Md-11 first officer describes an unstabilized approach; due to a late start down and late configurat...

Narrative:

Captain was pilot flying and was late configuring the aircraft in the approach; as well as high on the approach. The aircraft was stable precisely at 500 feet; not before. The captain understood at approximately 5;000 feet he was high and put the gear out as the first drag/flight control device. At the outer marker (1;800); he had gear down and flaps 15; as well as fast. I prompted twice if he wanted flaps 28; he looked directly at me and said; 'no not yet;' speed was well within flaps 28 range. It was around 1;000 feet we went to flaps 28; and under 1;000 we went to final flaps 35. However; we were still high on glideslope. At 500 feet I believe we had all parameters stable...glideslope 1/2 dot high. We remained a 1/2 dot high until 50 feet; then went one dot high; landed long just prior to the 3;000 foot marker. It was so busy in the final segment; I am not sure if I asked for or received a landing clearance. I did not realize this until I was driving home; some 5-6 hours later. This was the first night of hotel standby. We went on duty for standby at midnight local time and received a call for flight at approximately xa:00 am local time. I went to bed at approximately xr:30 local time the night before; felt fairly well rested. I am unsure of when captain went to bed. However; the captain said he was tired. The flight departure time was xc:23 local. The event was caused by late getting down from top of descent; and the approach. As well as late configuring the aircraft for landing; causing distraction in the cockpit. The final landing checklist was late in the approach; which may or may not have caused me to miss not calling the tower. I could have been more proactive earlier in the arrival to let the pilot flying know I was concerned he was not getting down. I tried to make the pilot flying aware he was high and fast; not configured; but he seemed overloaded and not listening. In the debrief his only comment was I was 'badgering' him. We discussed in the debrief that we had poor crew communication and coordination and would try harder next time. We discussed the value of being stable earlier and that the company was looking to move the stable corridor back to 1;000 feet for VMC. Lesson learned is be conservative and get down earlier; configured; and stable much earlier than the minimum requirements.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 First Officer describes an unstabilized approach; due to a late start down and late configuration by the flying Captain; that may have met stabilized criteria at 500 feet.

Narrative: Captain was pilot flying and was late configuring the aircraft in the approach; as well as high on the approach. The aircraft was stable precisely at 500 feet; not before. The Captain understood at approximately 5;000 feet he was high and put the gear out as the first drag/flight control device. At the outer marker (1;800); he had gear down and flaps 15; as well as fast. I prompted twice if he wanted flaps 28; he looked directly at me and said; 'No not yet;' speed was well within flaps 28 range. It was around 1;000 feet we went to flaps 28; and under 1;000 we went to final flaps 35. However; we were still high on glideslope. At 500 feet I believe we had all parameters stable...glideslope 1/2 dot high. We remained a 1/2 dot high until 50 feet; then went one dot high; landed long just prior to the 3;000 foot marker. It was so busy in the final segment; I am not sure if I asked for or received a landing clearance. I did not realize this until I was driving home; some 5-6 hours later. This was the first night of hotel standby. We went on duty for standby at midnight local time and received a call for flight at approximately XA:00 am local time. I went to bed at approximately XR:30 local time the night before; felt fairly well rested. I am unsure of when Captain went to bed. However; the Captain said he was tired. The flight departure time was XC:23 local. The event was caused by late getting down from top of descent; and the approach. As well as late configuring the aircraft for landing; causing distraction in the cockpit. The final landing checklist was late in the approach; which may or may not have caused me to miss not calling the Tower. I could have been more proactive earlier in the arrival to let the pilot flying know I was concerned he was not getting down. I tried to make the pilot flying aware he was high and fast; not configured; but he seemed overloaded and not listening. In the debrief his only comment was I was 'badgering' him. We discussed in the debrief that we had poor crew communication and coordination and would try harder next time. We discussed the value of being stable earlier and that the company was looking to move the stable corridor back to 1;000 feet for VMC. Lesson learned is be conservative and get down earlier; configured; and stable much earlier than the minimum requirements.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1197233
Time
Date	201408
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Initial Approach
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	First Officer Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Landing Without Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Md-11 first officer describes an unstabilized approach; due to a late start down and late configuration by the flying captain; that may have met stabilized criteria at 500 feet.