Narrative:

The flight was from the southeast to ord. The ATIS was received about 25 mins from ord, indicating 27L/right were the landing runways. The captain and I set the radios, the FMC and the mode control panel accordingly. Approximately 25 mins from ord, chicago center gave us large heading changes (70 degrees left, followed by 130 degrees right), and was repeated several mins later for traffic sep. We came approximately 40 mi from ord. The captain elected to inform the passenger the reason for the turns and the delay. I was covering the radios and flying the airplane. We were on vectors when center cleared us to chicago approach. I checked in and received another vector. The controller then said that all aircraft on the frequency would land 32L. Looking at my map display I could see we were almost on the extended centerline. We were then told to intercept 32L, proceed inbound, descend and maintain 8000'. The captain, at this time, had finished his passenger announcement. I informed him of all the changes. The aircraft was about 1 mi east of the extended centerline and instead of turning right, turned left instead, away from the localizer. This puzzled me, so I disconnected the autoplt and automatic throttles and turned back inbound. The controller commented our deviation left of course, but we were correcting. My flight director was pointing left, the captain's was pointing right. The controller asked us to cross litky intersection at 7000'. Most intxns are displayed on the ehsi. Litky, however, was not. I asked the captain where it was. He said 21-1 DME. We were right at litky at this time. My altitude had dropped to 6500'. The controller commented again about a mile inside of litky and said to maintain altitude for now to descend to cross lumpy intersection at 5000'. The remainer of the flight was uneventful. I felt extremely rushed from the switch to approach controller onward. Many factors changed at the last minute. I did not have time to review the 32L approach and brief it. Litky was an unfamiliar intersection to me. The flight directors were giving erroneous indications I thought, until I realized I had not turned the obs to 320 degrees--it was still on 270 degrees for the other runway. The controller gave the litky command west/O much lead time. While trying to get caught up, the altitude dropped below 7000'. This particular day started with a mild sore throat and I had noticed my left ear did not equalize pressure easily during the descent, which for me, usually indicates the onset of a cold. I know that my ability to stay ahead of the airplane is affected. I did not feel unfit to fly, however, just not as alert. If I could re-enact this flight, I should have switched all the EFIS off and flown conventional instruments and not be distracted by other factors which shortened the time even further to assess the changes taking place. I believe the controller's demands were not totally unreasonable, even though at that point in the flight 27 left/right would have been better as we had already briefed those approachs. Looking out for other traffic below 10000' is compromised if there is a major change of plan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG HAD DIFFICULTY IN INTERCEPT OF NEWLY ASSIGNED RWY LOCALIZER FOR APCH AND MISSED CROSSING RESTRICTION.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS FROM THE SE TO ORD. THE ATIS WAS RECEIVED ABOUT 25 MINS FROM ORD, INDICATING 27L/R WERE THE LNDG RWYS. THE CAPT AND I SET THE RADIOS, THE FMC AND THE MODE CTL PANEL ACCORDINGLY. APPROX 25 MINS FROM ORD, CHICAGO CENTER GAVE US LARGE HDG CHANGES (70 DEGS LEFT, FOLLOWED BY 130 DEGS RIGHT), AND WAS REPEATED SEVERAL MINS LATER FOR TFC SEP. WE CAME APPROX 40 MI FROM ORD. THE CAPT ELECTED TO INFORM THE PAX THE REASON FOR THE TURNS AND THE DELAY. I WAS COVERING THE RADIOS AND FLYING THE AIRPLANE. WE WERE ON VECTORS WHEN CENTER CLRED US TO CHICAGO APCH. I CHKED IN AND RECEIVED ANOTHER VECTOR. THE CTLR THEN SAID THAT ALL ACFT ON THE FREQ WOULD LAND 32L. LOOKING AT MY MAP DISPLAY I COULD SEE WE WERE ALMOST ON THE EXTENDED CENTERLINE. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO INTERCEPT 32L, PROCEED INBND, DSND AND MAINTAIN 8000'. THE CAPT, AT THIS TIME, HAD FINISHED HIS PAX ANNOUNCEMENT. I INFORMED HIM OF ALL THE CHANGES. THE ACFT WAS ABOUT 1 MI E OF THE EXTENDED CENTERLINE AND INSTEAD OF TURNING RIGHT, TURNED LEFT INSTEAD, AWAY FROM THE LOC. THIS PUZZLED ME, SO I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTO THROTTLES AND TURNED BACK INBND. THE CTLR COMMENTED OUR DEVIATION LEFT OF COURSE, BUT WE WERE CORRECTING. MY FLT DIRECTOR WAS POINTING LEFT, THE CAPT'S WAS POINTING RIGHT. THE CTLR ASKED US TO CROSS LITKY INTXN AT 7000'. MOST INTXNS ARE DISPLAYED ON THE EHSI. LITKY, HOWEVER, WAS NOT. I ASKED THE CAPT WHERE IT WAS. HE SAID 21-1 DME. WE WERE RIGHT AT LITKY AT THIS TIME. MY ALT HAD DROPPED TO 6500'. THE CTLR COMMENTED AGAIN ABOUT A MILE INSIDE OF LITKY AND SAID TO MAINTAIN ALT FOR NOW TO DSND TO CROSS LUMPY INTXN AT 5000'. THE REMAINER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. I FELT EXTREMELY RUSHED FROM THE SWITCH TO APCH CTLR ONWARD. MANY FACTORS CHANGED AT THE LAST MINUTE. I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO REVIEW THE 32L APCH AND BRIEF IT. LITKY WAS AN UNFAMILIAR INTXN TO ME. THE FLT DIRECTORS WERE GIVING ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS I THOUGHT, UNTIL I REALIZED I HAD NOT TURNED THE OBS TO 320 DEGS--IT WAS STILL ON 270 DEGS FOR THE OTHER RWY. THE CTLR GAVE THE LITKY COMMAND W/O MUCH LEAD TIME. WHILE TRYING TO GET CAUGHT UP, THE ALT DROPPED BELOW 7000'. THIS PARTICULAR DAY STARTED WITH A MILD SORE THROAT AND I HAD NOTICED MY LEFT EAR DID NOT EQUALIZE PRESSURE EASILY DURING THE DSCNT, WHICH FOR ME, USUALLY INDICATES THE ONSET OF A COLD. I KNOW THAT MY ABILITY TO STAY AHEAD OF THE AIRPLANE IS AFFECTED. I DID NOT FEEL UNFIT TO FLY, HOWEVER, JUST NOT AS ALERT. IF I COULD RE-ENACT THIS FLT, I SHOULD HAVE SWITCHED ALL THE EFIS OFF AND FLOWN CONVENTIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND NOT BE DISTRACTED BY OTHER FACTORS WHICH SHORTENED THE TIME EVEN FURTHER TO ASSESS THE CHANGES TAKING PLACE. I BELIEVE THE CTLR'S DEMANDS WERE NOT TOTALLY UNREASONABLE, EVEN THOUGH AT THAT POINT IN THE FLT 27 L/R WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER AS WE HAD ALREADY BRIEFED THOSE APCHS. LOOKING OUT FOR OTHER TFC BELOW 10000' IS COMPROMISED IF THERE IS A MAJOR CHANGE OF PLAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.