Narrative:

The captain was the pilot flying on this leg. While flying the lendy two arrival into jfk airport, center cleared us (air carrier flight xx) to cross lendy at FL230. The captain programmed the FMC for this crossing just south the #1 F/a came into the cockpit to complain about something. Neither one of us noticed that the FMC reverted to speed mode from VNAV path mode. About 15 mi from lendy I noticed we were much too high to make the crossing and the captain called center for relief. Center told us to stop at FL290, which we did. Center then cleared us to cross lga at 250 KIAS and FL190. The captain began programming the FMC when we should have started right down to FL190. As a result we had to make a high speed descent to FL190 to make the altitude and we could not slow down to 250 KIAS when we crossed lga. Afterwards, the captain commented that he always tells new coplts to begin the descent before programming the FMC if there is any doubt as to meeting the crossing, and he was upset that he had tried to program the FMC first. Contributing to this incident were several interruptions of our cockpit routine by the complaining #1 F/a. ZNY gave us xings which required immediate descent. Most of all, however, we did not fly the airplane first and program the FMC second, we relied too much on the FMC's in a situation where they require too much input and monitoring and increase the workload.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING DESCENT FLT CREW DID NOT COMPLY WITH ASSIGNED CROSSING ALT OR SPEED RESTRICTIONS.

Narrative: THE CAPT WAS THE PLT FLYING ON THIS LEG. WHILE FLYING THE LENDY TWO ARR INTO JFK ARPT, CENTER CLRED US (ACR FLT XX) TO CROSS LENDY AT FL230. THE CAPT PROGRAMMED THE FMC FOR THIS XING JUST S THE #1 F/A CAME INTO THE COCKPIT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT SOMETHING. NEITHER ONE OF US NOTICED THAT THE FMC REVERTED TO SPEED MODE FROM VNAV PATH MODE. ABOUT 15 MI FROM LENDY I NOTICED WE WERE MUCH TOO HIGH TO MAKE THE XING AND THE CAPT CALLED CENTER FOR RELIEF. CENTER TOLD US TO STOP AT FL290, WHICH WE DID. CENTER THEN CLRED US TO CROSS LGA AT 250 KIAS AND FL190. THE CAPT BEGAN PROGRAMMING THE FMC WHEN WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED RIGHT DOWN TO FL190. AS A RESULT WE HAD TO MAKE A HIGH SPEED DSCNT TO FL190 TO MAKE THE ALT AND WE COULD NOT SLOW DOWN TO 250 KIAS WHEN WE CROSSED LGA. AFTERWARDS, THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT HE ALWAYS TELLS NEW COPLTS TO BEGIN THE DSCNT BEFORE PROGRAMMING THE FMC IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT AS TO MEETING THE XING, AND HE WAS UPSET THAT HE HAD TRIED TO PROGRAM THE FMC FIRST. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE SEVERAL INTERRUPTIONS OF OUR COCKPIT ROUTINE BY THE COMPLAINING #1 F/A. ZNY GAVE US XINGS WHICH REQUIRED IMMEDIATE DSCNT. MOST OF ALL, HOWEVER, WE DID NOT FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST AND PROGRAM THE FMC SECOND, WE RELIED TOO MUCH ON THE FMC'S IN A SITUATION WHERE THEY REQUIRE TOO MUCH INPUT AND MONITORING AND INCREASE THE WORKLOAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.