Narrative:

Checked in with clt approach and was told to 'expect 36R'. ATIS was broadcasting gusty winds out of the north; 10 SM visibility; ceiling 2;900 ft broken. First officer was flying and he had briefed for the visual approach to [runway] 36R. After hearing the crj cleared for the localizer 36R ahead of us; the first officer then briefed for the localizer 36R approach (glideslope inoperative). We were cleared for the localizer 36R outside of lansr and told to maintain 4;000 ft till established. After passing cidku we were still in solid IMC and it was apparent the ceiling was less than advertised. We began to configure and at hayou I dialed in 1;100 ft (1;080 ft MDA charted on the plate) and the first officer began the descent; still on autopilot. During the descent we did get below the ceiling; but were now encountering moderate rain. Just before leveling off at 1;100 ft the tower advised 'low altitude alert; check your altimeter'. I responded that we were leveling off. They then asked if we would be able to continue the approach; and I replied that we would. The first officer waited to pick up the visual glideslope from the PAPI and descended to a normal landing. Nothing else was ever said from the tower. After we blocked in; we discussed the approach and especially the tower's transmissions. We then realized that there was a NOTAM which had a higher MDA of 1;220 ft. I was expecting to get a visual approach with the ATIS broadcasting 10 SM and 2;900 ft ceiling; and was expecting to follow the PAPI as a visual glideslope (since the glideslope was inoperative; and has been for a long time). The localizer approach was briefed; however we forgot to mention there was a NOTAM for the 36R localizer approach; with a higher MDA of 1;220 ft. When we got to hayou and were still in IMC I looked down at the approach chart and verified the MDA was 1;080 ft and dialed in 1;100 ft. We discussed the importance of reviewing any pertinent notams during our briefings and being ready for lower than expected weather during approach. Even when expecting a visual approach; always be prepared for the weather to be less than advertised. I normally double check the notams (first time being before departure) during the descent to look for anything that will pertain to our arrival runway; taxi route; etc. From now on I will make sure to not forget to double check this during descent; before the approach briefing and descent approach checklist are complete.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew reports being issued a low altitude warning by CLT Tower during a LOC approach to Runway 36R. The minimums had been raised by NOTAM from 1;080 to 1;220 FT; which the crew did not recall.

Narrative: Checked in with CLT Approach and was told to 'expect 36R'. ATIS was broadcasting gusty winds out of the north; 10 SM visibility; ceiling 2;900 FT broken. First Officer was flying and he had briefed for the visual approach to [Runway] 36R. After hearing the CRJ cleared for the LOC 36R ahead of us; the First Officer then briefed for the LOC 36R approach (glideslope inoperative). We were cleared for the LOC 36R outside of LANSR and told to maintain 4;000 FT till established. After passing CIDKU we were still in solid IMC and it was apparent the ceiling was less than advertised. We began to configure and at HAYOU I dialed in 1;100 FT (1;080 FT MDA charted on the plate) and the First Officer began the descent; still on autopilot. During the descent we did get below the ceiling; but were now encountering moderate rain. Just before leveling off at 1;100 FT the Tower advised 'Low Altitude alert; check your altimeter'. I responded that we were leveling off. They then asked if we would be able to continue the approach; and I replied that we would. The First Officer waited to pick up the visual glideslope from the PAPI and descended to a normal landing. Nothing else was ever said from the Tower. After we blocked in; we discussed the approach and especially the Tower's transmissions. We then realized that there was a NOTAM which had a higher MDA of 1;220 FT. I was expecting to get a visual approach with the ATIS broadcasting 10 SM and 2;900 FT ceiling; and was expecting to follow the PAPI as a visual glideslope (since the glideslope was inoperative; and has been for a long time). The localizer approach was briefed; however we forgot to mention there was a NOTAM for the 36R localizer approach; with a higher MDA of 1;220 FT. When we got to HAYOU and were still in IMC I looked down at the approach chart and verified the MDA was 1;080 FT and dialed in 1;100 FT. We discussed the importance of reviewing any pertinent NOTAMs during our briefings and being ready for lower than expected weather during approach. Even when expecting a visual approach; always be prepared for the weather to be less than advertised. I normally double check the NOTAMs (first time being before departure) during the descent to look for anything that will pertain to our arrival runway; taxi route; etc. From now on I will make sure to not forget to double check this during descent; before the approach briefing and Descent Approach Checklist are complete.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.