Narrative:

We were cruising at FL190. The bleed air in our aircraft was pretty weak, so the cockpit temperature was a little warm. The captain decided that it was too warm so he ran the cabin altitude up 'to cool it off'. I am not sure how high the cabin altitude got as the pressure controller was on his side. We did not get a cabin altitude warning light, so I think he ran it up to just under 10,000'. He said it didn't cool off enough, and told me to request FL230. I expressed my feelings about wanting to stay at FL190 but he told me to ask anyway. I asked for and received FL230. The captain was complaining of feeling sick most of the day, and is a very heavy smoker. At FL230 we were approaching a line of rain showers. We decided on about 30 degree left of course for a few mi would be the best course. Just as we were about to enter the clouds the captain said 'there's a hole, I'm going for it'. The hole he was referring to was non existent. He banked the airplane to the right almost 70 degree and we started climbing. 100' above altitude I called 'check altitude'. At 200' I said 'let's get this thing back down'. At 300' I pushed the yoke forward and leveled the wings. Still no response from the captain, just some mumbling. I asked the captain to 'go on oxygen' while I flew, but he refused. I did get him to lower the cabin altitude while I requested lower from center. While the cabin altitude was up, I was being very cautious, and watching for any of the effects of hypoxia. As far as I know, I wasn't experiencing any. It is my feeling that the captain was experiencing the effects of hypoxia and did not realize it. As we descended, the captain became more alert, yet it didn't seem to completely clear out until we were on the ground. This is just my opinion of what may have caused him to act this way. There were several bad decisions that led to this altitude bust. Running the cabin altitude up, and climbing even higher, just to cool down the aircraft, was not right. Attempting to shoot through a hole at the last second, when a course had already been thought out, was not right. I have often read that many times first officer's are not forceful enough. I feel that if I had pushed even harder, we may have ended up in a fight in the cockpit. This is not the first 'problem' I have encountered with this captain. Thankfully I only have 2 more trips to fly with him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER SMT ALT DEVIATION EXCURSION FROM CRUISE ALT. FO REPORTER THINKS PIC PF WAS EXPERIENCING HYPOXIA DUE TO HIGH CABIN ALT THAT HAD BEEN SET TO FACILITATE COCKPIT COOLING.

Narrative: WE WERE CRUISING AT FL190. THE BLEED AIR IN OUR ACFT WAS PRETTY WEAK, SO THE COCKPIT TEMP WAS A LITTLE WARM. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT IT WAS TOO WARM SO HE RAN THE CABIN ALT UP 'TO COOL IT OFF'. I AM NOT SURE HOW HIGH THE CABIN ALT GOT AS THE PRESSURE CTLR WAS ON HIS SIDE. WE DID NOT GET A CABIN ALT WARNING LIGHT, SO I THINK HE RAN IT UP TO JUST UNDER 10,000'. HE SAID IT DIDN'T COOL OFF ENOUGH, AND TOLD ME TO REQUEST FL230. I EXPRESSED MY FEELINGS ABOUT WANTING TO STAY AT FL190 BUT HE TOLD ME TO ASK ANYWAY. I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED FL230. THE CAPT WAS COMPLAINING OF FEELING SICK MOST OF THE DAY, AND IS A VERY HEAVY SMOKER. AT FL230 WE WERE APCHING A LINE OF RAIN SHOWERS. WE DECIDED ON ABOUT 30 DEG LEFT OF COURSE FOR A FEW MI WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE. JUST AS WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER THE CLOUDS THE CAPT SAID 'THERE'S A HOLE, I'M GOING FOR IT'. THE HOLE HE WAS REFERRING TO WAS NON EXISTENT. HE BANKED THE AIRPLANE TO THE RIGHT ALMOST 70 DEG AND WE STARTED CLIMBING. 100' ABOVE ALT I CALLED 'CHECK ALT'. AT 200' I SAID 'LET'S GET THIS THING BACK DOWN'. AT 300' I PUSHED THE YOKE FORWARD AND LEVELED THE WINGS. STILL NO RESPONSE FROM THE CAPT, JUST SOME MUMBLING. I ASKED THE CAPT TO 'GO ON OXYGEN' WHILE I FLEW, BUT HE REFUSED. I DID GET HIM TO LOWER THE CABIN ALT WHILE I REQUESTED LOWER FROM CENTER. WHILE THE CABIN ALT WAS UP, I WAS BEING VERY CAUTIOUS, AND WATCHING FOR ANY OF THE EFFECTS OF HYPOXIA. AS FAR AS I KNOW, I WASN'T EXPERIENCING ANY. IT IS MY FEELING THAT THE CAPT WAS EXPERIENCING THE EFFECTS OF HYPOXIA AND DID NOT REALIZE IT. AS WE DESCENDED, THE CAPT BECAME MORE ALERT, YET IT DIDN'T SEEM TO COMPLETELY CLEAR OUT UNTIL WE WERE ON THE GND. THIS IS JUST MY OPINION OF WHAT MAY HAVE CAUSED HIM TO ACT THIS WAY. THERE WERE SEVERAL BAD DECISIONS THAT LED TO THIS ALT BUST. RUNNING THE CABIN ALT UP, AND CLIMBING EVEN HIGHER, JUST TO COOL DOWN THE ACFT, WAS NOT RIGHT. ATTEMPTING TO SHOOT THROUGH A HOLE AT THE LAST SECOND, WHEN A COURSE HAD ALREADY BEEN THOUGHT OUT, WAS NOT RIGHT. I HAVE OFTEN READ THAT MANY TIMES F/O'S ARE NOT FORCEFUL ENOUGH. I FEEL THAT IF I HAD PUSHED EVEN HARDER, WE MAY HAVE ENDED UP IN A FIGHT IN THE COCKPIT. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST 'PROBLEM' I HAVE ENCOUNTERED WITH THIS CAPT. THANKFULLY I ONLY HAVE 2 MORE TRIPS TO FLY WITH HIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.