Narrative:

My crew met the airplane when it arrived at the gate. We swapped in; prepared the airplane; boarded; started and took off normally. We were westbound with [departure]; level at either five or six-thousand feet awaiting the next climb; when I commented that it smelled like exhaust. The first officer agreed and we realized that it was beginning to get hazy in the cockpit. We decided to call it smoke in the cockpit even though it wasn't very visible yet and announced to ATC that we had smoke in the cockpit and were returning to our departure airport. It was a clear; VFR afternoon; so we immediately had visual contact with the field upon turning. We donned our oxygen masks and began following headings and lower altitude assignments to land. The lavatory smoke detector began to sound and was almost immediately followed by the flight attendant calling the cockpit to see if we could hear it. I informed her that we could and were returning to the field. I instructed her to prepare the cabin for landing and that I would call her back shortly. I made the decision not to have the first officer run the emergency and abnormal checklists because of our proximity to the airport and estimated time to landing. At this time the first officer and I began preparing for an immediate landing and I believe the flight attendant; aided by a traveling pilot in uniform; checked the lavatory as well as the overhead bins for the source of the fire but was unable to find it. Smoke was now easily visible and clearly; albeit gradually; worsening. Given the exhaust smell and the low probability of a fire in the lavatory or smoke from the lavatory reaching the cockpit; I instructed the first officer to shut off the #2 bleed in an attempt to determine if one of the bleeds was the source. Engine indications were all normal and nothing irregular about the engines could be determined visually. Because of our proximity to the field; this was the extent of our troubleshooting. We decided that after landing we would clear the runway and meet fire rescue on the taxiway. While the first officer requested trucks; I called the flight attendant to inform her that we were not planning to evacuate and to have a fire extinguisher ready. Once we landed and pulled off onto a taxiway (which I estimate to be about fifteen minutes from initial detection of a problem); I shut down the engines and instructed the first officer to coordinate as necessary with ground control and then shut off the power. I got out of the cockpit to open the cabin door and noticed that the cabin was also smokey. I told fire rescue that the lavatory smoke detector had gone off and that we were unable to find a fire. I coordinated with airport personnel to have a people-mover driven out to take passengers to the terminal. With their help; we deplaned and had passengers wait in a grassy area attended by rescue personnel. I checked with the first officer and flight attendant to verify that they were uninjured and at the request of airport personnel the flight attendant accompanied the passengers to the terminal. The first officer and I helped fire rescue search for any signs of fire but were unsuccessful. By this time; the smoke had almost completely cleared out with the cabin door being open. Airport personnel advised us that there was a gate available and given the evidence at hand we asked to be towed to the gate instead of starting the engines and taxiing. I do not believe that there was any procedural root of the emergency and am confident that it was the result of a component failure; so I do not have suggestions for preventing or avoiding recurrence but I do have a suggestion for aiding in handling similar situations in the future; upgrade the oxygen equipment. Having experienced an emergency recently that involved donning the oxygen masks (after which I made the same suggestion); I was proficient in their use. Despite the quick donning configuration; the masks were still a hindrance to communication between the crew; both with and without use of the interphone; and over the radios. While the smoke never thickened sufficiently to obscure visibility; I considered the use of smoke goggles but quickly decided against it. Smoke goggles were not necessary in this case and would obviously have been used if the situation required it but part of my decision involved knowing that visibility through the plastic lens of 'snorkel mask' type goggles is diminished. I do like that they are an independent component from the oxygen masks so that use of one does not require the other in a situation that does not require both; but on the whole the equipment that we have is regarded by myself (and I suspect other crew members) as a critical-situation-only option due to discomfort and burden.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC200 Captain reports smoke in the cockpit and cabin shortly after takeoff and elects to return to the departure airport. The aircraft is met by ARFF but no source can be determined. The passengers are bussed to the terminal and the aircraft is towed to a gate.

Narrative: My crew met the airplane when it arrived at the gate. We swapped in; prepared the airplane; boarded; started and took off normally. We were westbound with [Departure]; level at either five or six-thousand feet awaiting the next climb; when I commented that it smelled like exhaust. The First Officer agreed and we realized that it was beginning to get hazy in the cockpit. We decided to call it smoke in the cockpit even though it wasn't very visible yet and announced to ATC that we had smoke in the cockpit and were returning to our departure airport. It was a clear; VFR afternoon; so we immediately had visual contact with the field upon turning. We donned our oxygen masks and began following headings and lower altitude assignments to land. The lavatory smoke detector began to sound and was almost immediately followed by the Flight Attendant calling the cockpit to see if we could hear it. I informed her that we could and were returning to the field. I instructed her to prepare the cabin for landing and that I would call her back shortly. I made the decision not to have the First Officer run the Emergency and Abnormal checklists because of our proximity to the airport and estimated time to landing. At this time the First Officer and I began preparing for an immediate landing and I believe the Flight Attendant; aided by a traveling pilot in uniform; checked the lavatory as well as the overhead bins for the source of the fire but was unable to find it. Smoke was now easily visible and clearly; albeit gradually; worsening. Given the exhaust smell and the low probability of a fire in the lavatory or smoke from the lavatory reaching the cockpit; I instructed the First Officer to shut off the #2 bleed in an attempt to determine if one of the bleeds was the source. Engine indications were all normal and nothing irregular about the engines could be determined visually. Because of our proximity to the field; this was the extent of our troubleshooting. We decided that after landing we would clear the runway and meet fire rescue on the taxiway. While the First Officer requested trucks; I called the Flight Attendant to inform her that we were not planning to evacuate and to have a fire extinguisher ready. Once we landed and pulled off onto a taxiway (which I estimate to be about fifteen minutes from initial detection of a problem); I shut down the engines and instructed the First Officer to coordinate as necessary with ground control and then shut off the power. I got out of the cockpit to open the cabin door and noticed that the cabin was also smokey. I told fire rescue that the lavatory smoke detector had gone off and that we were unable to find a fire. I coordinated with airport personnel to have a people-mover driven out to take passengers to the terminal. With their help; we deplaned and had passengers wait in a grassy area attended by rescue personnel. I checked with the First Officer and Flight Attendant to verify that they were uninjured and at the request of airport personnel the Flight Attendant accompanied the passengers to the terminal. The First Officer and I helped fire rescue search for any signs of fire but were unsuccessful. By this time; the smoke had almost completely cleared out with the cabin door being open. Airport personnel advised us that there was a gate available and given the evidence at hand we asked to be towed to the gate instead of starting the engines and taxiing. I do not believe that there was any procedural root of the emergency and am confident that it was the result of a component failure; so I do not have suggestions for preventing or avoiding recurrence but I do have a suggestion for aiding in handling similar situations in the future; upgrade the oxygen equipment. Having experienced an emergency recently that involved donning the oxygen masks (after which I made the same suggestion); I was proficient in their use. Despite the quick donning configuration; the masks were still a hindrance to communication between the crew; both with and without use of the interphone; and over the radios. While the smoke never thickened sufficiently to obscure visibility; I considered the use of smoke goggles but quickly decided against it. Smoke goggles were not necessary in this case and would obviously have been used if the situation required it but part of my decision involved knowing that visibility through the plastic lens of 'snorkel mask' type goggles is diminished. I do like that they are an independent component from the oxygen masks so that use of one does not require the other in a situation that does not require both; but on the whole the equipment that we have is regarded by myself (and I suspect other crew members) as a critical-situation-only option due to discomfort and burden.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.