Narrative:

Second leg of a long night of flying. Several early morning thundershowers in the area. Moderate rain and turbulence on the ILS final to 02L at wsss. I was pilot not flying. As we approached minimums with the field in sight; I called out to the captain that we still had 23 knots of wind on the tail. He elected to execute a go-around on short final. When I announced going around to the tower; they told us to continue runway heading and climb to 3;000 ft. The go-around had been executed properly; and the captain had me confirm that we were in heading select. We were. As we began accelerating to clean up above 1;000 ft; we were given a right turn to 090. At some point while I was moving the flaps and pulling the checklist up; the captain inadvertently selected LNAV; and I did not immediately catch it. The published missed approach procedure was a left turn to 335 if I remember correctly. So the airplane began a slow turn left instead of right. I didn't immediately notice (we were IMC in rough air and rain). After a few seconds I realized the airplane wasn't doing what I expected and pointed it out to the captain. He went back to heading select to reverse the turn and go right. As this was happening; ATC queried us. They asked if we were in a left turn. I stated that we were 'correcting back to the right'. The controller opted to give us a new vector to the left to avoid opposing traffic. We never got any TCAS alerts. The controller continued giving us vectors; stating they were for the ILS 02L. But then unexpectedly to us; he gave us an intercept to final and cleared us for the approach. We were still north of the airport. I queried him three times; and he finally realized that he was meaning to say 20R. We were a bit rushed configuring/slowing/finishing checklists; but we were able to finish up right as were crossing 1;000 ft AGL and completed an uneventful landing. We both made mistakes at the end of a long night of flying in some very challenging/demanding environmental conditions. I think the captain just mistakenly pushed the wrong button. Simple as that. He is a good pilot; and clearly understands the difference in the modes of the autopilot. My mistake was being head down during the clean-up and not keeping my eye on the MCP/FMA's to make sure he was doing exactly what I expected. I need to continue working at pilot not flying skills. For the vast majority of this flight; I think I was doing a nice job. Helping with weather avoidance; calling out the tailwind on final; etc. A momentary lapse during the go-around bit us though. In all phases of flight I need to be diligent in monitoring the MCP and FMA's to make sure the airplane is doing exactly what we're cleared for. It also would've been a good idea to talk through the go-around procedure before we commenced the approach. We mentioned that a go-around or hold might be a possibility; but never talked through it step-by-step.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew experiences a strong tailwind on short final during approach in turbulence and rain to Runway 02L then elects to go around at low altitude. The Controller issues a heading and altitude but the flying Captain inadvertently selects LNAV due to fatigue and turbulence. The Controller then issues vectors for landing Runway 02L and repeats the runway designation several times when queried by the crew; before finally realizing his mistake and stating Runway 20R. A normal landing ensues.

Narrative: Second leg of a long night of flying. Several early morning thundershowers in the area. Moderate rain and turbulence on the ILS final to 02L at WSSS. I was pilot not flying. As we approached minimums with the field in sight; I called out to the Captain that we still had 23 knots of wind on the tail. He elected to execute a go-around on short final. When I announced going around to the Tower; they told us to continue runway heading and climb to 3;000 FT. The go-around had been executed properly; and the Captain had me confirm that we were in Heading Select. We were. As we began accelerating to clean up above 1;000 FT; we were given a right turn to 090. At some point while I was moving the flaps and pulling the checklist up; the Captain inadvertently selected LNAV; and I did not immediately catch it. The published missed approach procedure was a left turn to 335 if I remember correctly. So the airplane began a slow turn left instead of right. I didn't immediately notice (we were IMC in rough air and rain). After a few seconds I realized the airplane wasn't doing what I expected and pointed it out to the Captain. He went back to Heading Select to reverse the turn and go right. As this was happening; ATC queried us. They asked if we were in a left turn. I stated that we were 'correcting back to the right'. The Controller opted to give us a new vector to the left to avoid opposing traffic. We never got any TCAS alerts. The Controller continued giving us vectors; stating they were for the ILS 02L. But then unexpectedly to us; he gave us an intercept to final and cleared us for the approach. We were still north of the airport. I queried him three times; and he finally realized that he was meaning to say 20R. We were a bit rushed configuring/slowing/finishing checklists; but we were able to finish up right as were crossing 1;000 FT AGL and completed an uneventful landing. We both made mistakes at the end of a long night of flying in some very challenging/demanding environmental conditions. I think the Captain just mistakenly pushed the wrong button. Simple as that. He is a good pilot; and clearly understands the difference in the modes of the autopilot. My mistake was being head down during the clean-up and not keeping my eye on the MCP/FMA's to make sure he was doing exactly what I expected. I need to continue working at pilot not flying skills. For the vast majority of this flight; I think I was doing a nice job. Helping with weather avoidance; calling out the tailwind on final; etc. A momentary lapse during the go-around bit us though. In all phases of flight I need to be diligent in monitoring the MCP and FMA's to make sure the airplane is doing exactly what we're cleared for. It also would've been a good idea to talk through the go-around procedure before we commenced the approach. We mentioned that a go-around or hold might be a possibility; but never talked through it step-by-step.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.