Narrative:

I would like to report a series of events involving the arsa at santa barbara airport, santa barbara, ca. We contacted approach 20 NM east and was vectored for 15L. During our approach to the airport we monitored several exchanges with other pilots. One pilot was off assigned heading by 20 degree, was reprimanded by the controller and given a landline number to call collect. We were now on a 4 mi left base. We were vectored by the tower to turn 20 degree 2 separate times right to give room for landing traffic runway 25. It seems the larger aircraft were landing 25 and general aviation 15R & left. The tower misjudged the time for the 25 traffic and we had to cross the approach for both 15 left & right then turn toward the numbers and land 15R. We were still in conflict with 25 traffic and were instructed to 'south turn'. After landing we turned left and held short of 15L. We were then promptly forgotten by the tower. During our wait between runways, the tower spaced 2 metroliners too close. The second aircraft was forced to go around. I was PIC upon departure and received clearance, taxi, and takeoff uneventfully. We were handed off to departure and vectored. After several vectors we were beyond gliding distance from land. I had not anticipated this and was not carrying flotation gear. We were thus forced into an unsafe situation of being over water without adequate flotation equipment. We were finally released to our own navigation but to monitor the frequency. At this time a pilot who did not understand clearance turned left at the shoreline as was the practice before the arsa. Pilot was reprimanded and lectured on the danger of midairs by the controller on the departure frequency. He then asked me my heading having completely forgotten I was on my own navigation. He started to explain my mistake. I told him I had been released 2 minutes earlier. Summary: 1) the arsa and airport controllers seemed to be less experienced than required for their duties. They also seem to have a desire to lecture pilots on the controling frequency. 2) for years the traffic has been heavy but smooth. The departing traffic did not have to go out over the ocean. 3) VFR pilots are not familiar with IFR type clrncs. They cannot, for the most part, hold altitude and heading to the degree of accuracy expected by the controllers. At santa barbara on climbout over the ocean with a hazy horizon you are, to all intents and purposes, on instruments. History has shown that VFR pilots are poorly prepared for this situation. Recommendations: 1) only implement arsa's when some improvement in safety can be realized. Staff the facility with competent controllers. 2) require a logbook endorsement for VFR pilots from cfii before operation in an arsa environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ARRIVING ACFT EXPERIENCED DELAYS TO ARPT, AND ROUTED OVER WATER AFTER DEP.

Narrative: I WOULD LIKE TO REPORT A SERIES OF EVENTS INVOLVING THE ARSA AT SANTA BARBARA ARPT, SANTA BARBARA, CA. WE CONTACTED APCH 20 NM E AND WAS VECTORED FOR 15L. DURING OUR APCH TO THE ARPT WE MONITORED SEVERAL EXCHANGES WITH OTHER PLTS. ONE PLT WAS OFF ASSIGNED HDG BY 20 DEG, WAS REPRIMANDED BY THE CTLR AND GIVEN A LANDLINE NUMBER TO CALL COLLECT. WE WERE NOW ON A 4 MI LEFT BASE. WE WERE VECTORED BY THE TWR TO TURN 20 DEG 2 SEPARATE TIMES RIGHT TO GIVE ROOM FOR LNDG TFC RWY 25. IT SEEMS THE LARGER ACFT WERE LNDG 25 AND GENERAL AVIATION 15R & L. THE TWR MISJUDGED THE TIME FOR THE 25 TFC AND WE HAD TO CROSS THE APCH FOR BOTH 15 L & R THEN TURN TOWARD THE NUMBERS AND LAND 15R. WE WERE STILL IN CONFLICT WITH 25 TFC AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO 'S TURN'. AFTER LNDG WE TURNED LEFT AND HELD SHORT OF 15L. WE WERE THEN PROMPTLY FORGOTTEN BY THE TWR. DURING OUR WAIT BETWEEN RWYS, THE TWR SPACED 2 METROLINERS TOO CLOSE. THE SECOND ACFT WAS FORCED TO GO AROUND. I WAS PIC UPON DEP AND RECEIVED CLRNC, TAXI, AND TKOF UNEVENTFULLY. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DEP AND VECTORED. AFTER SEVERAL VECTORS WE WERE BEYOND GLIDING DISTANCE FROM LAND. I HAD NOT ANTICIPATED THIS AND WAS NOT CARRYING FLOTATION GEAR. WE WERE THUS FORCED INTO AN UNSAFE SITUATION OF BEING OVER WATER WITHOUT ADEQUATE FLOTATION EQUIPMENT. WE WERE FINALLY RELEASED TO OUR OWN NAVIGATION BUT TO MONITOR THE FREQ. AT THIS TIME A PLT WHO DID NOT UNDERSTAND CLRNC TURNED LEFT AT THE SHORELINE AS WAS THE PRACTICE BEFORE THE ARSA. PLT WAS REPRIMANDED AND LECTURED ON THE DANGER OF MIDAIRS BY THE CTLR ON THE DEP FREQ. HE THEN ASKED ME MY HDG HAVING COMPLETELY FORGOTTEN I WAS ON MY OWN NAVIGATION. HE STARTED TO EXPLAIN MY MISTAKE. I TOLD HIM I HAD BEEN RELEASED 2 MINUTES EARLIER. SUMMARY: 1) THE ARSA AND ARPT CTLRS SEEMED TO BE LESS EXPERIENCED THAN REQUIRED FOR THEIR DUTIES. THEY ALSO SEEM TO HAVE A DESIRE TO LECTURE PLTS ON THE CTLING FREQ. 2) FOR YEARS THE TFC HAS BEEN HEAVY BUT SMOOTH. THE DEPARTING TFC DID NOT HAVE TO GO OUT OVER THE OCEAN. 3) VFR PLTS ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH IFR TYPE CLRNCS. THEY CANNOT, FOR THE MOST PART, HOLD ALT AND HDG TO THE DEGREE OF ACCURACY EXPECTED BY THE CTLRS. AT SANTA BARBARA ON CLIMBOUT OVER THE OCEAN WITH A HAZY HORIZON YOU ARE, TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, ON INSTRUMENTS. HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT VFR PLTS ARE POORLY PREPARED FOR THIS SITUATION. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) ONLY IMPLEMENT ARSA'S WHEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN SAFETY CAN BE REALIZED. STAFF THE FACILITY WITH COMPETENT CTLRS. 2) REQUIRE A LOGBOOK ENDORSEMENT FOR VFR PLTS FROM CFII BEFORE OPERATION IN AN ARSA ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.