Narrative:

We noticed a forward cargo door caution warning while holding short of the runway for takeoff. There had been no single chime associated with the caution. The captain noticed the message and figured it was just a sensor issue and elected to continue. I agreed. Once we started the takeoff roll; no issue was noted until rotation when the cargo door opened. After rotation; we returned to the field. The flight was without any further incident and we returned to the gate. Maintenance was contacted and met the aircraft at the gate. Prior to beginning the duty day; I was extremely tired; I had been up the entire night before unable to sleep due to personal issues with my spouse. I didn't want to call out on christmas eve due to the holidays and not wanting to disrupt the busy schedule and operations that day. Prior to every flight; I did a self-assessment of myself on if I believed I was ok to fly. Although I knew I was tired; I didn't feel at the time as if I was too fatigued to fly. In hindsight; it's become clear that I was fatigued. I believe my fatigued state led me to agreeing with the captain to continue; and; with it being our last round trip of the 4-day; just felt the pressure to get the flight done. After we returned to the gate; I called in fatigued for the last round trip and filled out the fatigue report the following morning. CRM training on this type of scenario and recognizing your limits on being fatigued could have prevented this outcome. I believe my fatigued state and the pressure on myself to get the last round trip completed on the holiday contributed to agreeing with the captain in this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-900 First Officer believes fatigue was a primary contributor to his willingness to concur with the Captain that a cargo door warning light discovered just prior to takeoff was a false warning and acquiesce to continuing the flight. The door opened on rotation and the flight returned to the airport and the gate for maintenance.

Narrative: We noticed a Forward Cargo Door Caution warning while holding short of the runway for takeoff. There had been no Single Chime associated with the Caution. The Captain noticed the message and figured it was just a sensor issue and elected to continue. I agreed. Once we started the takeoff roll; no issue was noted until rotation when the cargo door opened. After rotation; we returned to the field. The flight was without any further incident and we returned to the gate. Maintenance was contacted and met the aircraft at the gate. Prior to beginning the duty day; I was extremely tired; I had been up the entire night before unable to sleep due to personal issues with my spouse. I didn't want to call out on Christmas Eve due to the holidays and not wanting to disrupt the busy schedule and operations that day. Prior to every flight; I did a self-assessment of myself on if I believed I was OK to fly. Although I knew I was tired; I didn't feel at the time as if I was too fatigued to fly. In hindsight; it's become clear that I was fatigued. I believe my fatigued state led me to agreeing with the Captain to continue; and; with it being our last round trip of the 4-day; just felt the pressure to get the flight done. After we returned to the gate; I called in Fatigued for the last round trip and filled out the fatigue report the following morning. CRM training on this type of scenario and recognizing your limits on being fatigued could have prevented this outcome. I believe my fatigued state and the pressure on myself to get the last round trip completed on the holiday contributed to agreeing with the captain in this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.