Narrative:

After discharging our passenger we called for and received our route clearance back to home base. We then called ground control who cleared us to runway 12L with a right turn on the parallel taxiway coming out of ramp and hold short of runway 17. As we approached the taxiway, which is also runway 13/31, we observed an aircraft on short final for runway 13 and we stopped prior to entry. Shortly thereafter ground told us to hold short of the taxiway for landing traffic. Once the aircraft was clear of runway 13, we were told to continue taxi to runway 12L, and hold short of runway 17. As the pilot taxied the aircraft, the captain and the flight engineer began the before takeoff checklist, and we discussed ground's late call for us to hold short for the landing traffic. The next call we received was, ' , you were told to hold short of runway 17,' followed by, ' , you are on runway 17.' we acknowledged the call and expedited our taxi to clear the runway. An small aircraft had landed on runway 17 and was in the process of taxiing to the end. Ground instructed us to contact the tower supervisor upon return to home base. In my conversation with him, I found it interesting that he acknowledged recent problems with aircraft movement at the airport. Perhaps part of the problem is with his controllers. Needless to say, the flight crew was very concerned about the incident and factors that contributed to it: 1) even thought the crew had been into lambert before, it is a difficult airport to work at night because of ATC controllers, runway/taxiway markings (there are no hold lines painted for runway 17; there are runway sights to the right of the taxiway), and density of traffic on the radios. 2) the crew, consisting of 2 military pilots and a civilian flight engineer, were relatively new to the aircraft. We are in continuing effort to train the flight engineer in his responsibilities with the crew. 3) when in doubt about a clearance, either ask for clarification, if necessary, or review the appropriate publication prior to aircraft movement. 4) performance of a checklist causes a diversion of attention from outside of the aircraft and can lead to unintended negative results. There is an appropriate time and place to accomplish checklists.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIL FLT CREW TAXIING FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY WITH LNDG TRAFFIC.

Narrative: AFTER DISCHARGING OUR PAX WE CALLED FOR AND RECEIVED OUR ROUTE CLRNC BACK TO HOME BASE. WE THEN CALLED GND CTL WHO CLRED US TO RWY 12L WITH A RIGHT TURN ON THE PARALLEL TXWY COMING OUT OF RAMP AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17. AS WE APCHED THE TXWY, WHICH IS ALSO RWY 13/31, WE OBSERVED AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 13 AND WE STOPPED PRIOR TO ENTRY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER GND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF THE TXWY FOR LNDG TFC. ONCE THE ACFT WAS CLR OF RWY 13, WE WERE TOLD TO CONTINUE TAXI TO RWY 12L, AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17. AS THE PLT TAXIED THE ACFT, THE CAPT AND THE FE BEGAN THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, AND WE DISCUSSED GND'S LATE CALL FOR US TO HOLD SHORT FOR THE LNDG TFC. THE NEXT CALL WE RECEIVED WAS, ' , YOU WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17,' FOLLOWED BY, ' , YOU ARE ON RWY 17.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL AND EXPEDITED OUR TAXI TO CLR THE RWY. AN SMA HAD LANDED ON RWY 17 AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF TAXIING TO THE END. GND INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT THE TWR SUPVR UPON RETURN TO HOME BASE. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM, I FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED RECENT PROBS WITH ACFT MOVEMENT AT THE ARPT. PERHAPS PART OF THE PROB IS WITH HIS CTLRS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE FLC WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO IT: 1) EVEN THOUGHT THE CREW HAD BEEN INTO LAMBERT BEFORE, IT IS A DIFFICULT ARPT TO WORK AT NIGHT BECAUSE OF ATC CTLRS, RWY/TXWY MARKINGS (THERE ARE NO HOLD LINES PAINTED FOR RWY 17; THERE ARE RWY SIGHTS TO THE RIGHT OF THE TXWY), AND DENSITY OF TFC ON THE RADIOS. 2) THE CREW, CONSISTING OF 2 MIL PLTS AND A CIVILIAN FE, WERE RELATIVELY NEW TO THE ACFT. WE ARE IN CONTINUING EFFORT TO TRAIN THE FE IN HIS RESPONSIBILITIES WITH THE CREW. 3) WHEN IN DOUBT ABOUT A CLRNC, EITHER ASK FOR CLARIFICATION, IF NECESSARY, OR REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE PUBLICATION PRIOR TO ACFT MOVEMENT. 4) PERFORMANCE OF A CHKLIST CAUSES A DIVERSION OF ATTN FROM OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT AND CAN LEAD TO UNINTENDED NEGATIVE RESULTS. THERE IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME AND PLACE TO ACCOMPLISH CHKLISTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.