Narrative:

Captain flying. After beginning the nanci #2 arrival in the vicinity of philadelphia, I left the captain with ATC to get the ATIS. At lga, WX was reported as 14,000 overcast, visibility about 6 mi as I recall, apches to 4 (NDB). Captain commented kiddingly that flying an NDB is something he only does 'once a year' at recurrent and to 'keep an eye on his so that he doesn't hit anything'! This comment was prompted by a special WX advisory from approach control after just passing yardley VOR of WX being 1400 overcast, same visibility 6 mi. We briefed the approach and approach turned us toward the final approach course to intercept. Problem was aircraft was high and fast (clean). I called DME from lga VOR repeatedly hoping that his reaction would be to start configuring. He did so very timidly, however, and we were still not properly configured at this stage of the approach. We passed grene intersection at approximately 4000' going about 220 KTS (altitude at grene is 2700). While all of this was going on he intercepted by trying to fly to the beacon. I was focusing on speed/altitude while planning on a missed approach (I never thought he'd land out of it), so I wasn't really paying attention to our track, when approach gave us a '090 degree heading to 'reintercept'' cleared NDB 4. Captain complied, and as he was approaching 1400' level off point, he shallowed out descent rate which had been very high. He still, however, was descending when we got to 1400' and I repeated 'altitude' and '1400' twice while reaching behind yoke to arrest the descent. He saw this and said 'I've got it'. 'Ok'. Now we had broken out of the overcast and since we could see the ground he wanted to continue visually to the airport. He was having trouble establishing himself on the approach course, and he asked me if I could see the airport. I responded by saying 'we're supposed to be at 1400' still since we hadn't passed peths yet. He made a half-hearted attempt to climb but we only went up about 50' and then we got station passage, allowing us to continue to 680' MSL. I didn't push it too much since I could see the ground and felt we had sufficient obstacle clearance, however, we were definitely too low. I saw the airport and he continued flying visually to runway 4. After landing he said 'well I wasn't too proud of that'. I didn't say anything but he knew I was not very happy with what had transpired. We had been flying for 5 days together and this was not what I would call the first operational error in his conduct of a flight (second altitude bust, first significant on, and at least the 3RD drag in-duck under the G/south approach). He also commented, 'I hope sarcastically', that he doesn't read bulletins or changes to our manual. Although he said it in jest, I tend to believe it since he wanted to use a non-certified landing flap in a variation of the plane we normally fly. This incident is particularly disturbing since the captain serves on a voluntary 'training committee'. Additionally he is friends with everyone in the domicile, or so it seems, and while I feel he is somewhat aloof and very unprofessional in his cockpit behavior, I am reluctant to say anything to the flight office because I feel his network is so deep. There is no doubt, however, that he knows he is 'weak'. He has friends at our training center and has managed to arrange to fly in the simulator with his own private instructor for an extra period prior to reporting for his annual recurrent training. Not only is this unfair to all of the others who are checked annually, but I tend to think he learns all of the gouges to pass the check and then go out on the line and fly marginally at best! With regard to this incident, I should have been more vocal and specific about our position relative to the field and if he didn't start to slow down I should have used references to our speed and altitude relative to our position from the airport. From a human factors perspective, I can say that being in a 2-MAN crew makes it very difficult to be critical of another crew member since there are 'no witnesses'. An incident like this never happened to me while flying in A3-man crew, because I think the peer pressure to do things properly is greater, since the ramifications of not doing things SOP can be corroborated. I think I'm going to bid a 3-MAN/girl airplane before they're all gone. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: the reporter is a member of the association professional standards committee and that he has not given up on bringing this situation to the attention of company supervisors. The captain in question has little airline experience. Most of his time was in helicopters with minimal first officer time before checkout. Reporter was encouraged to keep factual records of this man's performance to be brought out when appropriate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TRACK HEADING DEVIATION AND ALT DEVIATION DURING IAP NDB TO RWY 4 AT LGA.

Narrative: CAPT FLYING. AFTER BEGINNING THE NANCI #2 ARR IN THE VICINITY OF PHILADELPHIA, I LEFT THE CAPT WITH ATC TO GET THE ATIS. AT LGA, WX WAS REPORTED AS 14,000 OVCST, VISIBILITY ABOUT 6 MI AS I RECALL, APCHES TO 4 (NDB). CAPT COMMENTED KIDDINGLY THAT FLYING AN NDB IS SOMETHING HE ONLY DOES 'ONCE A YEAR' AT RECURRENT AND TO 'KEEP AN EYE ON HIS SO THAT HE DOESN'T HIT ANYTHING'! THIS COMMENT WAS PROMPTED BY A SPECIAL WX ADVISORY FROM APCH CTL AFTER JUST PASSING YARDLEY VOR OF WX BEING 1400 OVCST, SAME VISIBILITY 6 MI. WE BRIEFED THE APCH AND APCH TURNED US TOWARD THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO INTERCEPT. PROBLEM WAS ACFT WAS HIGH AND FAST (CLEAN). I CALLED DME FROM LGA VOR REPEATEDLY HOPING THAT HIS REACTION WOULD BE TO START CONFIGURING. HE DID SO VERY TIMIDLY, HOWEVER, AND WE WERE STILL NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED AT THIS STAGE OF THE APCH. WE PASSED GRENE INTXN AT APPROX 4000' GOING ABOUT 220 KTS (ALT AT GRENE IS 2700). WHILE ALL OF THIS WAS GOING ON HE INTERCEPTED BY TRYING TO FLY TO THE BEACON. I WAS FOCUSING ON SPEED/ALT WHILE PLANNING ON A MISSED APCH (I NEVER THOUGHT HE'D LAND OUT OF IT), SO I WASN'T REALLY PAYING ATTN TO OUR TRACK, WHEN APCH GAVE US A '090 DEG HEADING TO 'REINTERCEPT'' CLRED NDB 4. CAPT COMPLIED, AND AS HE WAS APCHING 1400' LEVEL OFF POINT, HE SHALLOWED OUT DSCNT RATE WHICH HAD BEEN VERY HIGH. HE STILL, HOWEVER, WAS DSNDING WHEN WE GOT TO 1400' AND I REPEATED 'ALT' AND '1400' TWICE WHILE REACHING BEHIND YOKE TO ARREST THE DSCNT. HE SAW THIS AND SAID 'I'VE GOT IT'. 'OK'. NOW WE HAD BROKEN OUT OF THE OVCST AND SINCE WE COULD SEE THE GND HE WANTED TO CONTINUE VISUALLY TO THE ARPT. HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE ESTABLISHING HIMSELF ON THE APCH COURSE, AND HE ASKED ME IF I COULD SEE THE ARPT. I RESPONDED BY SAYING 'WE'RE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 1400' STILL SINCE WE HADN'T PASSED PETHS YET. HE MADE A HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPT TO CLIMB BUT WE ONLY WENT UP ABOUT 50' AND THEN WE GOT STATION PASSAGE, ALLOWING US TO CONTINUE TO 680' MSL. I DIDN'T PUSH IT TOO MUCH SINCE I COULD SEE THE GND AND FELT WE HAD SUFFICIENT OBSTACLE CLRNC, HOWEVER, WE WERE DEFINITELY TOO LOW. I SAW THE ARPT AND HE CONTINUED FLYING VISUALLY TO RWY 4. AFTER LNDG HE SAID 'WELL I WASN'T TOO PROUD OF THAT'. I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING BUT HE KNEW I WAS NOT VERY HAPPY WITH WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED. WE HAD BEEN FLYING FOR 5 DAYS TOGETHER AND THIS WAS NOT WHAT I WOULD CALL THE FIRST OPERATIONAL ERROR IN HIS CONDUCT OF A FLT (SECOND ALT BUST, FIRST SIGNIFICANT ON, AND AT LEAST THE 3RD DRAG IN-DUCK UNDER THE G/S APCH). HE ALSO COMMENTED, 'I HOPE SARCASTICALLY', THAT HE DOESN'T READ BULLETINS OR CHANGES TO OUR MANUAL. ALTHOUGH HE SAID IT IN JEST, I TEND TO BELIEVE IT SINCE HE WANTED TO USE A NON-CERTIFIED LNDG FLAP IN A VARIATION OF THE PLANE WE NORMALLY FLY. THIS INCIDENT IS PARTICULARLY DISTURBING SINCE THE CAPT SERVES ON A VOLUNTARY 'TRAINING COMMITTEE'. ADDITIONALLY HE IS FRIENDS WITH EVERYONE IN THE DOMICILE, OR SO IT SEEMS, AND WHILE I FEEL HE IS SOMEWHAT ALOOF AND VERY UNPROFESSIONAL IN HIS COCKPIT BEHAVIOR, I AM RELUCTANT TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE FLT OFFICE BECAUSE I FEEL HIS NETWORK IS SO DEEP. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT HE KNOWS HE IS 'WEAK'. HE HAS FRIENDS AT OUR TRAINING CENTER AND HAS MANAGED TO ARRANGE TO FLY IN THE SIMULATOR WITH HIS OWN PRIVATE INSTRUCTOR FOR AN EXTRA PERIOD PRIOR TO REPORTING FOR HIS ANNUAL RECURRENT TRAINING. NOT ONLY IS THIS UNFAIR TO ALL OF THE OTHERS WHO ARE CHECKED ANNUALLY, BUT I TEND TO THINK HE LEARNS ALL OF THE GOUGES TO PASS THE CHECK AND THEN GO OUT ON THE LINE AND FLY MARGINALLY AT BEST! WITH REGARD TO THIS INCIDENT, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE VOCAL AND SPECIFIC ABOUT OUR POSITION RELATIVE TO THE FIELD AND IF HE DIDN'T START TO SLOW DOWN I SHOULD HAVE USED REFERENCES TO OUR SPEED AND ALT RELATIVE TO OUR POSITION FROM THE ARPT. FROM A HUMAN FACTORS PERSPECTIVE, I CAN SAY THAT BEING IN A 2-MAN CREW MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANOTHER CREW MEMBER SINCE THERE ARE 'NO WITNESSES'. AN INCIDENT LIKE THIS NEVER HAPPENED TO ME WHILE FLYING IN A3-MAN CREW, BECAUSE I THINK THE PEER PRESSURE TO DO THINGS PROPERLY IS GREATER, SINCE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NOT DOING THINGS SOP CAN BE CORROBORATED. I THINK I'M GOING TO BID A 3-MAN/GIRL AIRPLANE BEFORE THEY'RE ALL GONE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE REPORTER IS A MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE AND THAT HE HAS NOT GIVEN UP ON BRINGING THIS SITUATION TO THE ATTN OF COMPANY SUPVRS. THE CAPT IN QUESTION HAS LITTLE AIRLINE EXPERIENCE. MOST OF HIS TIME WAS IN HELICOPTERS WITH MINIMAL F/O TIME BEFORE CHECKOUT. REPORTER WAS ENCOURAGED TO KEEP FACTUAL RECORDS OF THIS MAN'S PERFORMANCE TO BE BROUGHT OUT WHEN APPROPRIATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.