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A first officer and maintenance controller report how a left engine thrust reverser MEL deferral was inadvertently applied to a crj-200 aircraft that already had the left engine cowl anti-ice pressure relief valve deferred. Contributing factor was the lack of any cross-reference information in the thrust reverser MEL section that deferral of both items on the same side of aircraft; was not allowed.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1158903 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201403 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Light | Night |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Parked |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Minimum Equipment List (MEL) |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | First Officer |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | Other / Unknown |
| Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Powerplant |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR |
Narrative:
In ZZZ at the gate; when I got to the gate the captain and flight attendants were all ready there. I found out that maintenance was on the crj-200 aircraft. Maintenance was working on the left engine cowl anti-ice pressure relief valve and on the left thrust reverser; both on the left side. The left engine cowl anti-ice pressure relief valve had already been deferred on an earlier flight I believe? Maintenance came up and said that they deferred the left thrust reverser. We started to board while the captain took a look at the MEL and I was working on ATIS; pre departure clearance; weight and balance. The aircraft had at least four or five MEL's that the captain had to look at after maintenance got the logbook back to the flight deck. We missed the one line that said both of these [mels] cannot be deferred at the same time on the same side. The people who where involved was maintenance; captain and the first officer. [Recommendations] for avoiding a recurrence of this event should be the get everyone to take more time; at this point we where already an hour or so late. We should have held off on boarding for five minutes; to take more time to look over the MEL and talk to maintenance; to make sure everything with all the MEL's was ok. Five minutes would have made all the difference. It seemed [the MEL discrepancy] was detected by maintenance the day after the event occurred. Maintenance called the captain who then told myself (first officer).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A First Officer and Maintenance Controller report how a left engine thrust reverser MEL deferral was inadvertently applied to a CRJ-200 aircraft that already had the left engine cowl anti-ice pressure relief valve deferred. Contributing factor was the lack of any cross-reference information in the thrust reverser MEL section that deferral of both items on the same side of aircraft; was not allowed.
Narrative: In ZZZ at the gate; when I got to the gate the Captain and Flight Attendants were all ready there. I found out that Maintenance was on the CRJ-200 aircraft. Maintenance was working on the left engine cowl anti-ice pressure relief valve and on the left thrust reverser; both on the left side. The left engine cowl anti-ice pressure relief valve had already been deferred on an earlier flight I believe? Maintenance came up and said that they deferred the left thrust reverser. We started to board while the Captain took a look at the MEL and I was working on ATIS; PDC; Weight and Balance. The aircraft had at least four or five MEL's that the Captain had to look at after Maintenance got the logbook back to the flight deck. We missed the one line that said both of these [MELs] cannot be deferred at the same time on the same side. The people who where involved was Maintenance; Captain and the First Officer. [Recommendations] for avoiding a recurrence of this event should be the get everyone to take more time; at this point we where already an hour or so late. We should have held off on boarding for five minutes; to take more time to look over the MEL and talk to Maintenance; to make sure everything with all the MEL's was OK. Five minutes would have made all the difference. It seemed [the MEL discrepancy] was detected by Maintenance the day after the event occurred. Maintenance called the Captain who then told myself (First Officer).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.