Narrative:

I was working local control; ground control; and flight data all combined. Aircraft X was on the visual approach runway 15 into ase. Aircraft Y; was awaiting departure on runway 33. When aircraft X was on a 7 mile final; I launched aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was on the LINDZ8 departure runway 33. This is an opposite direction operation. I called traffic to aircraft X and he said that he had aircraft Y in sight. I then told aircraft Y to start his right turn per the LINDZ8 departure and called out the aircraft X traffic to him. Aircraft Y said he was in the heading of 343 and looking for the traffic and then reported that he had aircraft X in sight. I then taxied a VFR C185 to runway 33 and while I was giving the C185 taxi instructions; I noticed that aircraft X was climbing. I immediately said to aircraft X; 'say intentions.' aircraft X replied that it was just too close and that he had received a TCAS RA. I asked aircraft X if he could maintain his out terrain and obstruction clearance. Aircraft X said yes. So I instructed him to do so and to enter a left downwind to runway 15. Then I cleared aircraft X to land on runway 15 again. Aircraft X landed on runway 15 without incident.this is normal operation for the aspen airport and I find it completely safe if the aircraft fly the profile. The way the TCAS RA had the arrival climb into the departing aircraft is the most concerning thing. There is no overriding a TCAS RA; but the way ase does their operations puts the aircraft and the controller in a tight place when there is a TCAS RA during a wrap (the departing aircraft climbing out to the east; then wrapping behind the arriving aircraft to climb to the west). I think that pilots need to be prepared to fly into ase and know that if there is a departing aircraft that aircraft will come in close proximity to them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Controller departs opposite direction traffic with arrival on seven mile final; causing arrival aircraft to receive an RA. Arrival then executes missed approach and returns to land.

Narrative: I was working Local Control; Ground Control; and Flight Data all combined. Aircraft X was on the visual approach Runway 15 into ASE. Aircraft Y; was awaiting departure on Runway 33. When Aircraft X was on a 7 mile final; I launched Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was on the LINDZ8 departure Runway 33. This is an opposite direction operation. I called traffic to Aircraft X and he said that he had Aircraft Y in sight. I then told Aircraft Y to start his right turn per the LINDZ8 departure and called out the Aircraft X traffic to him. Aircraft Y said he was in the heading of 343 and looking for the traffic and then reported that he had Aircraft X in sight. I then taxied a VFR C185 to RWY 33 and while I was giving the C185 taxi instructions; I noticed that Aircraft X was climbing. I immediately said to Aircraft X; 'Say intentions.' Aircraft X replied that it was just too close and that he had received a TCAS RA. I asked Aircraft X if he could maintain his out terrain and obstruction clearance. Aircraft X said yes. So I instructed him to do so and to enter a left downwind to Runway 15. Then I cleared Aircraft X to land on Runway 15 again. Aircraft X landed on Runway 15 without incident.This is normal operation for the Aspen airport and I find it completely safe if the aircraft fly the profile. The way the TCAS RA had the arrival climb into the departing aircraft is the most concerning thing. There is no overriding a TCAS RA; but the way ASE does their operations puts the aircraft and the controller in a tight place when there is a TCAS RA during a wrap (the departing aircraft climbing out to the east; then wrapping behind the arriving aircraft to climb to the west). I think that pilots need to be prepared to fly into ASE and know that if there is a departing aircraft that aircraft will come in close proximity to them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.