Narrative:

This is a known event logged by the flm; aircraft X go-around runway 1C due to tech ops vehicle; on the runway and no radio contact. Iad was in a north operations; ILS/va 1R/C/left; departing 30. Tech ops wanted to get on runway 1C departure end to do some checks. The technician called local control 3 saying he was at the approach end of runway 19C and would need to be on the runway for about 5 minutes. Local control 3 did not see the vehicle and asked where he was. He responded this time that he was next to the 1C glideslope. That happens to be at the opposite end of the runway than first reported. Local control 3 still did not see the vehicle but had a gap; the next 1C arrival was 7 [to] 10 minutes out. Tech ops could proceed on the runway but might have to vacate if needed. As the arrival aircraft X approached 1C; local control 3 tried to contact tech ops to check progress. When there was no response from tech ops after several attempts; local control 3 sent aircraft X around. And as tech ops did not respond to subsequent radio calls; local control 3 circled the next two arrivals to runway 1R. Tech ops finally responded that they were clear of the runway. Local control 3 did a great job protecting both runway 1C and 1L because tech ops whereabouts were unknown. There were no losses of separation or any V/P D. Notifications were made to the soc by the tower flm. The voice file was forwarded to the navcom flm the following. I invited the tech ops manager to listen to the voice file with me and he was not happy when he realized all that happened. I pointed out these items: 1) the tech's poor radio calls and the resultant confusion over his position.2) the fact that he did not keep in radio contact while on the runway.3) the fact that when a vehicle enters the runway from other than a taxiway; it will not enter asde-X safety logic and would not cause an alert. The manager was surprised by this last item. In the interest of runway safety; I urged the tech ops manager to take strong measures to ensure this does not happen again. Please review the attached voice file which is in skip.a. 1) consider mandating that anytime a tech ops vehicle needs to enter the runway; they do so from a taxiway so as to enter asde-X safety logic. 2) equip vehicles with transponders. 3) enable tsap in this region and educate the technicians on how to use it. This tech should have been invited to use tsap if it had been pushed through.b. Ipm for the tech who introduced risk by not knowing how to correctly report his position and for not remaining in radio contact while on the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IAD Staff Specialist describes situation where a Technician entered the runway from a bad position report then failed to keep in radio contact with the Tower causing aircraft to be sent around.

Narrative: This is a known event logged by the FLM; Aircraft X go-around Runway 1C due to Tech Ops vehicle; on the runway and no radio contact. IAD was in a north operations; ILS/VA 1R/C/L; Departing 30. Tech Ops wanted to get on Runway 1C departure end to do some checks. The Technician called Local Control 3 saying he was at the approach end of Runway 19C and would need to be on the runway for about 5 minutes. Local Control 3 did not see the vehicle and asked where he was. He responded this time that he was next to the 1C glideslope. That happens to be at the opposite end of the runway than first reported. Local Control 3 still did not see the vehicle but had a gap; the next 1C arrival was 7 [to] 10 minutes out. Tech Ops could proceed on the runway but might have to vacate if needed. As the arrival Aircraft X approached 1C; Local Control 3 tried to contact Tech Ops to check progress. When there was no response from Tech Ops after several attempts; Local Control 3 sent Aircraft X around. And as Tech Ops did not respond to subsequent radio calls; Local Control 3 circled the next two arrivals to Runway 1R. Tech Ops finally responded that they were clear of the runway. Local Control 3 did a great job protecting both Runway 1C and 1L because Tech Ops whereabouts were unknown. There were no losses of separation or any V/P D. Notifications were made to the SOC by the Tower FLM. The voice file was forwarded to the NavCom FLM the following. I invited the Tech Ops manager to listen to the voice file with me and he was not happy when he realized all that happened. I pointed out these items: 1) The Tech's poor radio calls and the resultant confusion over his position.2) The fact that he did not keep in radio contact while on the runway.3) The fact that when a vehicle enters the runway from other than a taxiway; it will not enter ASDE-X safety logic and would not cause an alert. The manager was surprised by this last item. In the interest of runway safety; I urged the Tech Ops Manager to take strong measures to ensure this does not happen again. Please review the attached voice file which is in skip.a. 1) Consider mandating that anytime a Tech Ops vehicle needs to enter the runway; they do so from a taxiway so as to enter ASDE-X safety logic. 2) Equip vehicles with transponders. 3) Enable TSAP in this region and educate the technicians on how to use it. This tech should have been invited to use TSAP if it had been pushed through.b. IPM for the tech who introduced risk by not knowing how to correctly report his position and for not remaining in radio contact while on the runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.