Narrative:

I was the captain and pilot not flying on flight to ome. We were given instructions to hold at the peeko final approach fix for the localizer DME (back crs) runway 10 and that we were number 2. We proceeded to peeko intersection via the published 272 degree radial from ome VOR and were told to hold using right turns. We were told to maintain 5;000 ft. After approximately 20 minutes we were cleared for the approach. After getting established in the hold and several circuits; I diverted my attention to ascertain why it was taking so long to receive an approach clearance. I was talking with ome radio to find out if they had any recent arrivals (and a possible failure to cancel IFR) because we wanted to know how long we might be holding and if a diversion to our alternate was a possibility. After several circuits in the hold we were cleared for the approach and it appeared that we were west of peeko and in a position to make the procedure turn; we began the procedure turn and a descent to 3;100 ft (published) when ATC advised us to climb up to 6;000 ft because we appeared to be north of course and heading towards higher terrain. The pilot flying immediately climbed to 6;000 ft at which time we were completely disorientated. After the climb we requested to go direct to ome VOR; use the published hold as a course reversal and shoot the localizer DME (back crs) runway 10. We were approved as requested; proceeded directly to ome; and completed the transition; approach and landing without any incident. I am not sure exactly what occurred except that we thought we knew where we were when we actually didn't between the last hold circuit and being cleared for the approach. After initially being established properly on the hold; I basically 'tuned out' to concentrate on issues not directly related with flying the aircraft. This was a mistake. I am still not sure what exactly occurred between the last circuit of the hold and the approach clearance; except that when I mentally rejoined the pilot flying we weren't established on any course including the localizer back course. Clearly there was a significant breakdown in CRM and situation awareness. I believe a contributing factor was utilizing the localizer back course for guidance during the hold; when we could have easily used the VOR radial from ome and had instantaneous real time positional awareness by utilizing the RMI needles and DME. We utilized ome VOR to identify and navigate to peeko and it wasn't necessary to switch to the localizer back course for the hold; which turned out to be another big mistake. We may have been a bit anxious to shoot the approach and thought that an approach clearance would have been imminent. There was a lot of confusion between the hold and being cleared for the approach. We utilized the terrain awareness warning system (taws) the entire time to ensure we did not actually drift into higher terrain. On the last trip of the day; we noticed the captain and first officer's compasses exceeding 10 degrees difference; causing an instrument comparator warning. This occurred multiple times and may have been a contributing factor unknown to us at the time of the loss of situational awareness. In the future; as a result of the loss of situational awareness; I will stay more involved as part of the crew especially in terminal areas; at low altitudes; and times of increased work load. This was not the time for me to be chatting with ome radio. I must ensure that we are always aware of the aircrafts position; properly established on course; and call out significant deviations and ensure their prompt correction. I will exercise better CRM and show better leadership when situations in flight appear to be exceeding acceptable levels of tolerances and safety. We could have rejected the hold at peeko with right turns and instead asked for a hold at a higher altitude over ome VOR which would have also provided a better transition from the hold to the approach especially at 5;000 ft where ATC required us to be. There was significant task saturation on the pilot flying and my direct involvement in the hold and transition could have helped alleviate the pressure on the flying pilot. Fatigue may have played a factor. I traveled over 8;000 ft miles in the previous 48 hours where I started my travels in the central european time zone. In addition; I had 6 hours of sleep in base prior to my trip. In the future I will better manage my rest and account for long distance travel across multiple time zones prior to my report times.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported being issued holding instructions to hold at PEEKO on the back course to Runway 10 at OME; right turns with the First Officer flying. After 20 minutes of holding they are cleared for the LOC DME (BACK CRS) Runway 10. After commencing the procedure turn and starting descent the crew is advised by ATC that they are north of course heading towards high terrain and to climb to 6;000 FT being completely confused the Captain asks to start over from the VOR; which is accomplished successfully.

Narrative: I was the Captain and pilot not flying on flight to OME. We were given instructions to hold at the PEEKO final approach fix for the LOC DME (BACK CRS) Runway 10 and that we were Number 2. We proceeded to PEEKO Intersection via the published 272 degree radial from OME VOR and were told to hold using right turns. We were told to maintain 5;000 FT. After approximately 20 minutes we were cleared for the approach. After getting established in the hold and several circuits; I diverted my attention to ascertain why it was taking so long to receive an approach clearance. I was talking with OME radio to find out if they had any recent arrivals (and a possible failure to cancel IFR) because we wanted to know how long we might be holding and if a diversion to our alternate was a possibility. After several circuits in the hold we were cleared for the approach and it appeared that we were west of PEEKO and in a position to make the procedure turn; we began the procedure turn and a descent to 3;100 FT (published) when ATC advised us to climb up to 6;000 FT because we appeared to be north of course and heading towards higher terrain. The pilot flying immediately climbed to 6;000 FT at which time we were completely disorientated. After the climb we requested to go direct to OME VOR; use the published hold as a course reversal and shoot the LOC DME (BACK CRS) Runway 10. We were approved as requested; proceeded directly to OME; and completed the transition; approach and landing without any incident. I am not sure exactly what occurred except that we thought we knew where we were when we actually didn't between the last hold circuit and being cleared for the approach. After initially being established properly on the hold; I basically 'tuned out' to concentrate on issues not directly related with flying the aircraft. This was a mistake. I am still not sure what exactly occurred between the last circuit of the hold and the approach clearance; except that when I mentally rejoined the pilot flying we weren't established on any course including the localizer back course. Clearly there was a significant breakdown in CRM and situation awareness. I believe a contributing factor was utilizing the Localizer Back Course for guidance during the hold; when we could have easily used the VOR radial from OME and had instantaneous real time positional awareness by utilizing the RMI needles and DME. We utilized OME VOR to identify and navigate to PEEKO and it wasn't necessary to switch to the Localizer Back Course for the hold; which turned out to be another big mistake. We may have been a bit anxious to shoot the approach and thought that an approach clearance would have been imminent. There was a lot of confusion between the hold and being cleared for the approach. We utilized the Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) the entire time to ensure we did not actually drift into higher terrain. On the last trip of the day; we noticed the Captain and First Officer's compasses exceeding 10 degrees difference; causing an instrument comparator warning. This occurred multiple times and may have been a contributing factor unknown to us at the time of the loss of situational awareness. In the future; as a result of the loss of situational awareness; I will stay more involved as part of the crew especially in terminal areas; at low altitudes; and times of increased work load. This was not the time for me to be chatting with OME radio. I must ensure that we are always aware of the aircrafts position; properly established on course; and call out significant deviations and ensure their prompt correction. I will exercise better CRM and show better leadership when situations in flight appear to be exceeding acceptable levels of tolerances and safety. We could have rejected the hold at PEEKO with right turns and instead asked for a hold at a higher altitude over OME VOR which would have also provided a better transition from the hold to the approach especially at 5;000 FT where ATC required us to be. There was significant task saturation on the pilot flying and my direct involvement in the hold and transition could have helped alleviate the pressure on the flying pilot. Fatigue may have played a factor. I traveled over 8;000 FT miles in the previous 48 hours where I started my travels in the Central European time zone. In addition; I had 6 hours of sleep in base prior to my trip. In the future I will better manage my rest and account for long distance travel across multiple time zones prior to my report times.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.