Narrative:

As we were taxiing out; we were cleared full length from the IFR hold line; the captain called for the below the line checklist. I advised him we were not cleared on to the runway; he then said ok and held short of the runway. This should have been my first sign that something was wrong. We were then cleared for takeoff. Out of 600 ft; I contacted departure and they [gave us a] heading of 250 degrees; climb to 7;000 then advised us to expect direct twine. I verified twine on the second legs page. At this time they gave us a heading of 350; climb to 9;000; and then cleared direct twine. The captain went to put that in the FMS and had started his turn; but the bank increased to 45 degrees at which time I called out 'bank angle.' the captain started correcting the bank angle and was still trying to select twine when we were given a frequency change. I punched in the frequency as he entered direct twine and the FMS accepted it. The first time he tried he hit the wrong button so it didn't take...which I think is what led to [the] altitude bust. We checked in with departure on the new frequency and; at this time; I alerted the captain we were to level at 9;000 ft; but we were still climbing at 4;000 FPM. The captain had been hand flying the aircraft so; to avoid putting the passengers in a negative G situation; he slowly lowered the nose and I saw the altimeter hit 9;300 as the [altitude] alerter went off passing 9;200 as it was supposed to. The captain started a descent but as we went though 8;800; I again advised we were to maintain 9;000; he stated he had the aircraft and climbed back to 9;000. ATC never said anything. After the event the captain was very quiet for the rest of the trip; if I had not said anything as we were going though 8;800 ft I believe we would have kept climbing with out any level off.I feel the problem started on the ground when I advised him that we were not cleared on to the runway and that may have been a bit of confusion on our part; but it was better than taking the runway without the clearance. Then when he was trying to input the fix on the FMS and started the over banking situation that added to the confusion. All of these things were a chain of events that was heading us for a disaster; but after we finally leveled at 9;000 the captain was able to regain his thoughts and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.I have been flying with this captain for the past 4.5 years and normally we hand fly the aircraft though 10;000 ft and he always wants to input the FMS fixes himself and; with the pro-line 21 in our aircraft if one person starts the input he has to finish it or the other FMS will not take the information. So the pilot not flying will sit in the right seat and select the communication from the number 2 FMS and number 1 is doing the navigating. Even when I am in the left seat this captain will input the navigation from the right side FMS. This adds a lot to my workload trying to figure out what he is doing at the same time as what I am doing. This captain comes from a military background in single seat fighters and sometimes I feel that he takes offense to being corrected on things. I have often heard him comment on how smooth he is at the controls and landing as if he is wanting to berate me and give me a feeling of not being as good a pilot as he is. As I have pointed out to him before this is a crew airplane and we need to act as a crew. But the comment he continues to make is that he is PIC and anything that happens is on him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL30 First Officer used the occasion of an altitude deviation by his Captain to vent his frustrations with the Captain's shortcomings over a period of years during which they had worked together.

Narrative: As we were taxiing out; we were cleared full length from the IFR hold line; the Captain called for the Below The Line checklist. I advised him we were NOT cleared on to the runway; he then said OK and held short of the runway. This should have been my first sign that something was wrong. We were then cleared for takeoff. Out of 600 FT; I contacted Departure and they [gave us a] heading of 250 degrees; climb to 7;000 then advised us to expect Direct TWINE. I verified TWINE on the second legs page. At this time they gave us a heading of 350; climb to 9;000; and then cleared direct TWINE. The Captain went to put that in the FMS and had started his turn; but the bank increased to 45 degrees at which time I called out 'bank angle.' The Captain started correcting the bank angle and was still trying to select TWINE when we were given a frequency change. I punched in the frequency as he entered direct TWINE and the FMS accepted it. The first time he tried he hit the wrong button so it didn't take...which I think is what led to [the] altitude bust. We checked in with Departure on the new frequency and; at this time; I alerted the Captain we were to level at 9;000 FT; but we were still climbing at 4;000 FPM. The Captain had been hand flying the aircraft so; to avoid putting the passengers in a negative G situation; he slowly lowered the nose and I saw the altimeter hit 9;300 as the [altitude] alerter went off passing 9;200 as it was supposed to. The Captain started a descent but as we went though 8;800; I again advised we were to maintain 9;000; He stated he had the aircraft and climbed back to 9;000. ATC never said anything. After the event the Captain was very quiet for the rest of the trip; if I had not said anything as we were going though 8;800 FT I believe we would have kept climbing with out any level off.I feel the problem started on the ground when I advised him that we were not cleared on to the runway and that may have been a bit of confusion on our part; but it was better than taking the runway without the clearance. Then when he was trying to input the fix on the FMS and started the over banking situation that added to the confusion. All of these things were a chain of events that was heading us for a disaster; but after we finally leveled at 9;000 the Captain was able to regain his thoughts and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.I have been flying with this Captain for the past 4.5 years and normally we hand fly the aircraft though 10;000 FT and he always wants to input the FMS fixes himself and; with the Pro-Line 21 in our aircraft if one person starts the input he has to finish it or the other FMS will not take the information. So the pilot not flying will sit in the right seat and select the communication from the Number 2 FMS and Number 1 is doing the navigating. Even when I am in the left seat this Captain will input the navigation from the right side FMS. This adds a lot to my workload trying to figure out what he is doing at the same time as what I am doing. This Captain comes from a military background in single seat fighters and sometimes I feel that he takes offense to being corrected on things. I have often heard him comment on how smooth he is at the controls and landing as if he is wanting to berate me and give me a feeling of not being as good a pilot as he is. As I have pointed out to him before this is a crew airplane and we need to act as a crew. But the comment he continues to make is that he is PIC and anything that happens is on him.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.