Narrative:

On an empty leg to pick up a medical team and patient late at night; I inadvertently landed on the wrong runway. I was pilot flying at the time; and when we heard enroute from approach control the runway in use; I thought I heard 17R. So from then on I was fixated on the right side. The captain (pilot not flying); did not hear 17R; but correctly heard 17L; so started setting up for that runway; backing up the instruments to track the localizer and glideslope; even though it would be a visual approach. We both were tired; and felt rushed as usual; so the captain did the approach briefing instead of me. As we got within approximately 10 NM of the airport we saw the beacon; and called the airport in sight. The controller then cleared us for the visual to 17L; but I again thought I heard 17 right. I continued descending for the right side; and even though I noticed that the glideslope and localizer were acting funny; I was too tired to register what the issue was. The captain was also exhausted; having been up all day long as well; so when I mentioned the issue; he agreed that something was strange with the instruments; but was not able to figure it out. Since our aircraft has a history of instrument issues; we didn't worry about it further. As I continued towards the runway; we switched to tower; who cleared us to land on 17L. I again did not notice the left; and still continued lining up for 17R. When I was within 2 NM of the threshold to 17R; the controller apparently realized our error and quickly cleared us to land on 17R. We read back the clearance; and that is when it dawned on the captain and I that something was wrong. I continued and landed without incident; and taxied to the FBO; without further mention of an issue from the tower or ground control. Luckily there was no other traffic in the area; both on the ground and in the air. Obviously this situation could have been much worse; we were simply lucky that our fatigue did not cause a worse issue. This is the first major issue I have experienced; and consider it to be because of the inherent fatigue that is caused from a 24 hour on call schedule of the air ambulance industry. I have lost track of the number of times I have been fatigued; but have chosen to fly anyways because I am locked into an extremely punitive monetary contract with my air ambulance company. I was told by my chief pilot that if I called in fatigued; it would be ok once; but more than that; and I would be looking for another job. I cannot afford the monetary hit I would take if I quit; but I am way past my personal line of safety. Being called out at 9-10 pm for an all-nighter and flying until 10-11 am (after having been up all day) causes instant fatigue. This type of schedule must not be allowed to continue before something much worse happens.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Ambulance crew reports being cleared for the visual approach to Runway 17L but the flying First Officer believes that 17R is the clearance and continues to believe so until short final when the Tower changes the clearance to 17R. Extreme fatigue was cited as a factor by both pilots.

Narrative: On an empty leg to pick up a medical team and patient late at night; I inadvertently landed on the wrong runway. I was pilot flying at the time; and when we heard enroute from Approach Control the runway in use; I thought I heard 17R. So from then on I was fixated on the right side. The Captain (pilot not flying); did not hear 17R; but correctly heard 17L; so started setting up for that runway; backing up the instruments to track the localizer and glideslope; even though it would be a visual approach. We both were tired; and felt rushed as usual; so the Captain did the approach briefing instead of me. As we got within approximately 10 NM of the airport we saw the beacon; and called the airport in sight. The Controller then cleared us for the visual to 17L; but I again thought I heard 17 Right. I continued descending for the right side; and even though I noticed that the glideslope and localizer were acting funny; I was too tired to register what the issue was. The Captain was also exhausted; having been up all day long as well; so when I mentioned the issue; he agreed that something was strange with the instruments; but was not able to figure it out. Since our aircraft has a history of Instrument issues; we didn't worry about it further. As I continued towards the runway; we switched to Tower; who cleared us to land on 17L. I again did not notice the Left; and still continued lining up for 17R. When I was within 2 NM of the threshold to 17R; the Controller apparently realized our error and quickly cleared us to land on 17R. We read back the clearance; and that is when it dawned on the Captain and I that something was wrong. I continued and landed without incident; and taxied to the FBO; without further mention of an issue from the Tower or Ground Control. Luckily there was no other traffic in the area; both on the ground and in the air. Obviously this situation could have been much worse; we were simply lucky that our fatigue did not cause a worse issue. This is the first major issue I have experienced; and consider it to be because of the inherent fatigue that is caused from a 24 hour on call schedule of the air ambulance industry. I have lost track of the number of times I have been fatigued; but have chosen to fly anyways because I am locked into an extremely punitive monetary contract with my air ambulance company. I was told by my Chief Pilot that if I called in fatigued; it would be ok once; but more than that; and I would be looking for another job. I cannot afford the monetary hit I would take if I quit; but I am way past my personal line of safety. Being called out at 9-10 pm for an all-nighter and flying until 10-11 am (after having been up all day) causes instant fatigue. This type of schedule must not be allowed to continue before something much worse happens.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.