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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1153010 |
Time | |
Date | 201402 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | ATR 42 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Speed All Types Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
During the approach we were using icing speeds plus a 6 knot addition for head wind and using 36K card for speeds. There was a relatively small margin for error between approach speed and flaps overspeed. First officer mentioned that he was fixated on the speed and missed several step down fixes due to speed fixation and he was watching GPS DME rather than localizer DME for the step downs and was confused on the non-precision approach. I was trying to help with calling out next altitudes and was distracted with new information that another airplane gave about ceiling height while we were inside the FAF. At the map I called map and the first officer called maximum power flaps 15. I raised the flaps to 15 and set the power and watched for positive rate. After maybe 5 seconds with no positive rate indication; I noticed that we were still pitched to a level pitch. I said pitch up then we got a GPWS 'terrain' message so I pulled on the controls and said you need to pitch up. He did pitch up very slowly and I was watching him to make sure that he continued to pitch up and missed the positive rate call. He noticed the gear down and pulled it up and we almost instantly got a clacker. He immediately pulled the flaps up and the clacker went away very quickly. Neither one of us noted the airspeed at the time of the clacker. We diverted and became saturated with preparing for the return flight after landing and I forgot to write up the flaps overspeed. I wrote it up on the next leg. The first officer mentioned that it would have been more helpful if I had called out the step down fixes rather than the next altitude. Overall the first officer did a good job considering my failure to make multiple callouts throughout the approach and the missed. I allowed myself to lose situational awareness and become distracted at a critical point in flight. The first officer and I have discussed getting together on a regular basis and practicing abnormal procedures. I need to be more assertive and take the flight controls when I notice that we are getting too far behind. I really feel that I should have said 'my controls' and flown the missed approach when I noticed that we hadn't pitched up. Up to that point everything wasn't perfect but was within a satisfactory margin. That was the point where the culmination of small errors started to erode our situational awareness resulting in a flaps overspeed clacker. I also should have debriefed with the first officer immediately after landing rather than waiting to get home which would have eliminated the fact that I flew an airplane that needed the flaps to be inspected to become airworthy.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ATR42 flight crew describes a LOC BC approach in icing conditions and turbulence; using an approach speed close to flap limit speed. The flying First Officer becomes confused; identifying stepdown fixes with GPS DME instead of LOC DME. At the MAP a missed approach is initiated but the go around button is not pushed and the aircraft remains in level flight until the trim switch is used; disconnecting the autopilot. The gear remains down and flap overspeeds occur. The flight diverts to an alternate airport.
Narrative: During the approach we were using icing speeds plus a 6 knot addition for head wind and using 36K card for speeds. There was a relatively small margin for error between approach speed and flaps overspeed. First Officer mentioned that he was fixated on the speed and missed several step down fixes due to speed fixation and he was watching GPS DME rather than LOC DME for the step downs and was confused on the non-precision approach. I was trying to help with calling out next altitudes and was distracted with new information that another airplane gave about ceiling height while we were inside the FAF. At the MAP I called MAP and the First Officer called maximum power flaps 15. I raised the flaps to 15 and set the power and watched for positive rate. After maybe 5 seconds with no positive rate indication; I noticed that we were still pitched to a level pitch. I said pitch up then we got a GPWS 'Terrain' message so I pulled on the controls and said you need to pitch up. He did pitch up very slowly and I was watching him to make sure that he continued to pitch up and missed the positive rate call. He noticed the gear down and pulled it up and we almost instantly got a clacker. He immediately pulled the flaps up and the clacker went away very quickly. Neither one of us noted the airspeed at the time of the clacker. We diverted and became saturated with preparing for the return flight after landing and I forgot to write up the flaps overspeed. I wrote it up on the next leg. The First Officer mentioned that it would have been more helpful if I had called out the step down fixes rather than the next altitude. Overall the First Officer did a good job considering my failure to make multiple callouts throughout the approach and the missed. I allowed myself to lose situational awareness and become distracted at a critical point in flight. The First Officer and I have discussed getting together on a regular basis and practicing abnormal procedures. I need to be more assertive and take the flight controls when I notice that we are getting too far behind. I really feel that I should have said 'my controls' and flown the missed approach when I noticed that we hadn't pitched up. Up to that point everything wasn't perfect but was within a satisfactory margin. That was the point where the culmination of small errors started to erode our situational awareness resulting in a flaps overspeed clacker. I also should have debriefed with the First Officer immediately after landing rather than waiting to get home which would have eliminated the fact that I flew an airplane that needed the flaps to be inspected to become airworthy.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.