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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1137264 |
Time | |
Date | 201312 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Brake System |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was pilot monitoring/pilot not flying.... We were cleared for takeoff... It was a dry; flex; rolling; bleeds open takeoff and I believe flaps 20. We finished all appropriate checklists and began our takeoff roll. I called 80 knots; captain responded 'checks'; a few seconds passed when the master warning 'brake overheat' warning sounded along with the triple chime. At this time I believe I called 'v1; rotate' or we were very close to v1 when the captain elected to abort the takeoff. I monitored the amount of runway remaining while the captain slowed the aircraft. I remember coming up to the 1;000 foot remaining runway marker and called that out along with our speed of roughly 100 knots. I did not make the 90 knot call because I didn't want to prompt the captain to stow the thrust reversers due to the distance remaining and the reality that our braking may not be 100% effective. He managed to bring the aircraft to a stop with about 200 feet remaining and exited the runway. I notified ATC and made a PA. I completed the rejected takeoff checklist and the after landing checklist. We then waited about 5 minutes for the brakes to cool before taxiing to the gate. This event is unique because there is not time for a crew discussion and ultimately the decision to abort in most cases must be made quickly. The abort criteria is briefed but unless you brief every single caution message; warning message; environmental consideration; and possible thing that might come up; the decision to abort has to be identified; evaluated; and then ultimately performed in a second or two. In this case I believe it would have been a much better option to continue the takeoff and go from there. Unfortunately there wasn't time for my input; but fortunately things ended well. It might be helpful to pilots to have more guidance on which cautions and warnings to abort for or not. In this case with the brake ovht; if it had been a real indication we may have lost directional stability or had reduced braking. Not a good option to abort. If it was erroneous; then why abort? Either way; in my mind; it should say; 'do not abort.' I think that there are many caution and warning messages that lack a reason to abort for; yet we have no guidance on what those are. We are told to make a decision; when quite frankly there is no time to make a good; thought out decision. I think that ultimately it must come down to the fact that if you are told to not abort for say a 'brake ovht' message; and something tragic happens after takeoff then there are many more liability issues that arise. As of now it can be blamed solely on the pilot's poor decision to continue the takeoff for something that maybe had a 1% chance of ending badly vs. A 50% chance of ending badly if aborted for. These are a lot of things to think about at V1.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ-900 Captain rejected takeoff at approximately 115 knots due to a Brake Overheat warning. Aircraft stopped within 200 feet of runway end. First Officer questioned the Captain's decision.
Narrative: I was Pilot Monitoring/Pilot Not Flying.... We were cleared for takeoff... It was a Dry; Flex; Rolling; Bleeds Open takeoff and I believe Flaps 20. We finished all appropriate checklists and began our takeoff roll. I called 80 knots; Captain responded 'Checks'; a few seconds passed when the Master Warning 'Brake Overheat' warning sounded along with the triple chime. At this time I believe I called 'v1; rotate' or we were very close to v1 when the Captain elected to abort the takeoff. I monitored the amount of runway remaining while the Captain slowed the aircraft. I remember coming up to the 1;000 foot remaining runway marker and called that out along with our speed of roughly 100 knots. I did not make the 90 knot call because I didn't want to prompt the Captain to stow the thrust reversers due to the distance remaining and the reality that our braking may not be 100% effective. He managed to bring the aircraft to a stop with about 200 feet remaining and exited the runway. I notified ATC and made a PA. I completed the rejected takeoff checklist and the after landing checklist. We then waited about 5 minutes for the brakes to cool before taxiing to the gate. This event is unique because there is not time for a crew discussion and ultimately the decision to abort in most cases must be made quickly. The abort criteria is briefed but unless you brief every single caution message; warning message; environmental consideration; and possible thing that might come up; the decision to abort has to be identified; evaluated; and then ultimately performed in a second or two. In this case I believe it would have been a much better option to continue the takeoff and go from there. Unfortunately there wasn't time for my input; but fortunately things ended well. It might be helpful to pilots to have more guidance on which cautions and warnings to abort for or not. In this case with the brake OVHT; if it had been a real indication we may have lost directional stability or had reduced braking. Not a good option to abort. If it was erroneous; then why abort? Either way; in my mind; it should say; 'Do not abort.' I think that there are many caution and warning messages that lack a reason to abort for; yet we have no guidance on what those are. We are told to make a decision; when quite frankly there is no time to make a good; thought out decision. I think that ultimately it must come down to the fact that if you are told to not abort for say a 'Brake OVHT' message; and something tragic happens after takeoff then there are many more liability issues that arise. As of now it can be blamed solely on the pilot's poor decision to continue the takeoff for something that maybe had a 1% chance of ending badly vs. a 50% chance of ending badly if aborted for. These are a lot of things to think about at V1.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.