Narrative:

Upon glideslope intercept and handoff from cyvr approach to cyvr tower we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding A330 aircraft. Our aircraft was on autopilot and the captain subsequently disengaged the autopilot and recovered from the counterclockwise roll. After which; I queried ATC to ask for a repeat on the last radio command and to advise them of the occurrence. I then queried the captain as to his last command which was 'gear down'. Next I checked in with tower and advised them of the wake turbulence. Getting back to the aircraft; I then lowered flaps on command to the final setting of 30 degrees and completed the landing checklist; at which time I noticed our airspeed falling off. I advised the captain we were 15 KTS slow; and noticed the trend arrow seemed aggressive. I was not sure the captain understood the pace that the speed was dropping off so I put my hand on the throttles to advance them aggressively. His hand met with my hand and we advanced them together. During this speed event we dropped a half a dot below the glideslope. Fearing another wake; I asked the captain if he would rather fly 'a dot high'. He agreed and added power to fly a path above the glideslope. We were able to stay out of the A330 wake and landed in the touchdown zone and exited at the M5 high speed. Upon taxi ground control asked the severity of the wake; which I replied with '60 degrees of bank'. Upon further consideration I believe the bank to have been marginally over 30 degrees; however when your aircraft is uncommanded to a roll it always appears to be more dire and severe. They then asked where it happened; at which time the captain asked me to wait on my reply until at the gate; as we were in the ramp area and needed to focus on the traffic in the area. After reaching the gate and completing our shutdown checklist I advised ground control the event happened approximately at the final approach fix. The wake turbulence event was stronger than I have felt in the past and seemed to have more control over our aircraft than I have felt before. It is my opinion this stronger than normal event caused the captain to have a slight fixation on a single instrument causing a momentary lack of his instrument scan which led to the airspeed and glideslope deviation. We caught the error quickly and aggressively corrected.after clearing the runway and checking in with ground control we were cleared to taxi to gate and asked to use the 'bypass line' to avoid an airbus which had pushed back from their gate. As we were approaching the ramp area I noticed the ground crew had already disconnected from the aircraft and returned to the gate area. I then advised the captain that I felt the airbus would be calling for taxi 'any moment now' and that I was unsure of the distance between the taxi line and the bypass-taxi line at the location of the tango intersection. The captain made the decision to proceed onto the bypass line as the airbus had not begun their taxi. Our jumpseat check airman immediately noticed that while the airbus' nose wheel was on the taxi line the tail was at an approximate 30 degree angle towards our bypass line. He mentioned this to the captain who opted to move slightly more to the left to allow more room between the wingtips; at which time the jumpseat check airman commanded him to stop the jet. We stopped and then waited for the airbus to taxi before continuing on the bypass line and then to the gate. It is my opinion that this event happened as a result of the high stress wake turbulence encounter on final approach and the subsequent adrenalin/heightened-stress situation altering the captain's standard decision-making process.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported a wake vortex encounter in trail of an A330 on approach to CYVR that resulted in a roll and speed deviation.

Narrative: Upon glideslope intercept and handoff from CYVR Approach to CYVR Tower we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding A330 aircraft. Our aircraft was on autopilot and the Captain subsequently disengaged the autopilot and recovered from the counterclockwise roll. After which; I queried ATC to ask for a repeat on the last radio command and to advise them of the occurrence. I then queried the Captain as to his last command which was 'gear down'. Next I checked in with Tower and advised them of the wake turbulence. Getting back to the aircraft; I then lowered flaps on command to the final setting of 30 degrees and completed the Landing Checklist; at which time I noticed our airspeed falling off. I advised the Captain we were 15 KTS slow; and noticed the trend arrow seemed aggressive. I was not sure the Captain understood the pace that the speed was dropping off so I put my hand on the throttles to advance them aggressively. His hand met with my hand and we advanced them together. During this speed event we dropped a half a dot below the glideslope. Fearing another wake; I asked the Captain if he would rather fly 'a dot high'. He agreed and added power to fly a path above the glideslope. We were able to stay out of the A330 wake and landed in the touchdown zone and exited at the M5 high speed. Upon taxi Ground Control asked the severity of the wake; which I replied with '60 degrees of bank'. Upon further consideration I believe the bank to have been marginally over 30 degrees; however when your aircraft is uncommanded to a roll it always appears to be more dire and severe. They then asked where it happened; at which time the Captain asked me to wait on my reply until at the gate; as we were in the ramp area and needed to focus on the traffic in the area. After reaching the gate and completing our Shutdown Checklist I advised Ground Control the event happened approximately at the final approach fix. The wake turbulence event was stronger than I have felt in the past and seemed to have more control over our aircraft than I have felt before. It is my opinion this stronger than normal event caused the Captain to have a slight fixation on a single instrument causing a momentary lack of his instrument scan which led to the airspeed and glideslope deviation. We caught the error quickly and aggressively corrected.After clearing the runway and checking in with Ground Control we were cleared to taxi to gate and asked to use the 'bypass line' to avoid an Airbus which had pushed back from their gate. As we were approaching the ramp area I noticed the ground crew had already disconnected from the aircraft and returned to the gate area. I then advised the Captain that I felt the Airbus would be calling for taxi 'any moment now' and that I was unsure of the distance between the taxi line and the bypass-taxi line at the location of the Tango Intersection. The Captain made the decision to proceed onto the bypass line as the Airbus had not begun their taxi. Our jumpseat Check Airman immediately noticed that while the Airbus' nose wheel was on the taxi line the tail was at an approximate 30 degree angle towards our bypass line. He mentioned this to the Captain who opted to move slightly more to the left to allow more room between the wingtips; at which time the jumpseat Check Airman commanded him to stop the jet. We stopped and then waited for the Airbus to taxi before continuing on the bypass line and then to the gate. It is my opinion that this event happened as a result of the high stress wake turbulence encounter on final approach and the subsequent adrenalin/heightened-stress situation altering the Captain's standard decision-making process.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.