Narrative:

I was working [3] sectors combined. Weather was clear and not a factor. ZZZ runway xxr was closed for a month; so single runway operations at ZZZ; requiring increased separation and very little margin of error for the tower. A B737-800 was cleared for the visual approach and was number one for the airport. The B737-800 flew a long downwind which forced me to change the plan. I then made another company 737-800 number 4 instead of 2. The second 737-800 eventually went around due to traffic on runway; a LR35. Tower called and coordinated the go around on the second 737-800 giving a 270 heading and I verifed 3;000. I did not have immediate communications with the second 737-800 and was worried that the [737-800 was] heading was towards higher MVA's. The lear 35 checked in out of 2.7 for 5;000. The information I had was the aircraft was on the departure. I began to vector the second 737-800 for resequence with the push of aircraft inbound. I know the seond 737-800 comes in from the ocean and finding a hole is a priority. The sequence of aircraft from the south was acceptable but recognized a [another airliner] had slowed prematurely. I began speed control and vectors on all aircraft on final. My focus was well south of the airport. The lear 35 then called and asked if he should still be on a 300 heading. At that point; the lear 35 was in [another sector's] airspace and right in the strike zone for the ZZZ1 final. I called [the other airspace's controller] and tried to coordinate the runaway lear 35 with a point out. At first the [other] controller stated point out approved on the second 737-800; the previous go-around that I had already pointed out with automation; and not the lear 35 in the middle of the ZZZ1 final. I stated the lear 35 is the point out and was a runaway. I also called [another sector] with a point out. I let both sectors know I was going east with the lear 35. I called traffic for the lear 35 on a third 737-800; inbound to ZZZ1 and a 737-700; inbound to ZZZ2. I attempted to get the lear 35 out of harm's way with big turns and 'immediate and expedite' phraseology. I was informed later that separation was lost on both. I was also later informed the 737-800 went around a second time and was understanably angry. I should have controlled the first 737-800 base turn to final. I think staffing in the tower should be reviewed for single runway operations at night. The flms should be at the tower later during runway closures. All aircraft out of ZZZ shoud be required to subscribe to pre departure clearance services for clearance delivery. The majority of departure issues off ZZZ are from GA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON Controller described a multiple go-around event to the same inbound listing procedural restrictions and controller judgement as causal factors.

Narrative: I was working [3] sectors combined. Weather was clear and not a factor. ZZZ Runway XXR was closed for a month; so single runway operations at ZZZ; requiring increased separation and very little margin of error for the Tower. A B737-800 was cleared for the visual approach and was number one for the airport. The B737-800 flew a long downwind which forced me to change the plan. I then made another Company 737-800 number 4 instead of 2. The second 737-800 eventually went around due to traffic on runway; a LR35. Tower called and coordinated the go around on the second 737-800 giving a 270 heading and I verifed 3;000. I did not have immediate communications with the second 737-800 and was worried that the [737-800 was] heading was towards higher MVA's. The Lear 35 checked in out of 2.7 for 5;000. The information I had was the aircraft was on the departure. I began to vector the second 737-800 for resequence with the push of aircraft inbound. I know the seond 737-800 comes in from the ocean and finding a hole is a priority. The sequence of aircraft from the south was acceptable but recognized a [another airliner] had slowed prematurely. I began speed control and vectors on all aircraft on final. My focus was well south of the airport. The Lear 35 then called and asked if he should still be on a 300 heading. At that point; the Lear 35 was in [another sector's] airspace and right in the strike zone for the ZZZ1 final. I called [the other airspace's Controller] and tried to coordinate the runaway Lear 35 with a point out. At first the [other] Controller stated point out approved on the second 737-800; the previous go-around that I had already pointed out with automation; and not the Lear 35 in the middle of the ZZZ1 final. I stated the Lear 35 is the point out and was a runaway. I also called [another sector] with a point out. I let both sectors know I was going east with the Lear 35. I called traffic for the Lear 35 on a third 737-800; inbound to ZZZ1 and a 737-700; inbound to ZZZ2. I attempted to get the Lear 35 out of harm's way with big turns and 'immediate and expedite' phraseology. I was informed later that separation was lost on both. I was also later informed the 737-800 went around a second time and was understanably angry. I should have controlled the first 737-800 base turn to final. I think staffing in the Tower should be reviewed for single runway operations at night. The FLMs should be at the Tower later during runway closures. All aircraft out of ZZZ shoud be required to subscribe to PDC services for clearance delivery. The majority of departure issues off ZZZ are from GA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.