach well within limits and landed uneventfully. On short final; the aircraft seemed to wallow and wing rock back and forth. Captain noted it was more sluggish than normal. We stopped on the runway and ARFF and Airport Ops vehicles met us. We accomplished the Shutdown Checklist and the Tow-In Procedure and got towed in by a tug.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.