Narrative:

My captain and I had just completed a single engine turn and had reloaded passenger and were taxiing out for takeoff in cheyenne with the captain talking to the ground control and tower. I (the first officer) was busy securing luggage and making my safety briefing over the PA. When we had landed 15 minutes earlier we had landed on runway 12 with a 17 KT headwind. I assumed we would take off on runway 12 provided the winds remained the same. However, all I heard on our taxi out for takeoff was the ground control asking the captain if we had information (current ATIS). Since I was still making my briefing announcement at the time I thought the captain was informed as to the current winds and runway for takeoff. The captain then taxied onto the runway 30 for takeoff. The captain said I would have a tailwind for takeoff. I knew we were light and wouldn't be set up for takeoff knowing we had a greater than 10 KT tailwind (takeoff limitation 10 KTS). Upon takeoff the aircraft rotated as if we had an excessive tailwind. We did not use an above normal length of runway because of our light weight but the tailwind was apparent. After takeoff the captain confided in me that captain often gets confused taxiing at that airport. Since it was my first turn with this captain I was unaware of this difficulty. My concern was that captain had requested takeoff on a runway which exceeded our tailwind capability. Because I was occupied making the safety briefing and securing the luggage I was unable to get the total picture due to the inherent weakness in our operations of first officer duties. Proposed solution: install automatic briefing systems in all aircraft without flight attendants.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF WITH MORE THAN 10 KT TAILWIND.

Narrative: MY CAPT AND I HAD JUST COMPLETED A SINGLE ENGINE TURN AND HAD RELOADED PAX AND WERE TAXIING OUT FOR TKOF IN CHEYENNE WITH THE CAPT TALKING TO THE GND CTL AND TWR. I (THE F/O) WAS BUSY SECURING LUGGAGE AND MAKING MY SAFETY BRIEFING OVER THE PA. WHEN WE HAD LANDED 15 MINUTES EARLIER WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 12 WITH A 17 KT HEADWIND. I ASSUMED WE WOULD TAKE OFF ON RWY 12 PROVIDED THE WINDS REMAINED THE SAME. HOWEVER, ALL I HEARD ON OUR TAXI OUT FOR TKOF WAS THE GND CTL ASKING THE CAPT IF WE HAD INFO (CURRENT ATIS). SINCE I WAS STILL MAKING MY BRIEFING ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE TIME I THOUGHT THE CAPT WAS INFORMED AS TO THE CURRENT WINDS AND RWY FOR TKOF. THE CAPT THEN TAXIED ONTO THE RWY 30 FOR TKOF. THE CAPT SAID I WOULD HAVE A TAILWIND FOR TKOF. I KNEW WE WERE LIGHT AND WOULDN'T BE SET UP FOR TKOF KNOWING WE HAD A GREATER THAN 10 KT TAILWIND (TKOF LIMITATION 10 KTS). UPON TKOF THE ACFT ROTATED AS IF WE HAD AN EXCESSIVE TAILWIND. WE DID NOT USE AN ABOVE NORMAL LENGTH OF RWY BECAUSE OF OUR LIGHT WEIGHT BUT THE TAILWIND WAS APPARENT. AFTER TKOF THE CAPT CONFIDED IN ME THAT CAPT OFTEN GETS CONFUSED TAXIING AT THAT ARPT. SINCE IT WAS MY FIRST TURN WITH THIS CAPT I WAS UNAWARE OF THIS DIFFICULTY. MY CONCERN WAS THAT CAPT HAD REQUESTED TKOF ON A RWY WHICH EXCEEDED OUR TAILWIND CAPABILITY. BECAUSE I WAS OCCUPIED MAKING THE SAFETY BRIEFING AND SECURING THE LUGGAGE I WAS UNABLE TO GET THE TOTAL PICTURE DUE TO THE INHERENT WEAKNESS IN OUR OPERATIONS OF F/O DUTIES. PROPOSED SOLUTION: INSTALL AUTO BRIEFING SYSTEMS IN ALL ACFT WITHOUT FLT ATTENDANTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.