Narrative:

After landing on runway 30R at stl my flight cleared runway and was instructed to hold short of 30L, which we did. We were subsequently cleared to cross. I brought power up and crossed the runway. Upon reaching the other side tower controller asked 'how many engines did you use when taxiing across the runway?' I replied by asking why he wanted to know. He (controller) replied with (paraphrased) 'you air carrier X guys seem to take a long time crossing runways'. This accusation irritated me and I asked if his opinion was being influenced by 'word of mouth' e.g. Other controllers elsewhere that are saying air carrier X pilots are conducting a jor 'slow-down'. After this repartee the tower supervisor asked (ordered?) that I call the tower on the telephone. I told him 'I'd think about it'. Upon reaching company operations I called tower supervisor. The conversation that followed was heated. The supervisor told me that I was 'excited' (a stock accusation made by supervisors to pilots hoping to put pilot on defensive). When I confronted him with my opinion of stl's total operation he stated that this problem would have to go do a higher authority and he hung up the phone on me (now who's excited?) I would describe the situation at stl at the time of my landing as being on the 'ragged edge'. On this particular day after being cleared to land an air carrier jet was cleared into position in front of us. When my aircraft was less than a mile from touchdown this aircraft still had not begun its takeoff roll. The reason being that a third aircraft down field had been cleared to cross in front of 'positioned' aircraft. I informed copilot that when we reached approximately 200' AGL, if departing aircraft had not yet rotated, we were going to execute a go around. I watched for his rotation. Departing jet was just barely airborne while we were crossing threshold. This is obviously indicative of pushing a system to its limits. On the ground I followed instruction explicitly. I crossed the runway (30L) as expeditiously as conditions warranted. The aircraft weighed 70+ tons, the temperature was warm (in 70's) and the taxi route uphill. A pilot in this situation must be careful with power usage (at this particular position on taxiway between close parallel runways). Tailpipe blast is directed across runway that is being used for departing and arriving aircraft.! My assessments and recommendations regarding this incident are as follows: 1) the tower supervisor during our phone conversation stated, 'we're trying to make the system work!' trying? 'Trying' belies a system out of control. 'Trying' doesn't hack it when lives and property are at stake. The situation at stl (and from my observation many other places as well) are setting the stage for a catastrophe(south). 'Trying' to make it work fosters an atmosphere borne of frustration. A frustration whereby concerned parties try to place the blame elsewhere whenever a situation such as described occurs. (Eg controller accusing me and others of standing in the way of trying to make the system work.) when a problem arises either real, or as in this case, perceived, tempers flare exacerbating an already bad situation. Solution at stl is to cut down workload by restricting the number of operations. 2) tower controller, with his agitating question and subsequent opinion, initiated conversation on already busy frequency. A polite request for a phone call would have been a much better alternative. 3) education of controllers as to the physical principles involved in the operation of large turbojets (a course in the laws of motion). The effects of heavy weight, warm temperatures, uphill gradients, blast across adjacent runways should be taught to controllers at some point in their training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW ACCUSED OF TAKING TOO MUCH TIME CROSSING RWY. IMPLICATION OF JOB ACTION.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 30R AT STL MY FLT CLRED RWY AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF 30L, WHICH WE DID. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED TO CROSS. I BROUGHT POWER UP AND CROSSED THE RWY. UPON REACHING THE OTHER SIDE TWR CTLR ASKED 'HOW MANY ENGINES DID YOU USE WHEN TAXIING ACROSS THE RWY?' I REPLIED BY ASKING WHY HE WANTED TO KNOW. HE (CTLR) REPLIED WITH (PARAPHRASED) 'YOU ACR X GUYS SEEM TO TAKE A LONG TIME XING RWYS'. THIS ACCUSATION IRRITATED ME AND I ASKED IF HIS OPINION WAS BEING INFLUENCED BY 'WORD OF MOUTH' E.G. OTHER CTLRS ELSEWHERE THAT ARE SAYING ACR X PLTS ARE CONDUCTING A JOR 'SLOW-DOWN'. AFTER THIS REPARTEE THE TWR SUPVR ASKED (ORDERED?) THAT I CALL THE TWR ON THE TELEPHONE. I TOLD HIM 'I'D THINK ABOUT IT'. UPON REACHING COMPANY OPERATIONS I CALLED TWR SUPVR. THE CONVERSATION THAT FOLLOWED WAS HEATED. THE SUPVR TOLD ME THAT I WAS 'EXCITED' (A STOCK ACCUSATION MADE BY SUPVRS TO PLTS HOPING TO PUT PLT ON DEFENSIVE). WHEN I CONFRONTED HIM WITH MY OPINION OF STL'S TOTAL OPERATION HE STATED THAT THIS PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO GO DO A HIGHER AUTHORITY AND HE HUNG UP THE PHONE ON ME (NOW WHO'S EXCITED?) I WOULD DESCRIBE THE SITUATION AT STL AT THE TIME OF MY LNDG AS BEING ON THE 'RAGGED EDGE'. ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY AFTER BEING CLRED TO LAND AN AIR CARRIER JET WAS CLRED INTO POSITION IN FRONT OF US. WHEN MY ACFT WAS LESS THAN A MILE FROM TOUCHDOWN THIS ACFT STILL HAD NOT BEGUN ITS TKOF ROLL. THE REASON BEING THAT A THIRD ACFT DOWN FIELD HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS IN FRONT OF 'POSITIONED' ACFT. I INFORMED COPLT THAT WHEN WE REACHED APPROX 200' AGL, IF DEPARTING ACFT HAD NOT YET ROTATED, WE WERE GOING TO EXECUTE A GO AROUND. I WATCHED FOR HIS ROTATION. DEPARTING JET WAS JUST BARELY AIRBORNE WHILE WE WERE XING THRESHOLD. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY INDICATIVE OF PUSHING A SYSTEM TO ITS LIMITS. ON THE GND I FOLLOWED INSTRUCTION EXPLICITLY. I CROSSED THE RWY (30L) AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS CONDITIONS WARRANTED. THE ACFT WEIGHED 70+ TONS, THE TEMP WAS WARM (IN 70'S) AND THE TAXI ROUTE UPHILL. A PLT IN THIS SITUATION MUST BE CAREFUL WITH POWER USAGE (AT THIS PARTICULAR POSITION ON TXWY BETWEEN CLOSE PARALLEL RWYS). TAILPIPE BLAST IS DIRECTED ACROSS RWY THAT IS BEING USED FOR DEPARTING AND ARRIVING ACFT.! MY ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THIS INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE TWR SUPVR DURING OUR PHONE CONVERSATION STATED, 'WE'RE TRYING TO MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK!' TRYING? 'TRYING' BELIES A SYSTEM OUT OF CONTROL. 'TRYING' DOESN'T HACK IT WHEN LIVES AND PROPERTY ARE AT STAKE. THE SITUATION AT STL (AND FROM MY OBSERVATION MANY OTHER PLACES AS WELL) ARE SETTING THE STAGE FOR A CATASTROPHE(S). 'TRYING' TO MAKE IT WORK FOSTERS AN ATMOSPHERE BORNE OF FRUSTRATION. A FRUSTRATION WHEREBY CONCERNED PARTIES TRY TO PLACE THE BLAME ELSEWHERE WHENEVER A SITUATION SUCH AS DESCRIBED OCCURS. (EG CTLR ACCUSING ME AND OTHERS OF STANDING IN THE WAY OF TRYING TO MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK.) WHEN A PROBLEM ARISES EITHER REAL, OR AS IN THIS CASE, PERCEIVED, TEMPERS FLARE EXACERBATING AN ALREADY BAD SITUATION. SOLUTION AT STL IS TO CUT DOWN WORKLOAD BY RESTRICTING THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONS. 2) TWR CTLR, WITH HIS AGITATING QUESTION AND SUBSEQUENT OPINION, INITIATED CONVERSATION ON ALREADY BUSY FREQ. A POLITE REQUEST FOR A PHONE CALL WOULD HAVE BEEN A MUCH BETTER ALTERNATIVE. 3) EDUCATION OF CTLRS AS TO THE PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION OF LARGE TURBOJETS (A COURSE IN THE LAWS OF MOTION). THE EFFECTS OF HEAVY WEIGHT, WARM TEMPS, UPHILL GRADIENTS, BLAST ACROSS ADJACENT RWYS SHOULD BE TAUGHT TO CTLRS AT SOME POINT IN THEIR TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.