A80 controller described a loss of separation event by the ZTL controller when he/she allowed a clim...

Narrative:

I was training on dr-south position; and within a few minutes we received a call from ZTL; south departure with a point out descending to 12;000 from the northeast of our airspace splitting it down the middle. My trainee answered 'beacon code ?-?-?-?; point out approved descending to 12.' that aircraft was at FL180 and had not begun descending. Shortly after that my trainee climbed a pnutt departure to 140 and switched him immediately to the center. When he switched the aircraft our 'point out' plane had not left FL180 but shortly after he left and began descending. We were discussing how him climbing his pnutt ties the hands of center and switching him was not ensuring separation. Shortly after the center called up and asked if 'we were ok' with the pnutt and the point out. My trainee said I switched him and he's your control. The center controller climbed the low guy and descended the high guy and they passed only 2 miles apart before diverging. We have common 'technique' working departure in situations similar to this scenario where you either specify the traffic the center controller needs to not descend through; or you hang on to your pnutt departure and step him up reference the descent of the point out airplane. Neither of these were accomplished and although we did not 'ensure separation' we knew that the center was aware of the mistake and they were talking to both airplanes and chose to climb/descend the wrong aircraft in order to remedy the situation. A vector would have saved everyone some grief and I should have been less trusting of the centers 90 second control decisions and over-keyed my trainee. He was close to certifying and the window of 'allowing them to make mistakes' versus leaving time to fix those mistakes is small. I chose poorly. I would have reacted sooner but when the center was given control the last thing I thought they would do was descend through traffic that they were talking to; seems although accurate; silly to say; 'traffic; the plane you just took radar on; etc'.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A80 Controller described a loss of separation event by the ZTL Controller when he/she allowed a climbing and descending aircraft to pass within two miles; the reporter indicating training intervention should have been initiated.

Narrative: I was training on DR-S position; and within a few minutes we received a call from ZTL; South Departure with a point out descending to 12;000 from the northeast of our airspace splitting it down the middle. My trainee answered 'Beacon Code ?-?-?-?; Point Out Approved Descending to 12.' That aircraft was at FL180 and had not begun descending. Shortly after that my trainee climbed a PNUTT departure to 140 and switched him immediately to the Center. When he switched the aircraft our 'point out' plane had not left FL180 but shortly after he left and began descending. We were discussing how him climbing his PNUTT ties the hands of Center and switching him was NOT ensuring separation. Shortly after the Center called up and asked if 'we were OK' with the PNUTT and the POINT OUT. My trainee said I switched him and he's your control. The Center Controller climbed the low guy and descended the high guy and they passed only 2 miles apart before diverging. We have common 'technique' working departure in situations similar to this scenario where you either specify the traffic the Center Controller needs to not descend through; or you hang on to your PNUTT departure and step him up reference the descent of the POINT OUT airplane. Neither of these were accomplished and although we did not 'ensure separation' we knew that the Center was aware of the mistake and they were talking to both airplanes and chose to climb/descend the wrong aircraft in order to remedy the situation. A vector would have saved everyone some grief and I should have been less trusting of the Centers 90 second control decisions and over-keyed my trainee. He was close to certifying and the window of 'allowing them to make mistakes' versus leaving time to fix those mistakes is small. I chose poorly. I would have reacted sooner but when the Center was given control the last thing I thought they would do was descend through traffic that they were talking to; seems although accurate; silly to say; 'Traffic; the plane you just took RADAR on; etc'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1124639
Time
Date	201310
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	A80.TRACON
State Reference	GA
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Climb
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Approach Departure
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A80 controller described a loss of separation event by the ZTL controller when he/she allowed a climbing and descending aircraft to pass within two miles; the reporter indicating training intervention should have been initiated.