Narrative:

The aircraft had two write-ups the previous day for engine 2 overheat light illuminating during climb. The second write-up was cleared by replacing the overheat loops on the right engine. The first officer and I discussed this during preflight. During climb; through 15;000 ft; the engine 2 overheat light illuminated. I called for the overheat checklist. The first officer asked for and received a level off at 15;000 ft. We ran the checklist. When the thrust lever was retarded to approximately 75% N1; the light extinguished. We read the notes and agreed that we did not have to land immediately. We discussed our next course of action and agreed that we should continue the climb. I advanced the thrust levers to climb power. Approximately 60 seconds after climb power was set; the engine 2 overheat light illuminated again. We ran the overheat checklist. The light extinguished at approximately 75% N1. We leveled off at FL210; contacted dispatch; and advised ATC that we were evaluating a problem. Dispatch advised that maintenance control preferred a maintenance station for landing. We ran the landing performance numbers with the current ATIS and a landing weight of 136;000. The landing was legal on all preferred runways at flaps 30 and flaps 40 with no brake energy limits. All runways were [bracketed] at 1; 2 and 3. We both decided it was a safe diversion airport. I received an amendment to the release from dispatch. ATC was notified and we received our diversion clearance. We verified that all diversion needs were fulfilled by using the diversion checklist on the back of the normal checklist. The descent was normal and uneventful. During descent; the first officer brought up single-engine landing if the light illuminated during the approach. The first officer ran the landing numbers in for a flaps 15 landing. The landing would be legal (1; 2 3 and a bold B (brake energy)). We decided that if the light illuminated during the approach; we would request vectors; run the single-engine landing checklist; and then proceed inbound for landing. The light did not illuminate and I landed flaps 40 without incident. Taxi in and parking occurred without incident. Upon review; I feel that the QRH does not intend for the continued high power use of the engine. I am used to seeing verbiage about landing at the nearest suitable airport if that is required. I now feel that once the light illuminated we should have run the engine 2 overheat checklist; then started the diversion plan. I forgot about the possibility of single-engine landing until the first officer brought it up during descent. Reviewing the QRH checklist used one last time may have triggered me to brief this. Once we had the issue contained and were inbound for landing; I became focused on the overweight landing and ensuring a safe; smooth landing at a confined airport. I appreciate the great coordination; professionalism; and help from the first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 ENG 2 OVERHEAT light illuminated during climb after Maintenance had cleared the item earlier; so the flight diverted to a nearby maintenance station.

Narrative: The aircraft had two write-ups the previous day for ENG 2 Overheat light illuminating during climb. The second write-up was cleared by replacing the overheat loops on the right engine. The First Officer and I discussed this during preflight. During climb; through 15;000 FT; the ENG 2 Overheat light illuminated. I called for the Overheat Checklist. The First Officer asked for and received a level off at 15;000 FT. We ran the checklist. When the thrust lever was retarded to approximately 75% N1; the light extinguished. We read the notes and agreed that we did not have to land immediately. We discussed our next course of action and agreed that we should continue the climb. I advanced the thrust levers to climb power. Approximately 60 seconds after climb power was set; the ENG 2 Overheat light illuminated again. We ran the Overheat Checklist. The light extinguished at approximately 75% N1. We leveled off at FL210; contacted Dispatch; and advised ATC that we were evaluating a problem. Dispatch advised that Maintenance Control preferred a maintenance station for landing. We ran the landing performance numbers with the current ATIS and a landing weight of 136;000. The landing was legal on all preferred runways at Flaps 30 and Flaps 40 with no brake energy limits. All runways were [bracketed] at 1; 2 and 3. We both decided it was a safe diversion airport. I received an amendment to the Release from Dispatch. ATC was notified and we received our diversion clearance. We verified that all diversion needs were fulfilled by using the Diversion Checklist on the back of the Normal Checklist. The descent was normal and uneventful. During descent; the First Officer brought up single-engine landing if the light illuminated during the approach. The First Officer ran the landing numbers in for a Flaps 15 landing. The landing would be legal (1; 2 3 and a BOLD B (brake energy)). We decided that if the light illuminated during the approach; we would request vectors; run the Single-Engine Landing Checklist; and then proceed inbound for landing. The light did not illuminate and I landed Flaps 40 without incident. Taxi in and parking occurred without incident. Upon review; I feel that the QRH does not intend for the continued high power use of the engine. I am used to seeing verbiage about landing at the nearest suitable airport if that is required. I now feel that once the light illuminated we should have run the Engine 2 Overheat Checklist; then started the diversion plan. I forgot about the possibility of single-engine landing until the First Officer brought it up during descent. Reviewing the QRH checklist used one last time may have triggered me to brief this. Once we had the issue contained and were inbound for landing; I became focused on the overweight landing and ensuring a safe; smooth landing at a confined airport. I appreciate the great coordination; professionalism; and help from the First Officer.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.