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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1189684 |
Time | |
Date | 201407 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | BOI.Airport |
State Reference | ID |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Military |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Flight Data / Clearance Delivery |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Ground Conflict Critical Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Incursion Runway |
Miss Distance | Vertical 50 |
Narrative:
While working local control; I had 1 aircraft doing touch and goes in the pattern; which wasn't a factor in the situation. Aircraft X had been cleared for takeoff on 10R and switched to departure frequency on the ground as required by 7110.65. Ground control had coordinated to cross runway 10R with aircraft Y at the midfield echo taxiway after aircraft X departed. I approved this as ground currently cannot taxi any aircraft to the active runway when we are on an east flown due to airport construction and them closing the parallel runway for even taxiing aircraft even though there is no construction on the runway and no safety risks on the runway. As all the construction is on the parallel taxiway; which forces us to have to cross the active runway multiple times through out a shift. Because of this aircraft Y needed to cross. The aircraft X [type] typically do a 30-45 second hold in position to do a systems check [to] run their engines up. While aircraft X was doing this I was scanning the departure corridor to make sure there was no traffic; and then scanning to check on my cessna who was in the downwind. As I was in the process of this scan ground alerted me to aircraft Y crossing the hold line; I immediately went to talk [to] aircraft X and stop his takeoff roll but he had already started to roll and was no longer on my frequency without having a departure override I was unable to cancel aircraft X's takeoff clearance or at least alert him to the traffic entering the runway. Aircraft Y; after penetrating the runway environment; turned sharply to the right to attempt to avoid and minimize any potential collision. Aircraft X was able to pull the aircraft into the air at a speed and location that was well before the normal rotation point for the aircraft X [type]. While the collision was averted the aircraft came with in 50-100 feet of each other. Aircraft X then came back on frequency and made sure I was aware of the aircraft Y on the runway.I have two recommendations to help in a future situation like this: 1. The airport needs to plan and consult with ATC to have minimal impact on taxi routing and minimal runway crossing. Through out this summer runway construction the airport has for the most part said here is what we are doing and; you need to work around us. In the past they worked well with us; but for the last few years they will no longer consult us since they have employed new people in the management ranks; who refuse to work well with us. This has caused numerous incidents that could have been avoided if they would work with us. This event is just the culmination of their refusal to consult and work with us to minimize potential risks and inconvenience to the user. If they would open the closed runway to allow us to taxi on it during daylight hours which happen to be our busiest we would no longer have to cross the active runway.2. If at all possible the facility needs to install a departure control override button that allows the local position instantaneous communication with any aircraft that has been switched to departure on the ground. I'm not certain if our current communication gear will allow that; but I know we had this feature in the military and it saved situations like this from happening a few times. If we are unable to program in this feature then we need to sign a letter of agreement with the [military] that they will monitor the local/emergency frequency as well as the radar frequency until they are airborne. That way we can cancel or abort their takeoff if we have a safety risk.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Two BOI Tower Controllers report of a runway incursion that caused a departure to leave the runway earlier than normal. The Controller couldn't cancel the takeoff clearance because the military aircraft had already changed to Departure frequency as required.
Narrative: While working Local Control; I had 1 aircraft doing touch and goes in the pattern; which wasn't a factor in the situation. Aircraft X had been cleared for takeoff on 10R and switched to Departure frequency on the ground as required by 7110.65. Ground Control had coordinated to cross Runway 10R with Aircraft Y at the midfield Echo taxiway after Aircraft X departed. I approved this as Ground currently cannot taxi any aircraft to the active runway when we are on an east flown due to airport construction and them closing the parallel runway for even taxiing aircraft even though there is no construction on the runway and no safety risks on the runway. As all the construction is on the parallel taxiway; which forces us to have to cross the active runway multiple times through out a shift. Because of this Aircraft Y needed to cross. The Aircraft X [type] typically do a 30-45 second hold in position to do a systems check [to] run their engines up. While Aircraft X was doing this I was scanning the departure corridor to make sure there was no traffic; and then scanning to check on my Cessna who was in the downwind. As I was in the process of this scan Ground alerted me to Aircraft Y crossing the hold line; I immediately went to talk [to] Aircraft X and stop his takeoff roll but he had already started to roll and was no longer on my frequency without having a departure override I was unable to cancel Aircraft X's takeoff clearance or at least alert him to the traffic entering the runway. Aircraft Y; after penetrating the runway environment; turned sharply to the right to attempt to avoid and minimize any potential collision. Aircraft X was able to pull the aircraft into the air at a speed and location that was well before the normal rotation point for the Aircraft X [type]. While the collision was averted the aircraft came with in 50-100 feet of each other. Aircraft X then came back on frequency and made sure I was aware of the Aircraft Y on the runway.I have two recommendations to help in a future situation like this: 1. The airport needs to plan and consult with ATC to have minimal impact on taxi routing and minimal runway crossing. Through out this summer runway construction the airport has for the most part said here is what we are doing and; you need to work around us. In the past they worked well with us; but for the last few years they will no longer consult us since they have employed new people in the Management ranks; who refuse to work well with us. This has caused numerous incidents that could have been avoided if they would work with us. This event is just the culmination of their refusal to consult and work with us to minimize potential risks and inconvenience to the user. If they would open the closed runway to allow us to taxi on it during daylight hours which happen to be our busiest we would no longer have to cross the active runway.2. If at all possible the facility needs to install a Departure Control override button that allows the Local position instantaneous communication with any aircraft that has been switched to Departure on the ground. I'm not certain if our current communication gear will allow that; but I know we had this feature in the military and it saved situations like this from happening a few times. If we are unable to program in this feature then we need to sign a letter of agreement with the [military] that they will monitor the Local/emergency frequency as well as the Radar Frequency until they are airborne. That way we can cancel or abort their takeoff if we have a safety risk.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.