Narrative:

At about 80 KTS on the takeoff roll we received a right fadec caution message. The captain; who was pilot flying; decided to continue. Once the aircraft was at a safe altitude; and the after takeoff checklist had been accomplished; the captain asked the first officer to review the QRH procedure for right fadec caution. While reading through the checklist; the first officer noticed that the QRH called for the affected thrust lever to be reduced to idle. The first officer also noticed that the notes section of the checklist mentioned that the affected engine may operate normally without overspeed protection. He also noticed that the affected engine may shutdown. At that point; the first officer reluctantly mentioned to the captain that the checklist called for the affected engine to be shutdown. The captain mentioned that the engine was operating fine and that it did not make sense to shutdown a normally operating engine. The captain looked at the checklist and decided to keep the engine operating. The first officer mentioned the lack of overspeed protection and said; 'what if there is an engine surge in the flare?' we thought of the consequences of that happening without following the checklist and shutting the affected engine down. At this point all engine indications seemed normal. The captain and first officer reluctantly decided to follow the checklist and shut the engine down. The captain said to keep the engine operating until 10;000 ft. At 10;000 ft both thrust levers were reduced to in an effort to slow to 250 KTS. At that time the captain advanced the non-affected engine to maintain speed. The first officer began running through the checklist. An emergency was declared and the crew agreed that the longest runway available would be requested for landing. Once on the ground the aircraft was taxied to the gate under its own power. It wasn't until after getting to the gate and stress levels had subsided that the crew noticed the mistake that was made in shutting down the engine. The checklist called for affected thrust reverser instead of affected thrust lever.a threat in this event would be the number of times the crew has done single engine procedures in the training environment; which I believe to be top notch training; causing them to unintentionally not think outside the box. I read the checklist over a few times and each time I read it the same way. I think it's because thrust levers and thrust reversers have a few letters in common; in my head they translated into what I've seen in training (thrust levers). In the future I will definitely read through more carefully to make sure I'm doing what is being asked. Especially when it is something that myself and the captain both were reluctant to do to begin with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 flight crew experienced right engine FADEC Caution message at 80 KTS; continued takeoff and eventually shut down the engine due to a misreading of the QRH procedure.

Narrative: At about 80 KTS on the takeoff roll we received a R FADEC Caution Message. The Captain; who was pilot flying; decided to continue. Once the aircraft was at a safe altitude; and the After Takeoff Checklist had been accomplished; the Captain asked the First Officer to review the QRH procedure for R FADEC Caution. While reading through the checklist; the First Officer noticed that the QRH called for the affected thrust lever to be reduced to idle. The First Officer also noticed that the Notes section of the Checklist mentioned that the affected engine may operate normally without overspeed protection. He also noticed that the affected engine may shutdown. At that point; the First Officer reluctantly mentioned to the Captain that the checklist called for the affected engine to be shutdown. The Captain mentioned that the engine was operating fine and that it did not make sense to shutdown a normally operating engine. The Captain looked at the checklist and decided to keep the engine operating. The First Officer mentioned the lack of overspeed protection and said; 'What if there is an engine surge in the flare?' We thought of the consequences of that happening without following the checklist and shutting the affected engine down. At this point all engine indications seemed normal. The Captain and First Officer reluctantly decided to follow the checklist and shut the engine down. The Captain said to keep the engine operating until 10;000 FT. At 10;000 FT both thrust levers were reduced to in an effort to slow to 250 KTS. At that time the Captain advanced the non-affected engine to maintain speed. The First Officer began running through the checklist. An emergency was declared and the crew agreed that the longest runway available would be requested for landing. Once on the ground the aircraft was taxied to the gate under its own power. It wasn't until after getting to the gate and stress levels had subsided that the crew noticed the mistake that was made in shutting down the engine. The checklist called for affected thrust reverser instead of affected thrust lever.A threat in this event would be the number of times the crew has done Single Engine Procedures in the training environment; which I believe to be top notch training; causing them to unintentionally not think outside the box. I read the checklist over a few times and each time I read it the same way. I think it's because thrust levers and thrust reversers have a few letters in common; in my head they translated into what I've seen in training (thrust levers). In the future I will definitely read through more carefully to make sure I'm doing what is being asked. Especially when it is something that myself and the Captain both were reluctant to do to begin with.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.