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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1147828 |
Time | |
Date | 201402 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZLC.ARTCC |
State Reference | UT |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Sectors 3 and 4 were combined at 4. Before I came back from my break; the sector 4 controller removed strips on an air carrier aircraft. When I got back from my break I was asked to split sector 3 off and did so. During the briefing we had multiple salt lake departures; one of which requested higher while still in salt lake approach's airspace. The briefing also included an overview of the traffic we were dealing with at that time; but nothing was mentioned of the unidentified air carrier. As soon as the briefing was over my attention was drawn to the departures; and to coordinate with approach to climb an aircraft in their airspace. I didn't notice unidentified air carrier fly through the other side of my airspace. At this point the unidentified air carrier had no data block and would have been an intruder on a discrete code at FL310. Denver center then called and asked about the intruder in their airspace. I asked my supervisor about the code and he found out who it was. I then called denver center back informing them of who it was and verifying the frequency that they wanted the aircraft on.we have a 'fail safe' built into our system to prevent controllers from inadvertently removing strips on the wrong aircraft; it doesn't work. As in this case; the average controller never looks at the crud readout; they simply hit y to remove strips. I can't help but wonder of people would be more careful without this built in safety net? Or; maybe the 'fail safe' needs to be more of a safety net. Maybe after the computer asks if you want to remove strips on so and so; and you hit y; then the computer could ask; 'are you sure; do you really want to remove strips on so and so.' and then you'd have to hit 'Y' again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Two ZLC sectors were combined and while attempting to catch up; an experienced Controller removed a transiting aircraft's ID strip but the error was not seen until the aircraft entered ZDV airspace when ZDV called wanting flight information.
Narrative: Sectors 3 and 4 were combined at 4. Before I came back from my break; the Sector 4 Controller removed strips on an air carrier aircraft. When I got back from my break I was asked to split Sector 3 off and did so. During the briefing we had multiple Salt Lake departures; one of which requested higher while still in Salt Lake Approach's airspace. The briefing also included an overview of the traffic we were dealing with at that time; but nothing was mentioned of the unidentified air carrier. As soon as the briefing was over my attention was drawn to the departures; and to coordinate with Approach to climb an aircraft in their airspace. I didn't notice unidentified air carrier fly through the other side of my airspace. At this point the unidentified air carrier had no data block and would have been an intruder on a discrete code at FL310. Denver Center then called and asked about the intruder in their airspace. I asked my Supervisor about the code and he found out who it was. I then called Denver Center back informing them of who it was and verifying the frequency that they wanted the aircraft on.We have a 'fail safe' built into our system to prevent controllers from inadvertently removing strips on the wrong aircraft; it doesn't work. As in this case; the average controller never looks at the crud readout; they simply hit y to remove strips. I can't help but wonder of people would be more careful without this built in safety net? Or; maybe the 'fail safe' needs to be more of a safety net. Maybe after the computer asks if you want to remove strips on so and so; and you hit y; then the computer could ask; 'Are you sure; do you really want to remove strips on so and so.' And then you'd have to hit 'Y' again.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.