Narrative:

During pushback we started both engines. Prior to engine #1 fully stabilizing the ground crew advised me to set brakes and then later that they were ready to disconnect. Engine 1 stabilized and the tug started moving back and then stopped. The first officer and I noticed the ramp crew starting to talk amongst themselves; pointing to the airplane and then seeming to look at things in the tug giving us the impression that maybe they were having a problem with the tug. Soon; we saw one of the ramp crewmembers coming to the airplane to reconnect a headset. At that same time ATC told us to contact company. The ramper informed us that; 'it appears you may have something leaking from your #1 engine.' neither the first officer nor I noticed any urgency in his voice at this time nor did we notice any irregularities in our displays or instrumentation. We asked if they'd like us to call maintenance and I recall that they said they were already on their way out. Soon; maintenance told us over the radio to shut down the number 1 engine due to a leak of some sort and then return to the gate. I made a PA to the passengers and shut the engine down and then returned to the gate. After parking and connecting the jetbridge; I went down to the ramp and found two mechanics already pulling the #1 cowling open. The station supervisor was with me as we walked up to the mechanics to get insight into what was going on. After asking what was up; neither mechanic seemed to give me the time of day to explain anything about what had happened or what they would suggest I tell the passengers. The smell of jet fuel was very prevalent and significant amounts of jet fuel could be seen on the inside lips of the cowlings so it was clear that a significant fuel leak had developed. In fact; we later learned that the taxiway area where the event happened was shut down for over an hour for cleanup. After not getting any information from the mechanics; the supervisor and I walked over to the rampers to ask what they had seen. The one woman said she was very new and was actually scared to see the liquid (fuel) pouring so quickly from the engine. I said that I appreciated their help and that in the future it would be very helpful for them to just give me the shut down engine signal and sort it out later; particularly in light of how significant the leak was. We then walked up the stairs to the plane. We told the flight attendants and agents the latest and then I noticed a mechanic in the captain's seat (the same one who was previously at the cowling). I asked what the status was and was greeted with him putting his hand up as if to say; 'don't bother me right now.' then I heard him ask another mechanic over his walkie-talkie if he was ready to begin the test and with a yes reply he started to motor the #1 engine. At this point; I interjected and said that as the captain of the aircraft I needed to be brought up to speed about what was going on and that he definitely should not be doing anything on the flight deck--particularly an engine motor/run with passengers onboard--without coordinating with me first. He threw up his hands and said; 'fine. Deplane everyone;' and then quickly left the flight deck. I looked over my shoulder at the supervisor and asked; 'what did I say?' and he replied that he had no idea. Ultimately; the supervisor and I decided that an aircraft swap would be prudent and so he started the groundwork for that while I told the passengers and coordinated with the crew. The swap occurred a short time later and upon arriving at the new airplane I remembered that I had never made a logbook writeup. The supervisor took me to the hold pad where maintenance had towed the airplane only to have a mechanic tell me that he would make the writeup. From my perspective; there are a few issues of concern with this incident. 1. The pushback crew did not immediately issue the cut engine signal and their verbiage was not indicative of a major issue or cause for concern. It's my opinion that it would be more prudent to have just instructed me to shut the engine down and discuss it later. 2. As the captain; particularly with passengers onboard; I believe the mechanics should unquestionably have relayed status updates immediately upon request and should have coordinated any corrective action with the captain. 3. As a new captain with barely 100 hours in the left seat; I probably did not think about how critical it could have been to keep running the engine with a leak of any kind and should have instead immediately shut the engine down. Furthermore; I probably did not give enough thought to the potential for a fire or a subsequent need for evacuation. This will be top of mind the next time a situation like this arises. And lastly; 4. It is possible that due to my young age and appearance that the mechanic didn't realize I was the captain. In this case; I need to consider being more vocal about providing my title to mechanics/agents/etc in the future. I should also add that after the dust had settled and we were starting the swap; I walked up to the mechanic; and said; 'I hope you know I wasn't trying to step on your toes or cause problems; but that as the captain I just felt you needed to coordinate any of your actions on the flight deck with me.' he said he's sure it was a bit of a miscommunication and that he was getting pressure from his side to diagnose and fix the problem and from my side to update and inform. Hopefully; this is all the problem was; but it should still be reiterated that coordination with the captain is absolutely necessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain experiences a fuel leak after pushback and disconnect; that is not immediately conveyed to him by the ground crew. The ground crew plugs the headset back in and informs that something is leaking from the number one engine but the decision to shut the number one engine down is not made until Maintenance shows up.

Narrative: During pushback we started both engines. Prior to engine #1 fully stabilizing the ground crew advised me to set brakes and then later that they were ready to disconnect. Engine 1 stabilized and the tug started moving back and then stopped. The First Officer and I noticed the ramp crew starting to talk amongst themselves; pointing to the airplane and then seeming to look at things in the tug giving us the impression that maybe they were having a problem with the tug. Soon; we saw one of the ramp crewmembers coming to the airplane to reconnect a headset. At that same time ATC told us to contact Company. The Ramper informed us that; 'It appears you may have something leaking from your #1 engine.' Neither the First Officer nor I noticed any urgency in his voice at this time nor did we notice any irregularities in our displays or instrumentation. We asked if they'd like us to call Maintenance and I recall that they said they were already on their way out. Soon; Maintenance told us over the radio to shut down the number 1 engine due to a leak of some sort and then return to the gate. I made a PA to the passengers and shut the engine down and then returned to the gate. After parking and connecting the jetbridge; I went down to the ramp and found two mechanics already pulling the #1 cowling open. The Station Supervisor was with me as we walked up to the mechanics to get insight into what was going on. After asking what was up; neither Mechanic seemed to give me the time of day to explain anything about what had happened or what they would suggest I tell the passengers. The smell of jet fuel was very prevalent and significant amounts of jet fuel could be seen on the inside lips of the cowlings so it was clear that a significant fuel leak had developed. In fact; we later learned that the taxiway area where the event happened was shut down for over an hour for cleanup. After not getting any information from the mechanics; the Supervisor and I walked over to the rampers to ask what they had seen. The one woman said she was very new and was actually scared to see the liquid (fuel) pouring so quickly from the engine. I said that I appreciated their help and that in the future it would be very helpful for them to just give me the shut down engine signal and sort it out later; particularly in light of how significant the leak was. We then walked up the stairs to the plane. We told the flight attendants and agents the latest and then I noticed a Mechanic in the Captain's seat (the same one who was previously at the cowling). I asked what the status was and was greeted with him putting his hand up as if to say; 'Don't bother me right now.' Then I heard him ask another mechanic over his walkie-talkie if he was ready to begin the test and with a yes reply he started to motor the #1 engine. At this point; I interjected and said that as the Captain of the aircraft I needed to be brought up to speed about what was going on and that he definitely should not be doing anything on the flight deck--particularly an engine motor/run with passengers onboard--without coordinating with me first. He threw up his hands and said; 'Fine. Deplane everyone;' and then quickly left the flight deck. I looked over my shoulder at the Supervisor and asked; 'What did I say?' and he replied that he had no idea. Ultimately; the Supervisor and I decided that an aircraft swap would be prudent and so he started the groundwork for that while I told the passengers and coordinated with the crew. The swap occurred a short time later and upon arriving at the new airplane I remembered that I had never made a logbook writeup. The Supervisor took me to the hold pad where Maintenance had towed the airplane only to have a mechanic tell me that he would make the writeup. From my perspective; there are a few issues of concern with this incident. 1. The pushback crew did not immediately issue the cut engine signal and their verbiage was not indicative of a major issue or cause for concern. It's my opinion that it would be more prudent to have just instructed me to shut the engine down and discuss it later. 2. As the Captain; particularly with passengers onboard; I believe the mechanics should unquestionably have relayed status updates immediately upon request and should have coordinated any corrective action with the captain. 3. As a new Captain with barely 100 hours in the left seat; I probably did not think about how critical it could have been to keep running the engine with a leak of any kind and should have instead immediately shut the engine down. Furthermore; I probably did not give enough thought to the potential for a fire or a subsequent need for evacuation. This will be top of mind the next time a situation like this arises. And lastly; 4. it is possible that due to my young age and appearance that the Mechanic didn't realize I was the Captain. In this case; I need to consider being more vocal about providing my title to mechanics/agents/etc in the future. I should also add that after the dust had settled and we were starting the swap; I walked up to the Mechanic; and said; 'I hope you know I wasn't trying to step on your toes or cause problems; but that as the Captain I just felt you needed to coordinate any of your actions on the flight deck with me.' He said he's sure it was a bit of a miscommunication and that he was getting pressure from his side to diagnose and fix the problem and from my side to update and inform. Hopefully; this is all the problem was; but it should still be reiterated that coordination with the Captain is absolutely necessary.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.