Narrative:

I was the pilot flying on [a flight to] ewr. The weather was 400 ft overcast and RVR 5;500. We briefed and were cleared for the ILS 4R into ewr. I joined the glideslope at 180 KTS and flaps 15. Around two miles prior to the FAF; the aircraft began handling as if it was encountering wake turbulence and the speed began to increase beyond 190 KTS. I disengaged the autopilot and left the glideslope to facilitate the speed decrease needed to configure. I called 'flaps 20; gear down; landing checklist' and pitched down to get back to the glidepath.the plane remained high; so I called for flaps 25. As we neared 1;000 ft; we were still above the glideslope and around 165 KTS. I pitched up once again to reach flaps 30 extension speed; but from that point on; it was a futile effort to slow to our 129 KT approach speed and regain the glideslope at the same time. While able to recapture the glideslope by 500 ft; we were still 20 KTS above the target speed. The captain appropriately called for a go-around and I attempted to start the go-around. Having been on the B-737 for six years prior; I instinctively reached ahead of the throttle quadrant for the toga buttons. The fact that they weren't there surprised me and I spent the next few seconds reaching around with my fingers to find them. After a few seconds; the captain repeated 'go-around; let's go!' so; I manually overrode the throttles and proceeded to execute the go-around without flight director guidance. I called 'going around' and flaps were retracted to 20. I re-attempted to engage the toga switches by reaching behind and around the throttles where I recalled them being on the B-767; but could only find the autothrottles disconnect switches. In my efforts to hand fly on raw data and find the switch; I failed to call for the gear up. The captain called the tower and received the go-around instructions; which I did not hear. After several seconds; he realized I still had not engaged the toga modes and reached over and hit the toga button for me. I saw the captain had set 090 as a heading and confirmed that it was what ATC had assigned. By the time I called for 'heading select'; we were already above 1;000 ft. As we were turning; I called 'set clean maneuvering speed; flaps 5'. ATC then told us to fly a 060 heading. I hand flew the new heading but felt like I was behind the airplane and spending too much focus on hand flying. I engaged the autopilot and then checked to see what speed we were at for the next flap retraction. I only focused on the airspeed indicator for a few seconds but when I came back to the rest of my instruments; I saw we were around 1;900 ft and the autopilot had stopped climbing and was beginning a descent. That startled me so much; I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; aggressively pulled back on the yoke and applied full power. We quickly recovered; cleaned up the airplane; leveled off; reengaged the autopilot and autothrottles; and realized the gear had never been retracted. On our second approach; we were much more cautious; leading everything more aggressively with drag than before. I noticed we experienced the same turbulence again prior to the FAF and we had a 15-knot quartering tailwind down to 1;000 ft. It still took all of our precautionary actions just to get the airplane on profile by 1;000 ft. At no point do I believe we exceeded any aircraft parameters but we did briefly let the autopilot enter a descent on the go-around. To say I was startled to see us descending would be an understatement and I know I overreacted with the controls. Though correct; it was not a smooth response. Add rumbling gear and multiple full-power applications and I'm sure it alarmed some passengers in the back.mistakes: I made three clear mistakes. The first was that I briefed the single engine procedure for runway 4R instead of the normal go-around profile. While not a direct reason for our sloppy go-around; it certainly would not have hurt our performance. Secondly; and most problematic; I reverted to B-737 muscle memory for the go-around execution which led to a late go-around initiation; having to fly the airplane without the proper modes; and feeling overwhelmed enough to put the autopilot on as quickly as I did. Third; I put the autopilot on before we had finished cleaning up the aircraft and it somehow led to the aircraft descending briefly on the go-around. I do not know what mode commanded this or why but by the time I recognized it; we had already stopped climbing.other regrets: I wish I had asked the captain for help finding the toga switches. I also wish I had disconnected the autothrottles immediately to keep them from fighting me on the go-around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 First Officer reported he attempted a go-around because of an unstable approach due to either wake vortex or wind shear; and the go-around was sloppily executed.

Narrative: I was the pilot flying on [a flight to] EWR. The weather was 400 FT overcast and RVR 5;500. We briefed and were cleared for the ILS 4R into EWR. I joined the glideslope at 180 KTS and flaps 15. Around two miles prior to the FAF; the aircraft began handling as if it was encountering wake turbulence and the speed began to increase beyond 190 KTS. I disengaged the autopilot and left the glideslope to facilitate the speed decrease needed to configure. I called 'Flaps 20; gear down; Landing Checklist' and pitched down to get back to the glidepath.The plane remained high; so I called for flaps 25. As we neared 1;000 FT; we were still above the glideslope and around 165 KTS. I pitched up once again to reach flaps 30 extension speed; but from that point on; it was a futile effort to slow to our 129 KT approach speed and regain the glideslope at the same time. While able to recapture the glideslope by 500 FT; we were still 20 KTS above the target speed. The Captain appropriately called for a go-around and I attempted to start the go-around. Having been on the B-737 for six years prior; I instinctively reached ahead of the throttle quadrant for the TOGA buttons. The fact that they weren't there surprised me and I spent the next few seconds reaching around with my fingers to find them. After a few seconds; the Captain repeated 'Go-around; let's go!' So; I manually overrode the throttles and proceeded to execute the go-around without flight director guidance. I called 'Going around' and flaps were retracted to 20. I re-attempted to engage the TOGA switches by reaching behind and around the throttles where I recalled them being on the B-767; but could only find the autothrottles disconnect switches. In my efforts to hand fly on raw data and find the switch; I failed to call for the gear up. The Captain called the Tower and received the go-around instructions; which I did not hear. After several seconds; he realized I still had not engaged the TOGA modes and reached over and hit the TOGA button for me. I saw the Captain had set 090 as a heading and confirmed that it was what ATC had assigned. By the time I called for 'Heading select'; we were already above 1;000 FT. As we were turning; I called 'Set clean maneuvering speed; flaps 5'. ATC then told us to fly a 060 heading. I hand flew the new heading but felt like I was behind the airplane and spending too much focus on hand flying. I engaged the autopilot and then checked to see what speed we were at for the next flap retraction. I only focused on the airspeed indicator for a few seconds but when I came back to the rest of my instruments; I saw we were around 1;900 FT and the autopilot had stopped climbing and was beginning a descent. That startled me so much; I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; aggressively pulled back on the yoke and applied full power. We quickly recovered; cleaned up the airplane; leveled off; reengaged the autopilot and autothrottles; and realized the gear had never been retracted. On our second approach; we were much more cautious; leading everything more aggressively with drag than before. I noticed we experienced the same turbulence again prior to the FAF and we had a 15-knot quartering tailwind down to 1;000 FT. It still took all of our precautionary actions just to get the airplane on profile by 1;000 FT. At no point do I believe we exceeded any aircraft parameters but we did briefly let the autopilot enter a descent on the go-around. To say I was startled to see us descending would be an understatement and I know I overreacted with the controls. Though correct; it was not a smooth response. Add rumbling gear and multiple full-power applications and I'm sure it alarmed some passengers in the back.MISTAKES: I made three clear mistakes. The first was that I briefed the single engine procedure for Runway 4R instead of the normal go-around profile. While not a direct reason for our sloppy go-around; it certainly would not have hurt our performance. Secondly; and most problematic; I reverted to B-737 muscle memory for the go-around execution which led to a late go-around initiation; having to fly the airplane without the proper modes; and feeling overwhelmed enough to put the autopilot on as quickly as I did. Third; I put the autopilot on before we had finished cleaning up the aircraft and it somehow led to the aircraft descending briefly on the go-around. I do not know what mode commanded this or why but by the time I recognized it; we had already stopped climbing.Other regrets: I wish I had asked the Captain for help finding the TOGA switches. I also wish I had disconnected the autothrottles immediately to keep them from fighting me on the go-around.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.