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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1174985 |
Time | |
Date | 201405 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | A11.TRACON |
State Reference | AK |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Other Instrument Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Beech 1900 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Departure |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
Aircraft X was on approach to anc runway 15 talking to anc local control (local control). Aircraft Y was cleared for departure runway 15 prior to aircraft X. Separation was unable to be maintained by this runway sequence and aircraft X went around as aircraft Y was departing. Anc local control called south radar and advised that aircraft X was going around and coordinated a 250 heading. Aircraft X and aircraft Y tags were over lapping (no green between) and both aircraft mode C's indicated 010 (no altitude separation) when anc local control shipped both aircraft to departure frequencies. Aircraft X came over on the north radar frequency and aircraft Y on south radar. Aircraft X came over to the wrong frequency per the SOP. No coordination was made with TRACON advising visual separation being applied and from the radar view; it did not appear that any form separation was being applied.this individual's lack of controlling ability is a systemic issue at anc tower that affects A11 and airports air traffic. Anc management is well aware of this person's negligence and apathy to the NAS's overall goals. Anc management should be held accountable for this individual's inability to control air traffic as they are choosing to ignore a problematic employee instead of dealing with an apparent working place problem. Expeditious flow and safety were both overlooked in this operation. During a critical phase of flight; both aircraft were forced into unsafe vertical and lateral proximities with traffic. Decertification; training on local procedures; standard separation requirements and good judgment; training on the 7110.65; and relocation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Numerous reports of a go-around caused by the departure of an aircraft that didn't roll as fast as the Local Controller anticipated.
Narrative: Aircraft X was on approach to ANC Runway 15 talking to ANC Local Control (LC). Aircraft Y was cleared for departure Runway 15 prior to Aircraft X. Separation was unable to be maintained by this runway sequence and Aircraft X went around as Aircraft Y was departing. ANC LC called South Radar and advised that Aircraft X was going around and coordinated a 250 heading. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y tags were over lapping (no green between) and both aircraft Mode C's indicated 010 (no altitude separation) when ANC LC shipped both aircraft to departure frequencies. Aircraft X came over on the North Radar frequency and Aircraft Y on South Radar. Aircraft X came over to the wrong frequency per the SOP. No coordination was made with TRACON advising visual separation being applied and from the radar view; it did not appear that any form separation was being applied.This individual's lack of controlling ability is a systemic issue at ANC Tower that affects A11 and airports air traffic. ANC management is well aware of this person's negligence and apathy to the NAS's overall goals. ANC management should be held accountable for this individual's inability to control air traffic as they are choosing to ignore a problematic employee instead of dealing with an apparent working place problem. Expeditious flow and safety were both overlooked in this operation. During a critical phase of flight; both aircraft were forced into unsafe vertical and lateral proximities with traffic. Decertification; Training on local procedures; standard separation requirements and good judgment; Training on the 7110.65; and relocation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.