Narrative:

As we accepted the aircraft for its first flight of the day; we noticed that the APU was deferred. Everything else was deemed normal with the aircraft and operations for that morning. We were cleared for takeoff... Everything proceeded as normal until we were at about 600 feet AGL in the climbout; just after gear retraction. We received a master caution; gen 2 off. [I] proceeded to reach up to the overhead panel and reset what [I] thought was the gen 2 switch at around 1;000 feet AGL. [I] had accidentally selected gen 1 and placed the switch from off to on/reset. This action caused the aircraft to auto-deploy the air driven generator; also causing a host of caution messages on the EICAS. [I]; realizing [my] error; then reset gen 2; the proper generator. Certain components that had fallen offline from the power disruption were now reset. First officer then asked departure control for a level off to 6;000 feet; rather than continuing our climb and stated to departure control that we had an issue that we were working on. First officer then asked for autopilot engagement and called for the QRH procedures for gen 2 off. I then indicated to him that we should also run the procedure for inadvertent air driven generator deployment since I had made an error in selecting the wrong generator for a reset. The gen 2 off checklist ultimately had us monitoring the electrical loads on the schematic page; which indicated that everything was now being powered in a normal manner (except for the air driven generator being deployed) by both generators. Since this was a normal power distribution; we then elected not to declare an emergency. The inadvertent air driven generator deployment checklist ultimately had us push the power transfer override switch. A climb checklist was then run to make sure that nothing was missed. After a quick discussion we both then decided it was best to return to [departure airport] at that point. We landed safely. Later that day; on the subsequent climbout we received a gen 2 off master caution again at 600 feet. We continued the climbout as normal. First officer asked for autopilot engagement and called for the gen 2 off QRH procedure. I then ran the procedure and then generator reset properly without any further abnormalities. I realize that there were things I could've done better to prevent this situation from occurring. My first mistake came from reacting much too quickly to the gen 2 off master caution. A contributing factor may have been that I was hyper-sensitive to the fact that we didn't have an APU gen online at the time and were down to only one gen with the gen 2 off master caution. Proper technique is to wait until you're at a safe altitude and call for the QRH- gen 2 off master caution. Also; I should've verified with first officer baker the proper gen switch before moving it. When the issue happened again on the subsequent takeoff; I had learned my lesson (the hard way) and much care and time was taken in calling for the appropriate checklist; verifying the appropriate gen switch and not rushing into the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When Master Caution GEN 2 OFF illuminated after takeoff; CRJ-200 Captain inadvertently selected GEN 1 for reset thereby deploying the ADG. Flight crew returned to departure airport for uneventful landing.

Narrative: As we accepted the aircraft for its first flight of the day; we noticed that the APU was deferred. Everything else was deemed normal with the aircraft and operations for that morning. We were cleared for takeoff... Everything proceeded as normal until we were at about 600 feet AGL in the climbout; just after gear retraction. We received a Master Caution; GEN 2 OFF. [I] proceeded to reach up to the overhead panel and reset what [I] thought was the GEN 2 switch at around 1;000 feet AGL. [I] had accidentally selected GEN 1 and placed the switch from OFF to ON/RESET. This action caused the aircraft to auto-deploy the ADG; also causing a host of caution messages on the EICAS. [I]; realizing [my] error; then reset GEN 2; the proper generator. Certain components that had fallen offline from the power disruption were now reset. First Officer then asked Departure Control for a level off to 6;000 feet; rather than continuing our climb and stated to Departure Control that we had an issue that we were working on. First Officer then asked for autopilot engagement and called for the QRH Procedures for GEN 2 OFF. I then indicated to him that we should also run the procedure for INADVERTENT ADG DEPLOYMENT since I had made an error in selecting the wrong generator for a reset. The GEN 2 OFF checklist ultimately had us monitoring the electrical loads on the schematic page; which indicated that everything was now being powered in a normal manner (except for the ADG being deployed) by both generators. Since this was a normal power distribution; we then elected NOT to declare an emergency. The INADVERTENT ADG DEPLOYMENT checklist ultimately had us push the Power Transfer Override switch. A climb checklist was then run to make sure that nothing was missed. After a quick discussion we both then decided it was best to return to [departure airport] at that point. We landed safely. Later that day; on the subsequent climbout we received a GEN 2 OFF master caution again at 600 feet. We continued the climbout as normal. First Officer asked for autopilot engagement and called for the GEN 2 OFF QRH Procedure. I then ran the procedure and then generator reset properly without any further abnormalities. I realize that there were things I could've done better to prevent this situation from occurring. My first mistake came from reacting much too quickly to the GEN 2 OFF master caution. A contributing factor may have been that I was hyper-sensitive to the fact that we didn't have an APU gen online at the time and were down to only one gen with the GEN 2 OFF master caution. Proper technique is to wait until you're at a safe altitude and call for the QRH- GEN 2 OFF master caution. Also; I should've verified with First Officer Baker the proper gen switch before moving it. When the issue happened again on the subsequent takeoff; I had learned my lesson (the hard way) and much care and time was taken in calling for the appropriate checklist; verifying the appropriate gen switch and not rushing into the situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.