Narrative:

Weather conditions were VMC. We were transitioning from a configuration where arrivals were not restricted to particular runways to another configuration where [runway] 19L was for departures only. A B737-800; checked in on a visual approach to runway 19L and was cleared to land. Local control 1 waited until the preceding aircraft; a challenger 300; crossed the threshold before placing another departing B737-800; into luaw runway 19L. The arrival 737 was minimally spaced behind the challenger with a slight overtake. Local control 1 did not prompt the challenger to spend minimum time on the runway and the aircraft missed the first high speed; he was asked to hustle to the next. Once the challenger was off the runway; local control 1 cleared the departing 737 for an immediate takeoff advising of traffic on a 3-mile final. The squeeze play did not work. The arrival B737 crossed the threshold; but held off touching down because the departing B737 had not yet lifted off. The arrival B737 decided that it wasn't going to work and announced a go-around. Local control 1 immediately issued control instructions to fly runway heading climb and maintain 2;000. The arrival B737 wanted to offset to the left of the runway to stay clear of the departing B737's departure track. Local control 1 approved then coordinated the go around with departure who was told that local control 1 was visually separating the two aircraft and that the arrival B737 would be on runway heading climbing to 2;000. Departure said to switch the go-around to his frequency. The departing B737; now airborne and also assigned runway heading; was switched to departure. For some reason local control 3 switched the arrival B737 to another frequency instead of the coordinated frequency. At the time of the frequency changeover; the arrival B737 was on the same heading as the departing B737; less than 3 miles in trail; with about 500 ft vertical separation. Local control 1 never asked the arrival B737 to maintain visual separation from the departing B737. The flm was told by other controllers that 6;000 ft and airborne had been achieved. These errors occurred because local control 1 did not properly execute a squeeze play; then failed to send the arrival B737 around prior to the [runway] 19L threshold when the departing B737 was still rolling down the runway and not 6;000 ft from threshold and airborne. Additionally; there was another loss of separation when the arrival B737 was switched to departure without appropriate radar separation between it and the departing B737. The management team is reviewing this incident. Perhaps skill enhancement training will be one of the outcomes. In close situations like this; the flm should have done more investigation. [We need to] conduct a system service review. Have a 'lessons learned' presentation to the entire operational workforce. Squeeze plays take extra effort and a toolkit that is readily available. Continue to enhance our local control left academic syllabus; particularly the tower simulation scenarios. This incident would be a good one to recreate. Most of our newer local controllers do not have any radar background. [Other] facilities have been split; radar from tower; these non-radar-experienced-controllers have been having issues with initial separation of radar departures. Until the FAA wakes up; and starts providing legitimate radar training to local controllers at facilities with class B airspace; these losses of separation will continue to occur. The FAA must utilize the resources it has to provide this training; if not rtf; then the associated TRACON's etg lab.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller described a multiple loss of separation event involving a landing and departure aircraft; the reporter recommended some RADAR training be provided for Tower controllers to prevent future occurrences.

Narrative: Weather conditions were VMC. We were transitioning from a configuration where arrivals were not restricted to particular runways to another configuration where [Runway] 19L was for departures only. A B737-800; checked in on a visual approach to Runway 19L and was cleared to land. Local Control 1 waited until the preceding aircraft; a Challenger 300; crossed the threshold before placing another departing B737-800; into LUAW Runway 19L. The arrival 737 was minimally spaced behind the Challenger with a slight overtake. Local Control 1 did not prompt the Challenger to spend minimum time on the runway and the aircraft missed the first high speed; he was asked to hustle to the next. Once the Challenger was off the runway; Local Control 1 cleared the departing 737 for an immediate takeoff advising of traffic on a 3-mile final. The squeeze play did not work. The arrival B737 crossed the threshold; but held off touching down because the departing B737 had not yet lifted off. The arrival B737 decided that it wasn't going to work and announced a go-around. Local Control 1 immediately issued control instructions to fly runway heading climb and maintain 2;000. The arrival B737 wanted to offset to the left of the runway to stay clear of the departing B737's departure track. Local Control 1 approved then coordinated the go around with Departure who was told that Local Control 1 was visually separating the two aircraft and that the arrival B737 would be on runway heading climbing to 2;000. Departure said to switch the go-around to his frequency. The departing B737; now airborne and also assigned runway heading; was switched to Departure. For some reason Local Control 3 switched the arrival B737 to another frequency instead of the coordinated frequency. At the time of the frequency changeover; the arrival B737 was on the same heading as the departing B737; less than 3 miles in trail; with about 500 FT vertical separation. Local Control 1 never asked the arrival B737 to maintain visual separation from the departing B737. The FLM was told by other controllers that 6;000 FT and airborne had been achieved. These errors occurred because Local Control 1 did not properly execute a squeeze play; then failed to send the arrival B737 around prior to the [Runway] 19L threshold when the departing B737 was still rolling down the runway and not 6;000 FT from threshold and airborne. Additionally; there was another loss of separation when the arrival B737 was switched to Departure without appropriate RADAR separation between it and the departing B737. The management team is reviewing this incident. Perhaps skill enhancement training will be one of the outcomes. In close situations like this; the FLM should have done more investigation. [We need to] conduct a System Service Review. Have a 'lessons learned' presentation to the entire operational workforce. Squeeze plays take extra effort and a toolkit that is readily available. Continue to enhance our Local Control L academic syllabus; particularly the Tower simulation scenarios. This incident would be a good one to recreate. Most of our newer local controllers do not have any RADAR background. [Other] facilities have been split; RADAR from Tower; these non-RADAR-experienced-controllers have been having issues with initial separation of RADAR departures. Until the FAA wakes up; and starts providing legitimate RADAR training to local controllers at facilities with Class B airspace; these losses of separation will continue to occur. The FAA must utilize the resources it has to provide this training; if not RTF; then the associated TRACON's ETG lab.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.