Narrative:

First officer flying aircraft with autoplt engaged, level at 8000' MSL. Given a turn to the left and airspeed reduction at same time. Captain looked left to visually clear turn and his attention directed back to cockpit upon hearing aural 'altitude' warning. Aircraft was manually taken by captain, leveled at 7500' and climbed back up to 8000' assigned altitude. First officer did not know 'why' altitude did not capture or remain at 8000' and his attempts to correct the excursion were slow and ineffective. The ultimate responsibility is of course, the captain's for not adequately monitoring the aircraft. The problem is that in an air traffic area as busy as ord, if both pilots have to fly the aircraft, other responsibilities suffer, e.g., 'looking outside for traffic', various company calls, running the checklist. This first officer was 'new' less than 100 hours on type. I feel a contributory factor is the desire to alternate legs north trips. Maybe a brand new first officer should not be 'pushed' to fly every other leg if the captain honestly doesn't feel is is 'well-up-to-speed' on the aircraft. This would vary for individuals' skill levels, both captain and first officer. I also feel a contributory factor is the training department. Pilots are pushed into the system with bare minimum amounts of training and no actual on-line experience. The unwritten assumption is that the capts will train and give coplts the required experience. Well, capts are not all equal and not all are 'instructor pilots', nor have the mentality or skills to be one. I think the rapid hiring and expansion programs of the 'healthy' airlines (mine) contribute to an aggravate this problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEVIATION DUE AUTOPLT FAILURE TO CAPTURE AND ATTENTION OUTSIDE WHILE COMPLYING WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN AND REDUCE SPEED.

Narrative: F/O FLYING ACFT WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED, LEVEL AT 8000' MSL. GIVEN A TURN TO THE LEFT AND AIRSPEED REDUCTION AT SAME TIME. CAPT LOOKED LEFT TO VISUALLY CLEAR TURN AND HIS ATTN DIRECTED BACK TO COCKPIT UPON HEARING AURAL 'ALT' WARNING. ACFT WAS MANUALLY TAKEN BY CAPT, LEVELED AT 7500' AND CLIMBED BACK UP TO 8000' ASSIGNED ALT. F/O DID NOT KNOW 'WHY' ALT DID NOT CAPTURE OR REMAIN AT 8000' AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT THE EXCURSION WERE SLOW AND INEFFECTIVE. THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY IS OF COURSE, THE CAPT'S FOR NOT ADEQUATELY MONITORING THE ACFT. THE PROBLEM IS THAT IN AN ATA AS BUSY AS ORD, IF BOTH PLTS HAVE TO FLY THE ACFT, OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES SUFFER, E.G., 'LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR TFC', VARIOUS COMPANY CALLS, RUNNING THE CHECKLIST. THIS F/O WAS 'NEW' LESS THAN 100 HRS ON TYPE. I FEEL A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR IS THE DESIRE TO ALTERNATE LEGS N TRIPS. MAYBE A BRAND NEW F/O SHOULD NOT BE 'PUSHED' TO FLY EVERY OTHER LEG IF THE CAPT HONESTLY DOESN'T FEEL IS IS 'WELL-UP-TO-SPEED' ON THE ACFT. THIS WOULD VARY FOR INDIVIDUALS' SKILL LEVELS, BOTH CAPT AND F/O. I ALSO FEEL A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR IS THE TRAINING DEPT. PLTS ARE PUSHED INTO THE SYSTEM WITH BARE MINIMUM AMOUNTS OF TRAINING AND NO ACTUAL ON-LINE EXPERIENCE. THE UNWRITTEN ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE CAPTS WILL TRAIN AND GIVE COPLTS THE REQUIRED EXPERIENCE. WELL, CAPTS ARE NOT ALL EQUAL AND NOT ALL ARE 'INSTRUCTOR PLTS', NOR HAVE THE MENTALITY OR SKILLS TO BE ONE. I THINK THE RAPID HIRING AND EXPANSION PROGRAMS OF THE 'HEALTHY' AIRLINES (MINE) CONTRIBUTE TO AN AGGRAVATE THIS PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.