Narrative:

[It was] kind of a murky day here in denver; but decent visibility. I guess there was trouble getting visuals so the decision was made to go to simos [slang for simultaneous approaches]. This would normally mean runway 35L and runway 35R. However; someone made the decision that we would run simos to 34R and 35L and continue running visuals to 35R. How you can get visuals to 35R but not the 35L is beyond me. I question the legality of the operation; but even if legal; why would we go against the norm?in monitors; we are responsible for separation only on the last mile of final. We are responsible for the FAF in when not in monitors. I had no idea exactly where the lateral delineation was between the monitored approaches on 35L and the visuals on 35R for purposes of separation as there was no ntz [no transgression zone]. The contention was that the aircraft on the visual to 35R was maintaining visual separation. How? How can he maintain visual with an aircraft on a parallel final that is at his 8 o'clock on a monitored approach? Who is responsible for the separation if he blows through the final? We didn't even know if local control 1 or local control 2 should work them; and there are still differing opinions. He isn't being monitored; nor is he procedurally separated from the monitored aircraft. If I see him blowing through (I have lots of other things to watch) I have no authority to move the monitored aircraft; and no idea if the aircraft on visual is even on my frequency. And what if the monitor overrides me as I'm trying to fix the situation? Making matters worse; the flm couldn't answer even the most basic questions of how or why; and when challenged by two of the most senior controllers in the facility said 'we'll talk about it later.' isn't the time to talk about it before we get in trouble; not after? I have never seen this configuration before; nor can I find a single controller that can say that they have either. Funny thing is that the TRACON tmc said that we do it 'all the time' (absolutely incorrect) and our OM said 'I've seen it before (I doubt it).this highlights two of the biggest problems in the denver district. The first is staffing. I would be willing to bet that the TRACON simply didn't have the staffing to run monitors to the 35s as that would have required opening another scope. I have certainly seen shifts run here at the tower with absurdly low staffing levels and no attempt to call overtime. I realize that the budgets are tight; but safety is safety. We have been repeatedly told that if staffing gets low; services will be curtailed. I've yet to see that happen. I just sat in on an ssr about a bad weather shift that was run with very poor staffing; resulting in one person working a position that should have been worked by two for most of the night. This resulted in lengthy delays that don't get reported because they happen at the gate. I'm sure you got reports on that one. The other issue here; which I have reported here numerous times; is the dumbing down of the controllers here. The responsible party is the now retired who had the rare opportunity to screw up the TRACON and then come screw up the tower with his 'dumb it down' philosophy. The specific problem here is that the TRACON has completely abandoned staggered ILS approaches; which would have been an ideal solution to the situation described in this report. I sat in on a meeting with the airlines once when one of the chief pilots asked a staffer from the TRACON why they didn't run staggered approaches; the response was 'because we're not very good at it.' I don't know about you; but I'd be embarrassed to have to make that kind of admission to the airlines. Staggered approaches are a valuable tool that should be in any radar controller's bag of tricks; and now no one at D01 knows how to run them. So they can't run staggers; and they won't staff the facility to run simos. Bottom line: staff the facilities appropriately; even ifit means overtime. Do whatever is necessary training wise so the TRACON can once again run staggers. Oh yeah; listen to your controllers when they express concern about an operation rather than ignore them and forge ahead full speed.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DEN Tower controllers report of a session where the facility was running simultaneous approaches to non standard runways; along with visual approaches to another runway; and no transgression zone delineated on the radar scope for the simls.

Narrative: [It was] kind of a murky day here in Denver; but decent visibility. I guess there was trouble getting visuals so the decision was made to go to simos [slang for simultaneous approaches]. This would normally mean Runway 35L and Runway 35R. However; someone made the decision that we would run simos to 34R and 35L and continue running visuals to 35R. How you can get visuals to 35R but not the 35L is beyond me. I question the legality of the operation; but even if legal; why would we go against the norm?In monitors; we are responsible for separation only on the last mile of final. We are responsible for the FAF in when not in monitors. I had no idea exactly where the lateral delineation was between the monitored approaches on 35L and the visuals on 35R for purposes of separation as there was no NTZ [No Transgression Zone]. The contention was that the aircraft on the visual to 35R was maintaining visual separation. How? How can he maintain visual with an aircraft on a parallel final that is at his 8 o'clock on a monitored approach? Who is responsible for the separation if he blows through the final? We didn't even know if Local Control 1 or Local Control 2 should work them; and there are still differing opinions. He isn't being monitored; nor is he procedurally separated from the monitored aircraft. If I see him blowing through (I have lots of other things to watch) I have no authority to move the monitored aircraft; and no idea if the aircraft on visual is even on my frequency. And what if the monitor overrides me as I'm trying to fix the situation? Making matters worse; the FLM couldn't answer even the most basic questions of how or why; and when challenged by two of the most senior controllers in the facility said 'we'll talk about it later.' Isn't the time to talk about it before we get in trouble; not after? I have never seen this configuration before; nor can I find a single controller that can say that they have either. Funny thing is that the TRACON TMC said that we do it 'all the time' (absolutely incorrect) and our OM said 'I've seen it before (I doubt it).This highlights two of the biggest problems in the Denver District. The first is staffing. I would be willing to bet that the TRACON simply didn't have the staffing to run monitors to the 35s as that would have required opening another scope. I have certainly seen shifts run here at the Tower with absurdly low staffing levels and no attempt to call overtime. I realize that the budgets are tight; but safety is safety. We have been repeatedly told that if staffing gets low; services will be curtailed. I've yet to see that happen. I just sat in on an SSR about a bad weather shift that was run with very poor staffing; resulting in one person working a position that should have been worked by two for most of the night. This resulted in lengthy delays that don't get reported because they happen at the gate. I'm sure you got reports on that one. The other issue here; which I have reported here numerous times; is the dumbing down of the controllers here. The responsible party is the now retired who had the rare opportunity to screw up the TRACON and then come screw up the Tower with his 'dumb it down' philosophy. The specific problem here is that the TRACON has completely abandoned staggered ILS approaches; which would have been an ideal solution to the situation described in this report. I sat in on a meeting with the airlines once when one of the chief pilots asked a staffer from the TRACON why they didn't run staggered approaches; the response was 'because we're not very good at it.' I don't know about you; but I'd be embarrassed to have to make that kind of admission to the airlines. Staggered approaches are a valuable tool that should be in any radar controller's bag of tricks; and now no one at D01 knows how to run them. So they can't run staggers; and they won't staff the facility to run SIMOS. Bottom line: Staff the facilities appropriately; even ifit means overtime. Do whatever is necessary training wise so the TRACON can once again run staggers. Oh yeah; listen to your controllers when they express concern about an operation rather than ignore them and forge ahead full speed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.