Narrative:

I went to my sector to talk to the controller about a collaborative work group we are negotiating. The controller had a military BE20 at FL280 who was trying to negotiate a narrow corridor between two restricted airspace with a weather cell right between the two restricted areas. The BE20 tried to deviate left; the controller only allowed 5 degrees because of the first restricted area. The BE20 then reversed course and went due south nearly going into the second restricted area. At that point; the BE20 declared at emergency; turned due west bound with the intent of returning to their destination. I grabbed the handset; plugged in on the d-side; and coordinated for the controller. As I finished that and plugged the handset in; the d-side on sector xx was trying to get in touch with an adjacent center about a B737; who deviated right of course into the second restricted area and a third restricted area. The r-side on sector xx said he had one previously deviate into restricted airspace. The event review committees (ercs) are obviously aware of the telecon requirements of civil air regulation (car) 40; but I'm not sure if the various centers are aware of the requirements and are complying. I do not believe traffic management initiatives (tmis) are being accomplished for this. Local planning telecon: if weather is forecasted to impact a facility's traffic flow; which may potentially cause aircraft to come into close proximity to special use airspace (sua); the traffic management unit (tmu) must conduct a local planning telecon. The local planning telecon must include the: using the national weather service information and any other entities necessary to ensure a comprehensive look at the day ahead. The intent of the telecon is to address any issues that may arise due to weather; the usage of sua; civil traffic flow; and alternate plans. These calls will also serve as a venue in which the agency can determine the type of activity that will be occurring in the sua. Unless it is clearly understood and agreed upon by the using agency that the sua will be available for civil traffic; facilities should not base their plan on using active military airspace to run their traffic flow. Tmis must be put in place to avoid placing aircraft in close proximity to active sua that will be impacted by weather. If the telecons are not being accomplished; the car efficacy obviously has to be called into question. I'm not even sure if the tmu is aware of their requirements. Some controllers are also not aware of the requirements in the car. I believe a national audit of both the efficacy and the implementation of CAR40 should be conducted. One of the elements of safety culture that I believe is often missed is what I call continuous improvement process. This involves improving the system regardless of whether something austere has occurred and evaluating the changes in the system for effectiveness. I believe better lines of communication between ATC (both the facilities at the operational level and the administrative level); the military (operational and administrative as well) and the command center should be considered. The facility does not have great lines of communication; particularly with the administrative side between the relevant parties. This could potentially improve release airspace in real time rather than blocking restricted areas based on notamed times regardless of whether there are any aircraft in the area. Lastly; tmu needs to comply with the tmi requirement in CAR40.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller provided a number of suggestions with regard to Traffic Management initiates prompted by weather; retsricted areas and airspace constraints.

Narrative: I went to my sector to talk to the Controller about a collaborative work group we are negotiating. The Controller had a military BE20 at FL280 who was trying to negotiate a narrow corridor between two restricted airspace with a weather cell right between the two restricted areas. The BE20 tried to deviate left; the Controller only allowed 5 degrees because of the first restricted area. The BE20 then reversed course and went due south nearly going into the second restricted area. At that point; the BE20 declared at emergency; turned due west bound with the intent of returning to their destination. I grabbed the handset; plugged in on the D-side; and coordinated for the Controller. As I finished that and plugged the handset in; the D-Side on Sector XX was trying to get in touch with an adjacent Center about a B737; who deviated right of course into the second restricted area and a third restricted area. The R-Side on Sector XX said he had one previously deviate into restricted airspace. The Event Review Committees (ERCs) are obviously aware of the TELECON requirements of Civil Air Regulation (CAR) 40; but I'm not sure if the various Centers are aware of the requirements and are complying. I do not believe Traffic Management Initiatives (TMIs) are being accomplished for this. Local planning TELECON: If weather is forecasted to impact a facility's traffic flow; which may potentially cause aircraft to come into close proximity to Special Use Airspace (SUA); the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) must conduct a local planning TELECON. The local planning TELECON must include the: using the National Weather Service information and any other entities necessary to ensure a comprehensive look at the day ahead. The intent of the TELECON is to address any issues that may arise due to weather; the usage of SUA; civil traffic flow; and alternate plans. These calls will also serve as a venue in which the agency can determine the type of activity that will be occurring in the SUA. Unless it is clearly understood and agreed upon by the using agency that the SUA will be available for civil traffic; facilities should not base their plan on using active military airspace to run their traffic flow. TMIs must be put in place to avoid placing aircraft in close proximity to active SUA that will be impacted by weather. If the TELECONS are not being accomplished; the CAR efficacy obviously has to be called into question. I'm not even sure if the TMU is aware of their requirements. Some controllers are also not aware of the requirements in the CAR. I believe a national audit of both the efficacy and the implementation of CAR40 should be conducted. One of the elements of safety culture that I believe is often missed is what I call continuous improvement process. This involves improving the system regardless of whether something austere has occurred and evaluating the changes in the system for effectiveness. I believe better lines of communication between ATC (both the facilities at the operational level and the administrative level); the military (operational and administrative as well) and the command center should be considered. The facility does not have great lines of communication; particularly with the administrative side between the relevant parties. This could potentially improve release airspace in real time rather than blocking restricted areas based on NOTAMed times regardless of whether there are any aircraft in the area. Lastly; TMU needs to comply with the TMI requirement in CAR40.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.