Narrative:

The [pilot] applicant had successfully completed [the entire] commercial [airplane multi engine land] test except for the single engine instrument approach and the single engine landing. After intercepting the approach course at the [initial approach fix] he was told to contact the tower. The tower asked for a report on 3 mile final. The applicant responded properly; but did not start down to the next applicable altitude and began switching pages on the garmin 530. He then reloaded the approach; and said something like; I don't see the distance. I responded to a traffic call and when I found the traffic I noticed he still had not descended more than a few hundred feet. This was the first and seemingly correctable distraction. We received another traffic call and I reported traffic on base; a cessna 152 in sight. We were about 10 KTS fast and I was concerned about the closure rate. As we approached the [final approach fix] he was 1;000 ft high. School procedure calls for him to put the gear down at the [final approach fix]; but I was distracted and did not follow through to confirm. I made a note to debrief him about the option of doing a missed approach and setting it up again. The applicant descended aggressively and got to MDA at the proper time. I had expected him to level off at MDA; but instead he increased his descent through 400 ft and continued to approach the runway. I said; you didn't level off at MDA. He said; I had the runway in sight. The school procedure calls for a 400 foot check of the gear; but we were both distracted by this discussion and missed that one. He started his flare at the runway aiming point and floated quite a distance due to excess speed. About 3 seconds before we would have touched down someone on the frequency said go-around go-around! The applicant added power and did a successful go around. I asked why the go-around; and they said; your gear is up. That is when I realized how close we had come. We had missed two required call outs and had come within inches of landing gear up. The applicant had been knowledgeable on the oral portion of the test and had missed only one question on the knowledge (computer based) test. He had performed well on each flight task; and seemed to have the approach properly set up. We had multiple distractions during critical times which masked the fact that we had not put the gear down at the proper time. It was the end of a beautiful day; and I was fairly relaxed rather than anticipating errors. The weather had changed from several cool days to sunny and quite warm. I had not adjusted my fluid intake. I did not realize it at the time; but later at dinner I finished off two soft drinks before the food was served. I usually don't finish one during the entire meal. The applicant was more familiar with the garmin 430 and could not find his page on the 530. This caused him to try several things to find it. I was wearing a new pair of sunglasses; which was dramatically different than my old ones. I remember feeling a little uneasy with the bright orange presentation. The right seat pilot cannot see the gear down lights when the left seat pilot has his hands on the throttles. The right seat pilot has to lean over to see around his hand. This true of many training airplanes with retractable gear.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The multi engine check ride almost went awry until the examiner and applicant were advised over the radio to go-around due to their landing gear not being extended.

Narrative: The [pilot] applicant had successfully completed [the entire] commercial [airplane multi engine land] test except for the single engine instrument approach and the single engine landing. After intercepting the approach course at the [initial approach fix] he was told to contact the Tower. The Tower asked for a report on 3 mile final. The applicant responded properly; but did not start down to the next applicable altitude and began switching pages on the Garmin 530. He then reloaded the approach; and said something like; I don't see the distance. I responded to a traffic call and when I found the traffic I noticed he still had not descended more than a few hundred feet. This was the first and seemingly correctable distraction. We received another traffic call and I reported traffic on base; a Cessna 152 in sight. We were about 10 KTS fast and I was concerned about the closure rate. As we approached the [final approach fix] he was 1;000 FT high. School procedure calls for him to put the gear down at the [final approach fix]; but I was distracted and did not follow through to confirm. I made a note to debrief him about the option of doing a missed approach and setting it up again. The applicant descended aggressively and got to MDA at the proper time. I had expected him to level off at MDA; but instead he increased his descent through 400 FT and continued to approach the runway. I said; you didn't level off at MDA. He said; I had the runway in sight. The school procedure calls for a 400 foot check of the gear; but we were both distracted by this discussion and missed that one. He started his flare at the runway aiming point and floated quite a distance due to excess speed. About 3 seconds before we would have touched down someone on the frequency said GO-AROUND GO-AROUND! The applicant added power and did a successful go around. I asked why the go-around; and they said; your gear is up. That is when I realized how close we had come. We had missed two required call outs and had come within inches of landing gear up. The applicant had been knowledgeable on the oral portion of the test and had missed only one question on the knowledge (computer based) test. He had performed well on each flight task; and seemed to have the approach properly set up. We had multiple distractions during critical times which masked the fact that we had not put the gear down at the proper time. It was the end of a beautiful day; and I was fairly relaxed rather than anticipating errors. The weather had changed from several cool days to sunny and quite warm. I had not adjusted my fluid intake. I did not realize it at the time; but later at dinner I finished off two soft drinks before the food was served. I usually don't finish one during the entire meal. The applicant was more familiar with the Garmin 430 and could not find his page on the 530. This caused him to try several things to find it. I was wearing a new pair of sunglasses; which was dramatically different than my old ones. I remember feeling a little uneasy with the bright orange presentation. The right seat pilot cannot see the Gear Down lights when the left seat pilot has his hands on the throttles. The right seat pilot has to lean over to see around his hand. This true of many training airplanes with retractable gear.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.