Narrative:

Aircraft was assigned river visual to runway 19; dca. Plane was initially high for approach; gear lowered and flaps 10 with speedbrakes in effort to be at 10 miles/3;000 ft to begin approach. Relatively new first officer (first officer) was pilot flying; he had difficulty seeing bridge where approach begins while in descent; flew past the river. I told him to turn back to right; and he did; but he also maintained a steep descent; and as he rolled onto the river; we were at 2;000 ft instead of 3;000. I told him to maintain 2;000 until we intercepted the glide path; just as ATC called and mentioned that we were below the recommended altitude; asked if we needed any assistance. I replied that we were following the river; had the airport in sight; and did not. I turned to set my ipad up for taxi; looked back and noticed that first officer was continuing to descend. I repeated that he needed to stop descending 'now' --and made sure he did. ATC again noted that we were below recommended altitude. I affirmed that we didn't require assistance; had the airport in sight; and were following the river. We intercepted a visual glide path; and landed uneventfully.the first officer had not flown this approach before; and I had never flown with him prior to this trip. He has about 300 hours since returning from furlough; I probably should've flown the approach; as I've done it many times; and he could've had a chance to see it before doing it. In briefing; I recommended that he follow a simple '3 to 1' rule to fly the approach; and configure early. He expressed a desire to use VNAV; and I told him that was fine; but that it might not lend itself well to a 'slam dunk' when cleared for the approach; he set MDA; in the midst of the slam dunk. In discussing the approach with him later; it was clear that his ADI guidance had been more confusing than helpful. I should've made absolutely sure that my first officer stopped descending before shifting my attention to the I pad; and initially I was overly focused on helping him to get on the approach; and should've picked up his descent below recommended altitude sooner. I don't think we violated any far's; but do think I could've done a better job in backing him up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer just returned from furlough and never having flown the DCA Runway 19 River Visual was nearly a 1;000 FT low to start with and only after the Captain commanded leveling twice did he return to profile.

Narrative: Aircraft was assigned River Visual to Runway 19; DCA. Plane was initially high for approach; gear lowered and flaps 10 with speedbrakes in effort to be at 10 miles/3;000 FT to begin approach. Relatively new First Officer (FO) was pilot flying; he had difficulty seeing bridge where approach begins while in descent; flew past the river. I told him to turn back to right; and he did; but he also maintained a steep descent; and as he rolled onto the river; we were at 2;000 FT instead of 3;000. I told him to maintain 2;000 until we intercepted the glide path; just as ATC called and mentioned that we were below the recommended altitude; asked if we needed any assistance. I replied that we were following the river; had the airport in sight; and did not. I turned to set my iPad up for taxi; looked back and noticed that FO was continuing to descend. I repeated that he needed to stop descending 'NOW' --and made sure he did. ATC again noted that we were below recommended altitude. I affirmed that we didn't require assistance; had the airport in sight; and were following the river. We intercepted a visual glide path; and landed uneventfully.The FO had not flown this approach before; and I had never flown with him prior to this trip. He has about 300 hours since returning from furlough; I probably should've flown the approach; as I've done it many times; and he could've had a chance to see it before doing it. In briefing; I recommended that he follow a simple '3 to 1' rule to fly the approach; and configure early. He expressed a desire to use VNAV; and I told him that was fine; but that it might not lend itself well to a 'slam dunk' When cleared for the approach; he set MDA; in the midst of the slam dunk. in discussing the approach with him later; it was clear that his ADI guidance had been more confusing than helpful. I should've made absolutely sure that my FO stopped descending before shifting my attention to the I pad; and Initially I was overly focused on helping him to get on the approach; and should've picked up his descent below recommended altitude sooner. I don't think we violated any FAR's; but do think I could've done a better job in backing him up.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.