Tower controller described a primary radar unit failure and questioned the class B operations that c...

Narrative:

The radar feed in the tower cab froze and then some of the targets continued as discreet beacon codes no longer tagged. There were mode C and VFR targets on the scope that also froze. During the radar 'outage' we had frozen verified mode C targets that we were watching other targets fly through. As ATC we were knowingly running an operation merging IFR targets! We reset our radar feed by going to our backup and then returned to our primary. When the people in charge put us back on the primary radar; tech ops was never notified; and the ASR-9 was never taken out for maintenance or recertified. During the 'outage' no one deemed the primary ASR-9 inoperative. In last 20 minutes; the same error had occurred for a second time! Denver tower and the TRACON have the ability to run the radar feeds off of a couple of different locations. I do not understand why the people in charge never went to a back up radar feed. I also highly doubt that tech ops was notified; or the primary ASR9 recertified. My gut feeling is that for the last 20 hours everything happening in the denver class bravo airspace is being done on an uncertified radar source. I might be wrong; and I hope that I am; but it is definitely worth looking into. Also I think the people in charge deserve a fair amount of scrutiny.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller described a primary RADAR unit failure and questioned the Class B operations that continued after the failure along with doubtful coordination with Maintenance.

Narrative: The RADAR feed in the Tower Cab froze and then some of the targets continued as discreet beacon codes no longer tagged. There were Mode C and VFR targets on the scope that also froze. During the RADAR 'outage' we had frozen verified Mode C targets that we were watching other targets fly through. As ATC we were knowingly running an operation merging IFR targets! We reset our RADAR feed by going to our backup and then returned to our primary. When the people in charge put us back on the primary RADAR; Tech Ops was never notified; and the ASR-9 was never taken out for maintenance or recertified. During the 'outage' no one deemed the Primary ASR-9 inoperative. In last 20 minutes; the same error had occurred for a second time! Denver Tower and the TRACON have the ability to run the RADAR feeds off of a couple of different locations. I do not understand why the people in charge never went to a back up RADAR feed. I also highly doubt that Tech Ops was notified; or the primary ASR9 recertified. My gut feeling is that for the last 20 hours everything happening in the Denver Class Bravo airspace is being done on an uncertified RADAR source. I might be wrong; and I hope that I am; but it is definitely worth looking into. Also I think the people in charge deserve a fair amount of scrutiny.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1110552
Time
Date	201308
Local Time Of Day	0001-0600
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight Phase	Final Approach
Route In Use	Visual Approach
Person 1
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Tower controller described a primary radar unit failure and questioned the class B operations that continued after the failure along with doubtful coordination with maintenance.