Narrative:

Originally cleared via the norfolk 290 degree right to the 43 DME fix, then via the hopewell 178 degree right to the hopewell VOR, frequency 112.0. To eliminate the dogleg of the initial portion of our route, washington ATC cleared my flight direct to the hopewell VOR. I tuned in 112.2, which is the cape charles VOR instead of hopewell, and proceeded direct to cape charles--which is approximately 60 degrees northeast of hopewell. Once I recognized the error, the flight had traveled 25 mi off course. Washington ATC had also noted the deviation and asked me my heading, then advised me that hopewell was 112.0. I tuned in 112.0 and proceeded direct to hopewell VOR and on course to lga. I feel there are at least 3 factors that contributed to this error: 1) once cleared to hopewell, I should have confirmed the frequency with the en route chart instead of relying on my memory and the frequency my copilot had turned in, which was 112.2. No explanation of why he had tuned in 112.2. 2) as a crew, my copilot should have x-chked my frequency, which I might add, he normally does. Furthermore, we had flown together for 2 weeks prior to this incident and during the time we had an open discussion cockpit. Nevertheless, this does not relieve me of my responsibility to command the aircraft. I feel it is my responsibility to know the outcome of every action. 3) the navigation system has allowed 2 frequencys, on the same frequency band, to be placed within 100 mi of each other. I feel this should not be permitted and contributed, in a minor way, to this incident. In conclusion, the salient point is: I should never trust my memory for a frequency--if I do, confirm it with my en route chart. Moreover, crew coordination should be routinely emphasized to other crew members.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG DEVIATED FROM CLRNC ROUTE TRACK HEADING DEVIATION.

Narrative: ORIGINALLY CLRED VIA THE NORFOLK 290 DEG R TO THE 43 DME FIX, THEN VIA THE HOPEWELL 178 DEG R TO THE HOPEWELL VOR, FREQ 112.0. TO ELIMINATE THE DOGLEG OF THE INITIAL PORTION OF OUR ROUTE, WASHINGTON ATC CLRED MY FLT DIRECT TO THE HOPEWELL VOR. I TUNED IN 112.2, WHICH IS THE CAPE CHARLES VOR INSTEAD OF HOPEWELL, AND PROCEEDED DIRECT TO CAPE CHARLES--WHICH IS APPROX 60 DEGS NE OF HOPEWELL. ONCE I RECOGNIZED THE ERROR, THE FLT HAD TRAVELED 25 MI OFF COURSE. WASHINGTON ATC HAD ALSO NOTED THE DEVIATION AND ASKED ME MY HDG, THEN ADVISED ME THAT HOPEWELL WAS 112.0. I TUNED IN 112.0 AND PROCEEDED DIRECT TO HOPEWELL VOR AND ON COURSE TO LGA. I FEEL THERE ARE AT LEAST 3 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR: 1) ONCE CLRED TO HOPEWELL, I SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED THE FREQ WITH THE ENRTE CHART INSTEAD OF RELYING ON MY MEMORY AND THE FREQ MY COPLT HAD TURNED IN, WHICH WAS 112.2. NO EXPLANATION OF WHY HE HAD TUNED IN 112.2. 2) AS A CREW, MY COPLT SHOULD HAVE X-CHKED MY FREQ, WHICH I MIGHT ADD, HE NORMALLY DOES. FURTHERMORE, WE HAD FLOWN TOGETHER FOR 2 WKS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT AND DURING THE TIME WE HAD AN OPEN DISCUSSION COCKPIT. NEVERTHELESS, THIS DOES NOT RELIEVE ME OF MY RESPONSIBILITY TO COMMAND THE ACFT. I FEEL IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO KNOW THE OUTCOME OF EVERY ACTION. 3) THE NAV SYS HAS ALLOWED 2 FREQS, ON THE SAME FREQ BAND, TO BE PLACED WITHIN 100 MI OF EACH OTHER. I FEEL THIS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED AND CONTRIBUTED, IN A MINOR WAY, TO THIS INCIDENT. IN CONCLUSION, THE SALIENT POINT IS: I SHOULD NEVER TRUST MY MEMORY FOR A FREQ--IF I DO, CONFIRM IT WITH MY ENRTE CHART. MOREOVER, CREW COORD SHOULD BE ROUTINELY EMPHASIZED TO OTHER CREW MEMBERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.