Narrative:

To preface this entire episode; I would like to note that on the day of the event described I was returning to flying after 84 days of non-flying due to medical reasons. This is not to say that I had been impaired at any time; as I had been on medical leave while being evaluated after a cardiac-related observation made on my last physical. I mention this because I believe that lack of recent flying time affected my proficiency to a degree in this instance. After initial level off; I checked the ATIS for a heads up and saw that the ILS 13C was our likely approach; and we both remarked about the low altimeter setting; which I think was 29.48 at the time. The cruise portion of the flight was uneventful; and when we copied the later ATIS; we then expected and briefed the RNAV (rnp) Y 13C; as well as the 13C transition for the pangg 2 arrival. We also noted that in our fairly heavy -800 with wet-fair condition reports; we would be utilizing max autobrake and flaps 40 with a 160 foot stopping margin predicted. After switching to chicago approach; we were indeed told to expect the RNAV Y 13C. The altimeter continued to drop; I believe it was 29.46 at this point. Within perhaps two minutes of our initial check on; we were now told to expect the ILS 13C. We reprogrammed; reset mins (30 feet lower on the ILS); and rebriefed. On the next approach frequency; we were given 29.42 as the altimeter and told again to expect the RNAV Y 13C. Again we reprogrammed; reset mins; and did a very short rebrief. We were now on a fairly tight right downwind for 13C; and were descended to 2500 feet MSL. Shortly thereafter we were told to expect the ILS 13C again. Again we reprogrammed; reset; and quickly rebriefed. Another company aircraft checked on shortly afterward and the disbelief was quite evident in that pilot's voice when she was told to expect the ILS; so we were not the only ones rapidly changing our plans. Just before turning base we were given a new altimeter setting of 29.35. I mistakenly began to move the baro mins selector; realized my mistake; and then reset the altimeter. We were then turned to a 050 base heading and slowed to 200 KIAS. This appeared to be a very tight base; and we were turned shortly thereafter to a 070 heading; then a 110 heading to intercept and given a descent to 2100 feet until established; 170 KIAS until hitob; and cleared for the ILS 13C. (I am fairly certain of the altitudes and speeds; the headings are probably correct.) VOR/localizer capture was uneventful; but it was then that I noticed that I had not reset the baro mins selector after changing it by mistake; and I proceeded to do so. At that time I noticed the first officer holding his hand in the vicinity of the gear lever trying to prompt me to configure; as we had already captured the GS. I immediately called for gear down and flaps 15; but did not reset the MCP speed of 170 as I should have; so our decel rate was not great. By the time I realized this with his help; I was able to continue the configuration; but we clearly did not meet stabilized approach criteria at our target altitude; although I continued the approach nonetheless. The landing was moderately firm and the decel rate was abrupt with autobrakes max. We turned off at kilo and taxied to our gate. I realize that ATC needs some flexibility to adjust their plans and that sequencing non RNAV capable aircraft with RNAV capable aircraft can be challenging; but our having been given four expect approach clearances in a matter of a few minutes seems excessive without a runway change or inop NAVAID being involved. As for myself; I don't feel that on day one of my return I had the necessary mental toughness and resilience for such a dynamically changing situation. The first officer did a strong job as pm; but I would rather have had him direct a go-around when I failed to initiate one on my own. I realize that his not having done so doesn't get me a pass; but I would say that his sa was clearly stronger than mine at that point; and I was not in the green. My observations are all made given the benefit of hindsight; of course. Due to distractions got behind on ILS approach and late to configure/stabilize approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain describes the circumstances leading up to an unstabilized approach after nearly three months off flight status.

Narrative: To preface this entire episode; I would like to note that on the day of the event described I was returning to flying after 84 days of non-flying due to medical reasons. This is not to say that I had been impaired at any time; as I had been on medical leave while being evaluated after a cardiac-related observation made on my last physical. I mention this because I believe that lack of recent flying time affected my proficiency to a degree in this instance. After initial level off; I checked the ATIS for a heads up and saw that the ILS 13C was our likely approach; and we both remarked about the low altimeter setting; which I think was 29.48 at the time. The cruise portion of the flight was uneventful; and when we copied the later ATIS; we then expected and briefed the RNAV (RNP) Y 13C; as well as the 13C transition for the PANGG 2 Arrival. We also noted that in our fairly heavy -800 with WET-FAIR condition reports; we would be utilizing max autobrake and flaps 40 with a 160 foot stopping margin predicted. After switching to Chicago Approach; we were indeed told to expect the RNAV Y 13C. The altimeter continued to drop; I believe it was 29.46 at this point. Within perhaps two minutes of our initial check on; we were now told to expect the ILS 13C. We reprogrammed; reset mins (30 feet lower on the ILS); and rebriefed. On the next Approach frequency; we were given 29.42 as the altimeter and told again to expect the RNAV Y 13C. Again we reprogrammed; reset mins; and did a very short rebrief. We were now on a fairly tight right downwind for 13C; and were descended to 2500 feet MSL. Shortly thereafter we were told to expect the ILS 13C again. Again we reprogrammed; reset; and quickly rebriefed. Another Company aircraft checked on shortly afterward and the disbelief was quite evident in that Pilot's voice when she was told to expect the ILS; so we were not the only ones rapidly changing our plans. Just before turning base we were given a new altimeter setting of 29.35. I mistakenly began to move the baro mins selector; realized my mistake; and then reset the altimeter. We were then turned to a 050 base heading and slowed to 200 KIAS. This appeared to be a very tight base; and we were turned shortly thereafter to a 070 heading; then a 110 heading to intercept and given a descent to 2100 feet until established; 170 KIAS until HITOB; and cleared for the ILS 13C. (I am fairly certain of the altitudes and speeds; the headings are probably correct.) VOR/LOC capture was uneventful; but it was then that I noticed that I had not reset the baro mins selector after changing it by mistake; and I proceeded to do so. At that time I noticed the FO holding his hand in the vicinity of the gear lever trying to prompt me to configure; as we had already captured the GS. I immediately called for gear down and flaps 15; but did not reset the MCP speed of 170 as I should have; so our decel rate was not great. By the time I realized this with his help; I was able to continue the configuration; but we clearly did not meet stabilized approach criteria at our target altitude; although I continued the approach nonetheless. The landing was moderately firm and the decel rate was abrupt with autobrakes max. We turned off at Kilo and taxied to our gate. I realize that ATC needs some flexibility to adjust their plans and that sequencing non RNAV capable aircraft with RNAV capable aircraft can be challenging; but our having been given four expect approach clearances in a matter of a few minutes seems excessive without a runway change or inop NAVAID being involved. As for myself; I don't feel that on day one of my return I had the necessary mental toughness and resilience for such a dynamically changing situation. The First Officer did a strong job as PM; but I would rather have had him direct a go-around when I failed to initiate one on my own. I realize that his not having done so doesn't get me a pass; but I would say that his SA was clearly stronger than mine at that point; and I was not in the green. My observations are all made given the benefit of hindsight; of course. Due to distractions got behind on ILS approach and late to configure/stabilize approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.