Narrative:

A B757-200 aircraft had the fuel flow governer changed previously for slow/no start condition on engine number 2. Removal and replacement (right/right) was accomplished in accordance with aircraft maintenance manual (amm) 73-21-01-xx; and the jet run-up handbook (jrh). Five [different] engine tests were performed [including test X] and the item fact'ed [cleared]. The engine still did not start reliably after return from engine run and further troubleshooting was conducted by next shifts. The last test performed was test X; [for the] acceleration/deceleration test. This test goes past the point of the part power stop (pps); which would not have been possible had the stop been engaged. This was confirmed by ground personnel and rii. The part power stop is in a location that lends readily as a handhold rather than [compared to] cables or plumbing. It is very likely that during the following maintenance troubleshooting and repair the stop was inadvertently engaged. There is no positive lockout mechanism. [Recommend] some type of safety could be installed to prevent inadvertent engagement of the part power stop. Equipment malfunction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about a Part Power Stop (PPS) that was inadvertently engaged on a B757-200 aircraft engine after a Fuel Flow Governor replacement. Technician also noted the lack of a positive lockout mechanism to properly secure the PPS.

Narrative: A B757-200 aircraft had the Fuel Flow Governer changed previously for slow/no start condition on Engine Number 2. Removal and Replacement (R/R) was accomplished IAW Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 73-21-01-XX; and the Jet Run-up Handbook (JRH). Five [different] Engine tests were performed [including Test X] and the item FACT'ed [Cleared]. The engine still did not start reliably after return from engine run and further troubleshooting was conducted by next shifts. The last test performed was Test X; [for the] Acceleration/Deceleration Test. This Test goes past the point of the Part Power Stop (PPS); which would not have been possible had the stop been engaged. This was confirmed by ground personnel and RII. The Part Power Stop is in a location that lends readily as a handhold rather than [compared to] cables or plumbing. It is very likely that during the following maintenance troubleshooting and repair the stop was inadvertently engaged. There is no positive lockout mechanism. [Recommend] some type of safety could be installed to prevent inadvertent engagement of the Part Power Stop. Equipment malfunction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.