Narrative:

There was a line of level 3-4 thunderstorms lying across our route of flight. Dca cleared us to deviate east as necessary to avoid the WX, then changed our clearance to proceed direct to rdu direct to roa direct to djb, dtw then added 'that should keep you clear the of WX...'. We were given a frequency change, still dca center. The new controller seemed overloaded and inexperienced. After checking on, the volume of radio traffic increased quickly and frequent 'squeals' from simultaneous xmissions were heard. More alarming, however, was the fact that the assigned route wasn't going to keep us clear of the WX after all. We moved east slightly, the heading was about 080 degree, and noted a hole in the line to the north. The assigned routing would have taken us through a cell and a portion of the line with no break in the radar return. I advised dca that we needed to turn to a heading of about 020 degree for 40 mi then could proceed to roa. From our present position, the 020 degree heading was just about direct to roa. Center did not acknowledge the call, but the volume of radio traffic was still very great. A moment passed, and it became imperative that we turn either left or right to avoid penetrating the WX. The captain initiated a turn through the break and in the turn I again announced our intentions to dca center. The radio patter was unrelenting and again dca did not acknowledge our report. Shortly after rolling out on a heading of about 020 degree, center very excitedly exclaimed 'turn right heading 110 degree...' and repeated this a couple of times. The urgency in his voice alarmed me, but with the number of aircraft on the frequency I wasn't sure that he intended the heading for us. Our flight number was XXX but up until now every flight number had been preceded with the company name. I again announced to center our heading and intentions and he said '...maintain your present heading...'. We were handed off a short time later with no further discussion of why he was so excited about turning right to 110 degree. Obviously, our turning left almost 80 degree without a specific clearance to do so was a bad idea, but so was flying through a line of level 4 returns or turning right 50 degree. These were our only options. The option we exercised seemed to be in keeping with the spirit of our clearance. It took us almost directly to roa. A maximum effort was made by us to inform center of our needs and intentions, the volume of traffic and the controller's seeming inexperience made for a very poor level of communication quality. Only the controller's urgent and strident tone of voice indicated that there may have been a traffic conflict. We maintained an active traffic vigil and the only aircraft we observed was well below our altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLT CREW GIVEN HEADING TO 'KEEP CLEAR OF WX'. IT DIDN'T. HAD TO DEVIATE, NOT SURE IF CENTER HEARD COM DUE FREQ CONGESTION.

Narrative: THERE WAS A LINE OF LEVEL 3-4 TSTMS LYING ACROSS OUR ROUTE OF FLT. DCA CLRED US TO DEVIATE E AS NECESSARY TO AVOID THE WX, THEN CHANGED OUR CLRNC TO PROCEED DIRECT TO RDU DIRECT TO ROA DIRECT TO DJB, DTW THEN ADDED 'THAT SHOULD KEEP YOU CLEAR THE OF WX...'. WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE, STILL DCA CENTER. THE NEW CTLR SEEMED OVERLOADED AND INEXPERIENCED. AFTER CHECKING ON, THE VOLUME OF RADIO TFC INCREASED QUICKLY AND FREQUENT 'SQUEALS' FROM SIMULTANEOUS XMISSIONS WERE HEARD. MORE ALARMING, HOWEVER, WAS THE FACT THAT THE ASSIGNED ROUTE WASN'T GOING TO KEEP US CLEAR OF THE WX AFTER ALL. WE MOVED E SLIGHTLY, THE HDG WAS ABOUT 080 DEG, AND NOTED A HOLE IN THE LINE TO THE N. THE ASSIGNED ROUTING WOULD HAVE TAKEN US THROUGH A CELL AND A PORTION OF THE LINE WITH NO BREAK IN THE RADAR RETURN. I ADVISED DCA THAT WE NEEDED TO TURN TO A HDG OF ABOUT 020 DEG FOR 40 MI THEN COULD PROCEED TO ROA. FROM OUR PRESENT POSITION, THE 020 DEG HDG WAS JUST ABOUT DIRECT TO ROA. CENTER DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE CALL, BUT THE VOLUME OF RADIO TFC WAS STILL VERY GREAT. A MOMENT PASSED, AND IT BECAME IMPERATIVE THAT WE TURN EITHER LEFT OR RIGHT TO AVOID PENETRATING THE WX. THE CAPT INITIATED A TURN THROUGH THE BREAK AND IN THE TURN I AGAIN ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTIONS TO DCA CENTER. THE RADIO PATTER WAS UNRELENTING AND AGAIN DCA DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE OUR REPORT. SHORTLY AFTER ROLLING OUT ON A HDG OF ABOUT 020 DEG, CENTER VERY EXCITEDLY EXCLAIMED 'TURN RIGHT HDG 110 DEG...' AND REPEATED THIS A COUPLE OF TIMES. THE URGENCY IN HIS VOICE ALARMED ME, BUT WITH THE NUMBER OF ACFT ON THE FREQ I WASN'T SURE THAT HE INTENDED THE HDG FOR US. OUR FLT NUMBER WAS XXX BUT UP UNTIL NOW EVERY FLT NUMBER HAD BEEN PRECEDED WITH THE COMPANY NAME. I AGAIN ANNOUNCED TO CENTER OUR HDG AND INTENTIONS AND HE SAID '...MAINTAIN YOUR PRESENT HDG...'. WE WERE HANDED OFF A SHORT TIME LATER WITH NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF WHY HE WAS SO EXCITED ABOUT TURNING RIGHT TO 110 DEG. OBVIOUSLY, OUR TURNING LEFT ALMOST 80 DEG WITHOUT A SPECIFIC CLRNC TO DO SO WAS A BAD IDEA, BUT SO WAS FLYING THROUGH A LINE OF LEVEL 4 RETURNS OR TURNING RIGHT 50 DEG. THESE WERE OUR ONLY OPTIONS. THE OPTION WE EXERCISED SEEMED TO BE IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF OUR CLRNC. IT TOOK US ALMOST DIRECTLY TO ROA. A MAX EFFORT WAS MADE BY US TO INFORM CENTER OF OUR NEEDS AND INTENTIONS, THE VOLUME OF TFC AND THE CTLR'S SEEMING INEXPERIENCE MADE FOR A VERY POOR LEVEL OF COM QUALITY. ONLY THE CTLR'S URGENT AND STRIDENT TONE OF VOICE INDICATED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A TFC CONFLICT. WE MAINTAINED AN ACTIVE TFC VIGIL AND THE ONLY ACFT WE OBSERVED WAS WELL BELOW OUR ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.