Narrative:

I was training on D34; my instructor asked me if any aircraft were in conflict; after my scan I told him a B737-500 was climbing slow out of FL265 to FL370 and was a factor with a md-83 opposite direction at FL340. I pointed this out to the r-side. The traffic was about 7 minutes apart; my r-side decided to issue 1;800 FPM for 4 minutes to the B737-500. The aircraft said he could do that but that he was heavy today. After a few minutes; I asked if he wanted to stop the B737-500 at FL330; and he said no; so I flashed the aircraft to the next sector. My instructor told the r-side that he was not ensuring separation and didn't agree with his climb rate calculation. About 4-5 minutes before the conflict point; I called the next sector as they were calling me. They asked if I was planning on toping the md-83; I said yes; and got control of md-83 in case we needed to turn the aircraft. Maybe 2 minutes before the conflict; my r-side asked if I could check what direct eug looked like for the md-83; I told him it appeared to be maybe 5 degrees to the right. So the r-side issued it to the pilot; then 1 minute before the conflict; he turned the aircraft 10 degrees right. At 15 seconds before the conflict he asked the B737-500 to verify out of FL350; the pilot reported out of FL349; the next update we showed the mode C at FL348 and less then 5 miles. Recommendation; better controller judgment; there was no need to keep the B737-500 climbing; we could have stopped the aircraft and let the next sector climb passing traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOA Controller described a loss of separation event when the R-Side failed to accept the suggestions of the D-Side and tried to climb above an aircraft; the reporter suggesting an altitude 'stop' would have prevented to event.

Narrative: I was training on D34; my Instructor asked me if any aircraft were in conflict; after my scan I told him a B737-500 was climbing slow out of FL265 to FL370 and was a factor with a MD-83 opposite direction at FL340. I pointed this out to the R-Side. The traffic was about 7 minutes apart; my R-Side decided to issue 1;800 FPM for 4 minutes to the B737-500. The aircraft said he could do that but that he was heavy today. After a few minutes; I asked if he wanted to stop the B737-500 at FL330; and he said no; so I flashed the aircraft to the next sector. My Instructor told the R-Side that he was not ensuring separation and didn't agree with his climb rate calculation. About 4-5 minutes before the conflict point; I called the next sector as they were calling me. They asked if I was planning on toping the Md-83; I said yes; and got control of MD-83 in case we needed to turn the aircraft. Maybe 2 minutes before the conflict; my R-Side asked if I could check what direct EUG looked like for the MD-83; I told him it appeared to be maybe 5 degrees to the right. So the R-side issued it to the pilot; then 1 minute before the conflict; he turned the aircraft 10 degrees right. At 15 seconds before the conflict he asked the B737-500 to verify out of FL350; the pilot reported out of FL349; the next update we showed the Mode C at FL348 and less then 5 miles. Recommendation; better controller judgment; there was no need to keep the B737-500 climbing; we could have stopped the aircraft and let the next sector climb passing traffic.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.