Narrative:

I was working ci-departure (coordinator in charge of the departure wall) when a B757 departed. Weather was moving through the area. We had been off the RNAV departure tracks for some time. As the weather moved from the southeast; it kept moving the [runway] 8R atl departures more and more to the north. When we were on a 030 heading; I left it there as long as we could. Departures started telling my departure north (dr-north) controller they needed more of a turn to avoid the weather (showing level 4-6). I saw on the tdwr/itws that a gust front was coming off of that cell. I called the tower and told them they could depart 3 more on their 030 heading; then we were going to try to get on the 'back side' of the precipitation (070 heading so we could separate them from the [runway] 9L departures). Tower advised they had a regional jet that had a warm gear and would need to climbout with the gear down at 200 KTS; and that would be a good place to stop (he was 4th). I agreed to that. I couldn't keep turning more for a couple of reasons: the gust front was getting ready to hit the arrival side of the airport; and when the wind shear alarms went off; aircraft might go-around. There would be room for only one airplane; a departure or an arrival; but not both. That would've meant stopping one or the other; and airborne demand couldn't allow us to stop landing [runway] 8L. Had something like that happened; we would've had two very low airspeed aircraft performing evasive maneuvers. The only other option would've been to continue climbing in the downwind (see above for why this is a worse idea). There was still significant arrival demand coming in to the atl area from the northeast. In short; we'd have arrivals that [would] want to descend above departures wanting to climbout on the exact same heading. Not an option. We had a LJ45 departure off of pdk fly through the precipitation on the east side of the cell. He reported a 'very good ride; light rain'; which we clarified to 'light chop; light rain'. The first 070 heading came off atl; he wanted to turn right (with a 9L departure 1.5 miles off his wing). The dr-north departure obviously denied that and issued the PIREP he just received. He vectored him through what I agreed was a lighter area of the precip and reported moderate rain; light chop. That was our route now! The second departure [B757] came off and also required a right turn. Same thing; there was a [runway] 9L departure. He couldn't turn right. The dr-north controller issued the PIREP. He then tried to turn him north; and the pilot refused. I believe the controller asked the aircraft in front to confirm the PIREP; which he did. He again refused. I told the controller; after hearing the pilot refuse to descend him to 6;000 ft; I would coordinate with satellite. I did; and we agreed that 9;000 ft was more appropriate because it achieved the intended results. It got him out of the same altitude other aircraft were going to be at. Had we kept him at 10;000 ft; all the aircraft behind him were going to have to follow. That would've brought at least 3 other sectors into dealing with all the atl departures. Unacceptable. I stopped departures to see if it was an obstinate pilot; or real change to conditions. The answer came quickly. I released departures again with normal spacing (3 miles) because with one other exception; all of them reported exactly the same thing on the track we were using. Light to moderate precipitation; nothing worse than light chop (the one exception reported a single 'moderate bump'). I can live with that. With the B757 not out of the way of all the other departures; the decision of 'where to put him' started coming into play. He was out of the stream; and as far as I was concerned; he could stay out of it until an acceptable plan presented itself. The dr-north controller identified a regional jet flight going out the jckts departure as the likely candidate for him to fall in behind. I liked the plan because sincethe B757 was going out the rmbln; it provided good diverging courses and would get them out of the way quicker. The controller stepped him up; allowed the stream to climb above him; turned him west; climbed him; and sent him on course. There was an offer to send the B757 to gqo and have ZTL take care of the reroute. The controller declined the offer; and I believe it was the best move. Gqo was 70 miles north of his route. It would have got him higher; yes; but the plan was in motion and working; and I believe the aircraft flew less miles and arrived earlier because he was put back on his filed route rather than take him 70 miles out of the way. We saw the weather painted. We were getting continuous updates on the ride. The ride did not get worse. In fact; pilots that departed immediately behind the B757 and heard the whole thing were giving the controller 'nice job!' comments. All the vindication I need is in what happened after the B757. Every other crew went where the controller told them to. We have had issues with some crews assimilating themselves into the atl environment. This is a very high density area to fly in. We run a lot of airplanes in very narrow corridors. We don't always have the ability to keep an airplane dry; to climbout wherever they want; etc... This was one of those instances. When I reported the situation to the ops manager for the shift; he pulled up the replay on his equipment; watched it; and we talked about the handling of the B757. He asked the same questions I'm sure the pilot did; 'why didn't we stay on a 030 heading?' we discovered on the replay equipment that the weather had locked up and not updated- it still showed the heaviest 4-6 precipitation well northwest of atl. I pointed out that the arrival traffic was flying through the same area we were (with the same pireps being given to the tar-left controller; by the way). That was kind of odd. The fact remains there wasn't room for arrivals to descend and departures to climb in the downwind space available; even if it wasn't safe to not protect for possible go-arounds in the wind shear environment. You may see that on FAA replays. Keep that in mind and note the arrivals flying above where the departures are going. I'm very social when I fly on any carrier. I introduce myself to the cockpit crew; leave a couple business cards; and if time allows; chit chat with them. The one consistent thing they say is that atlanta TRACON does an incredible job moving airplanes; and there is one place in the system they will allow controllers to vector them into weather they think is iffy. Atlanta. The reason is because we get great PIREPS; they're timely; and they hear that on the frequency. The dr-north controller did that; and I guess we found a crew that didn't feel that way. That's ok. He came up with a plan-B that only affected the airplane that didn't do what they were told. Now; do I think the pilot felt 'penalized' by this? Absolutely! Who wouldn't. At 9;000 ft for 40 extra miles; listening to other aircraft climb and be switched to center; staring at TCAS and seeing the stream above you; getting vectored all around northwest georgia. Absolutely. Now; was he in fact penalized? Maybe; but I would argue it was completely self-inflicted and the controller doing what he did saved 20 airplanes from extra flying miles (not to mention a potential operational error with the aircraft behind him doing what he was told at the same altitude). I understand there may be an implication that the recent media events regarding 'just kidding' and 'captain happy' would make a controller want 'payback' on a crew. I can't speak for the controller's state of mind; but from my position; the media is wrong 99.9% of the time regarding aviation related stories. We know that the same as the pilot's who we work know it. We work in a professional; stressful environment. That stuff never enters my mind when I'm working airplanes. This individual isn't one I see being any different than myself. I fully support the controller's decision. I had supervisory functions on the wall; and I was monitoring and watching the situation from the same vantage point; practically in the chair with him. Had I not agreed with his plan; I would've let him know it. In fact; if I were [the chief pilot]; I would pull this pilot aside and ask him why he was so stubborn and refused to fly through an area where it was completely safe to fly through (via PIREPS). I had 20+ crews that flew where this controller told them to with consistent pireps of no more than light chop and rain. Then I have 1 crew that didn't and is upset he was taken out of the stream. What I've got here is a non-issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A80 Controller describes the consequences of refusing a vector through weather by a B757 Captain departing ATL; although PIREP's stated only light rain and chop on the vector.

Narrative: I was working CI-Departure (coordinator in charge of the departure wall) when a B757 departed. Weather was moving through the area. We had been off the RNAV departure tracks for some time. As the weather moved FROM the southeast; it kept moving the [Runway] 8R ATL departures more and more to the north. When we were on a 030 heading; I left it there as long as we could. Departures started telling my Departure North (DR-N) Controller they needed more of a turn to avoid the weather (showing level 4-6). I saw on the TDWR/ITWS that a gust front was coming off of that cell. I called the Tower and told them they could depart 3 more on their 030 heading; then we were going to try to get on the 'back side' of the precipitation (070 heading so we could separate them from the [Runway] 9L departures). Tower advised they had a regional jet that had a warm gear and would need to climbout with the gear down at 200 KTS; and that would be a good place to stop (he was 4th). I agreed to that. I couldn't keep turning more for a couple of reasons: The gust front was getting ready to hit the arrival side of the airport; and when the wind shear alarms went off; aircraft might go-around. There would be room for only one airplane; a departure or an arrival; but not both. That would've meant stopping one or the other; and airborne demand couldn't allow us to stop landing [Runway] 8L. Had something like that happened; we would've had two VERY low airspeed aircraft performing evasive maneuvers. The only other option would've been to continue climbing in the downwind (see above for why this is a worse idea). There was still significant arrival demand coming in to the ATL area from the northeast. In short; we'd have arrivals that [would] want to descend above departures wanting to climbout on the exact same heading. Not an option. We had a LJ45 departure off of PDK fly through the precipitation on the east side of the cell. He reported a 'VERY good ride; light rain'; which we clarified to 'light chop; light rain'. The first 070 heading came off ATL; he wanted to turn right (with a 9L departure 1.5 miles off his wing). The DR-N departure obviously denied that and issued the PIREP he just received. He vectored him through what I agreed was a lighter area of the precip and reported moderate rain; light chop. That was our route now! The second departure [B757] came off and also required a right turn. Same thing; there was a [Runway] 9L departure. He couldn't turn right. The DR-N Controller issued the PIREP. He then tried to turn him north; and the pilot refused. I believe the Controller asked the aircraft in front to confirm the PIREP; which he did. He again refused. I told the Controller; after hearing the pilot refuse to descend him to 6;000 FT; I would coordinate with Satellite. I did; and we agreed that 9;000 FT was more appropriate because it achieved the intended results. It got him OUT of the same altitude other aircraft were going to be at. Had we kept him at 10;000 FT; ALL the aircraft behind him were going to have to follow. That would've brought at least 3 other sectors into dealing with ALL the ATL departures. Unacceptable. I stopped departures to see if it was an obstinate pilot; or real change to conditions. The answer came quickly. I released departures again with normal spacing (3 miles) because with ONE other exception; ALL of them reported exactly the same thing on the track we were using. Light to moderate precipitation; nothing worse than light chop (the one exception reported a single 'moderate bump'). I can live with that. With the B757 not out of the way of all the other departures; the decision of 'where to put him' started coming into play. He was out of the stream; and as far as I was concerned; he could stay out of it until an acceptable plan presented itself. The DR-N Controller identified a Regional jet flight going out the JCKTS departure as the likely candidate for him to fall in behind. I liked the plan because sincethe B757 was going out the RMBLN; it provided good diverging courses and would get them out of the way quicker. The Controller stepped him up; allowed the stream to climb above him; turned him west; climbed him; and sent him on course. There was an offer to send the B757 to GQO and have ZTL take care of the reroute. The Controller declined the offer; and I believe it was the best move. GQO was 70 miles north of his route. It would have got him higher; yes; but the plan was in motion and working; and I believe the aircraft flew LESS miles and arrived earlier because he was put back on his filed route rather than take him 70 miles out of the way. We saw the weather painted. We were getting continuous updates on the ride. The ride did NOT get worse. In fact; pilots that departed immediately behind the B757 and heard the WHOLE THING were giving the Controller 'NICE JOB!' comments. All the vindication I need is in what happened after the B757. EVERY other crew went where the Controller told them to. We have had issues with some crews assimilating themselves into the ATL environment. This is a VERY high density area to fly in. We run a LOT of airplanes in VERY narrow corridors. We don't always have the ability to keep an airplane dry; to climbout wherever they want; etc... This was one of those instances. When I reported the situation to the Ops Manager for the shift; he pulled up the replay on his equipment; watched it; and we talked about the handling of the B757. He asked the same questions I'm sure the pilot did; 'why didn't we stay on a 030 heading?' We discovered on the replay equipment that the weather had LOCKED UP and not updated- it still showed the heaviest 4-6 precipitation well NW of ATL. I pointed out that the arrival traffic was flying through the same area we were (with the same PIREPs being given to the TAR-L Controller; by the way). That was kind of odd. The fact remains there wasn't room for arrivals to descend and departures to climb in the downwind space available; even if it wasn't safe to not protect for possible go-arounds in the wind shear environment. You may see that on FAA replays. Keep that in mind and note the arrivals flying above where the departures are going. I'm very social when I fly on any carrier. I introduce myself to the cockpit crew; leave a couple business cards; and if time allows; chit chat with them. The one consistent thing they say is that Atlanta TRACON does an incredible job moving airplanes; and there is one place in the system they will allow controllers to vector them into weather they think is iffy. Atlanta. The reason is because we get GREAT PIREPS; they're timely; and they hear that on the frequency. The DR-N Controller did that; and I guess we found a crew that didn't feel that way. That's OK. He came up with a Plan-B that ONLY AFFECTED THE AIRPLANE THAT DIDN'T DO WHAT THEY WERE TOLD. Now; Do I think the pilot felt 'penalized' by this? Absolutely! Who wouldn't. At 9;000 FT for 40 extra miles; listening to other aircraft climb and be switched to Center; staring at TCAS and seeing the stream above you; getting vectored all around northwest Georgia. Absolutely. Now; was he in fact penalized? Maybe; but I would argue it was completely SELF-INFLICTED and the Controller doing what he did saved 20 airplanes from extra flying miles (not to mention a potential operational error with the aircraft behind him doing what he was told at the same altitude). I understand there may be an implication that the recent media events regarding 'Just Kidding' and 'Captain Happy' would make a controller want 'payback' on a crew. I can't speak for the Controller's state of mind; but from my position; the media is wrong 99.9% of the time regarding aviation related stories. We know that the same as the pilot's who we work know it. We work in a professional; stressful environment. That stuff NEVER enters my mind when I'm working airplanes. This individual isn't one I see being any different than myself. I FULLY support the Controller's decision. I had supervisory functions on the wall; and I was monitoring and watching the situation from the same vantage point; practically in the chair with him. Had I not agreed with his plan; I would've let him know it. In fact; if I were [the chief pilot]; I would pull this pilot aside and ask him why he was so stubborn and refused to fly through an area where it was completely safe to fly through (via PIREPS). I had 20+ crews that flew where this Controller told them to with consistent PIREPs of no more than light chop and rain. Then I have 1 crew that didn't and is upset he was taken out of the stream. What I've got here is a non-issue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.