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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1127815 |
Time | |
Date | 201311 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | DCA.Airport |
State Reference | DC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | MD Helicopter 500/C/D/E/L |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Person 1 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I received a briefing from the current local controller after observing the operation for approximately 5 minutes due to volume and complexity. The local controller was maneuvering aircraft on runway 15 to get him in the block of runway 19 as well as working a moderate paced session of arrivals and departures. In addition helicopter control was open and the local controller briefed me on a photo mission [helicopter] operating west of the (final) implied by where he pointed. I accepted the position under the assumption [the] helicopter was going to remain west of the final approach corridor. I observed [the] helicopter in a left turn approaching my final approach corridor closer than I am used to for these kinds of photo missions. It was never coordinated with me that helicopter would be on my final approach nor at 1;600 ft. I issued a traffic call to air carrier X for helicopter traffic at his 12 O'clock and 3 miles. I queried the helicopter controller as to what [the] helicopter was doing? Helicopter did not respond. I then raised my voice and asked again and got no response again. The third time I shouted at helicopter control to 'move air photo now!' the helicopter controller walked to my side of the tower to look out the window at [the] helicopter even though it was evident from the racd that he was encroaching on the final [corridor]. He then walked back to his position and engaged in coordination with helicopter to maintain visual separation which I heard and relayed to air carrier X. By the time the aircraft were diverging I believe they came within 1 mile; 0 vertical; converging at close to 250 knots. I was about to issue go around instructions to air carrier X when I heard helicopters get the visual read back and saw helicopter's next radar return in a descending left turn. The controller working helicopters at the time blatantly disregarded my attempts at coordination before taking action. I have sent around another airbus in a prior situation where he attempted to cross my final with a helicopter without coordination. Interpersonal relationships should not be a focus in safe movement of air traffic. Our helicopter operation is an abomination of the picture of safe aircraft movement. We had an operational error which led to a corrective action plan being implemented in a shotgun fashion. We have at least tripled the helicopter controllers' workload due to requiring altitude verification and radar identification procedures that none of us have achieved a comfortable grasp of. In this case specifically; the route to be flown by the helicopter should have never been approved without coordination from the helicopter controller directly to the local controller. Additionally; the helicopter should have never been allowed near the final during this time period which is a consistently busy hour.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Tower Controller described a conflict event involving a helicopter operating a photo mission and an Air Carrier arrival; the reporter suggesting improved and standardized procedures for handling helicopter photo operations.
Narrative: I received a briefing from the current Local Controller after observing the operation for approximately 5 minutes due to volume and complexity. The Local Controller was maneuvering aircraft on Runway 15 to get him in the block of Runway 19 as well as working a moderate paced session of arrivals and departures. In addition Helicopter Control was open and the Local Controller briefed me on a photo mission [helicopter] operating west of the (Final) implied by where he pointed. I accepted the position under the assumption [the] helicopter was going to remain west of the final approach corridor. I observed [the] helicopter in a left turn approaching my final approach corridor closer than I am used to for these kinds of photo missions. It was never coordinated with me that helicopter would be on my final approach nor at 1;600 FT. I issued a traffic call to Air Carrier X for helicopter traffic at his 12 O'clock and 3 miles. I queried the Helicopter Controller as to what [the] helicopter was doing? Helicopter did not respond. I then raised my voice and asked again and got no response again. The third time I shouted at Helicopter Control to 'MOVE AIR PHOTO NOW!' The Helicopter Controller walked to my side of the Tower to look out the window at [the] helicopter even though it was evident from the RACD that he was encroaching on the final [corridor]. He then walked back to his position and engaged in coordination with helicopter to maintain visual separation which I heard and relayed to Air Carrier X. By the time the aircraft were diverging I believe they came within 1 mile; 0 vertical; converging at close to 250 knots. I was about to issue go around instructions to Air Carrier X when I heard helicopters get the visual read back and saw helicopter's next RADAR return in a descending left turn. The controller working helicopters at the time blatantly disregarded my attempts at coordination before taking action. I have sent around another Airbus in a prior situation where he attempted to cross my final with a helicopter without coordination. Interpersonal relationships should not be a focus in safe movement of air traffic. Our helicopter operation is an abomination of the picture of safe aircraft movement. We had an operational error which led to a Corrective Action Plan being implemented in a shotgun fashion. We have at least tripled the helicopter controllers' workload due to requiring altitude verification and RADAR identification procedures that none of us have achieved a comfortable grasp of. In this case specifically; the route to be flown by the helicopter should have never been approved without coordination from the Helicopter Controller directly to the Local Controller. Additionally; the helicopter should have never been allowed near the final during this time period which is a consistently busy hour.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.