Narrative:

I was the pilot flying with autopilot/auto throttles engaged slowing to flaps 5 speeds 15 miles out on approach to atl ILS prm 28 approach at 3;000 feet. Upon switching to atlanta tower; landing winds were called at 130/6g17. We suspected these winds were out of limits and re-entered them into the performance computer. The data showed our landing tailwind out of limits. We briefly discussed we would not be able to land. The captain (pm) began to converse with tower about the winds and that we would be unable to land with these winds. The conversation went back and forth; while I delayed calling for further configurations since I was preparing in my head for a go-around instead. Passing through a 1;000 feet; the winds reported for the runway were determined to be within limits and the captain reaches up and drops the gear; however; we were still at flaps 5 approximately 160 knots. At this point; my overall situational awareness was low and I failed to call for the go-around. With the complexity of atlanta operations and airspace; thunderstorms off the departure end; and the split-second decision; we elected to immediately configure and continue. We quickly configured and met stabilized approach criteria by approximately 500 feet. We landed safely on speed; in the first 1;000 feet with an uneventful touchdown.upon reflection; even with the safe culmination of the flight; in accordance with our procedures for stabilized approach; the split-second decision after the winds were determined in limits should have been to go-around regardless of the complex airport operations and weather. We were just too low and far into the approach. With a completely clear head; it is clear a go-around was our only option in compliance with our procedures. Manage distractions better; stay focused on the primary task of flying and recognize when I'm no longer in the green so that I consciously regain my situational awareness to the point where I have the assertiveness to break the cycle; strictly follow the procedures; and go around. Also; I think atlanta tower giving landing winds that are out of limits or for a runway we aren't landing on needs to be addressed. This led to being forced to resolve a problem during a time where task loading was already high.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew describes the circumstances leading up to an unstabilized approach and landing at ATL.

Narrative: I was the pilot flying with autopilot/auto throttles engaged slowing to flaps 5 speeds 15 miles out on approach to ATL ILS PRM 28 Approach at 3;000 feet. Upon switching to Atlanta Tower; landing winds were called at 130/6G17. We suspected these winds were out of limits and re-entered them into the performance computer. The data showed our landing tailwind out of limits. We briefly discussed we would not be able to land. The Captain (PM) began to converse with Tower about the winds and that we would be unable to land with these winds. The conversation went back and forth; while I delayed calling for further configurations since I was preparing in my head for a go-around instead. Passing through a 1;000 feet; the winds reported for the runway were determined to be within limits and the Captain reaches up and drops the gear; however; we were still at flaps 5 approximately 160 knots. At this point; my overall situational awareness was low and I failed to call for the go-around. With the complexity of Atlanta operations and airspace; thunderstorms off the departure end; and the split-second decision; we elected to immediately configure and continue. We quickly configured and met stabilized approach criteria by approximately 500 feet. We landed safely on speed; in the first 1;000 feet with an uneventful touchdown.Upon reflection; even with the safe culmination of the flight; in accordance with our procedures for stabilized approach; the split-second decision after the winds were determined in limits should have been to go-around regardless of the complex airport operations and weather. We were just too low and far into the approach. With a completely clear head; it is clear a go-around was our only option in compliance with our procedures. Manage distractions better; stay focused on the primary task of flying and recognize when I'm no longer in the green so that I consciously regain my situational awareness to the point where I have the assertiveness to break the cycle; strictly follow the procedures; and go around. Also; I think Atlanta Tower giving landing winds that are out of limits or for a runway we aren't landing on needs to be addressed. This led to being forced to resolve a problem during a time where task loading was already high.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.