Narrative:

Hand-flying the departure I noticed controls were stiff after takeoff; something just did not seem right. As soon as we sped up through approximately 220 knots I noticed that the trim switches on my yoke were not functioning. I verified with the first officer when the last time the trim was seen working normally. The trim was only moved one time from preflight to takeoff; and it was moved less than half a unit. This was done before we left ground metering and the temperature was not even 80 degrees outside; so an overheat seemed very unlikely. While discussing (very quickly I might add) the above I was unable to apply enough forward pressure to push the nose over therefore I disconnected the autothrottles and manually reduced the thrust to about the twelve o'clock position of the throttles to get the nose down and not exacerbate the situation by speeding up any more (even though that is not in our dc-9 book I remember that memory item from the boeing 737 'do not increase airspeed'). I asked him if his trim switch would work. His would work but not in the direction we needed. His switch would only trim the nose up--the opposite way of where we needed to trim at the time. I told my first officer to declare an emergency immediately and we want to level at 6;000 feet with a heading to put us out over [a nearby lake]. We stabilized the aircraft at two hundred and something knots where it was manageable to hand with the trim in that position; slats still out. After the aircraft was stabilized we proceeded with the stabilizer inoperative in-flight checklist in a methodical manner (also checking all circuit breakers) and we were vectored by ATC around the lake until we were all set for an approach. I hand flew the airplane until we reached the point in the checklist that allowed the use of the autopilot since we verified the alternate trim worked per the procedure. After the abnormal checklist was completed and it was verified that no circuit breakers were popped; transferred control of the jet to the first officer and t-e-south-ted the flight attendants (I told them the only way this could get worse would be for anyone to evacuate the aircraft upon landing without my command and it was not anticipated); made a PA to the passengers that we would be returning to ZZZ for a normal landing then taxi into the gate. I told them they might see safety vehicles as a precaution. I also asked ATC to call operations and dispatch to notify them we would be returning for an emergency landing and to have the arff standing by. I then took the airplane and the radios and told the first officer to complete the after takeoff checklist through the descent and before landing checklist. After a wind check I told ATC I would like vectors for xx. They offered xy. I asked again for a wind check; and they told me 110 degrees at 8 knots gusting to 15. I told them I refuse to land with a tailwind and needed at least 15 mile final to assure a burn below maximum landing weight and I wanted to have plenty of room to get the aircraft stabilized. We were able to burn down below maximum landing weight while we maneuvered the aircraft during the checklist and extended the gear early to get us down to approximately 129;000 lbs; maximum landing weight on the S-80 is 130;000. Touchdown was very smooth. After landing and clearing the runway and safely stopped on the taxiway I made a PA to the passengers reminding them to remain seated and that as promised we had made a normal landing and there is no reason for alarm and to remain calm and we would have them at the gate shortly and the safety vehicles would be following only as a precaution. At the gate I again verified; in front of the maintenance supervisor; that both trim switches as unable to trim the nose down. However; the captain trim switch was inoperable in both directions at one point in the climbout. He told me to 'put it in the book' and left. The logbook was completed and we shut the airplane down normally. The first officer switch may or may not have been completely inoperable at one point but we just do not know since it was only tried once (on climbout) and would not trim the nose down. I want to extend a special thanks to the first officer. He was calm; cool; and collected and very efficient in running all checklists and backing me up in this ordeal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After takeoff both MD-80 Main Electric Horizontal Stabilizer trim switches were inoperative; so maintaining a slow airspeed to control the aircraft; the crew worked through the QRH and declared an emergency for a return. The Alternative Trim did function for the landing.

Narrative: Hand-flying the departure I noticed controls were stiff after takeoff; something just did not seem right. As soon as we sped up through approximately 220 knots I noticed that the trim switches on my yoke were not functioning. I verified with the First Officer when the last time the trim was seen working normally. The trim was only moved one time from preflight to takeoff; and it was moved less than half a unit. This was done before we left ground metering and the temperature was not even 80 degrees outside; so an overheat seemed very unlikely. While discussing (very quickly I might add) the above I was unable to apply enough forward pressure to push the nose over therefore I disconnected the autothrottles and manually reduced the thrust to about the twelve o'clock position of the throttles to get the nose down and not exacerbate the situation by speeding up any more (even though that is not in our DC-9 book I remember that memory item from the Boeing 737 'Do not increase airspeed'). I asked him if his trim switch would work. His would work but not in the direction we needed. His switch would only trim the nose up--the opposite way of where we needed to trim at the time. I told my First Officer to declare an emergency immediately and we want to level at 6;000 feet with a heading to put us out over [a nearby lake]. We stabilized the aircraft at two hundred and something knots where it was manageable to hand with the trim in that position; slats still out. After the aircraft was stabilized we proceeded with the Stabilizer Inoperative In-Flight Checklist in a methodical manner (also checking ALL circuit breakers) and we were vectored by ATC around the lake until we were all set for an approach. I hand flew the airplane until we reached the point in the checklist that allowed the use of the autopilot since we verified the alternate trim worked per the procedure. After the Abnormal Checklist was completed and it was verified that no circuit breakers were popped; transferred control of the jet to the First Officer and T-E-S-Ted the flight attendants (I told them the only way this could get worse would be for anyone to evacuate the aircraft upon landing without my command and it was not anticipated); made a PA to the passengers that we would be returning to ZZZ for a normal landing then taxi into the gate. I told them they might see safety vehicles as a precaution. I also asked ATC to call Operations and Dispatch to notify them we would be returning for an emergency landing and to have the ARFF standing by. I then took the airplane and the radios and told the First Officer to complete the After Takeoff Checklist through the Descent and Before Landing Checklist. After a wind check I told ATC I would like vectors for XX. They offered XY. I asked again for a wind check; and they told me 110 degrees at 8 knots gusting to 15. I told them I refuse to land with a tailwind and needed at least 15 mile final to assure a burn below maximum landing weight and I wanted to have plenty of room to get the aircraft stabilized. We were able to burn down below maximum landing weight while we maneuvered the aircraft during the checklist and extended the gear early to get us down to approximately 129;000 lbs; maximum landing weight on the S-80 is 130;000. Touchdown was very smooth. After landing and clearing the runway and safely stopped on the taxiway I made a PA to the passengers reminding them to remain seated and that as promised we had made a normal landing and there is no reason for alarm and to remain calm and we would have them at the gate shortly and the safety vehicles would be following only as a precaution. At the gate I again verified; in front of the Maintenance Supervisor; that both trim switches as unable to trim the nose down. However; the Captain trim switch was inoperable in both directions at one point in the climbout. He told me to 'put it in the book' and left. The logbook was completed and we shut the airplane down normally. The First Officer switch may or may not have been completely inoperable at one point but we just do not know since it was only tried once (on climbout) and would not trim the nose down. I want to extend a special thanks to the First Officer. He was calm; cool; and collected and very efficient in running all checklists and backing me up in this ordeal.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.